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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation has concentrated on a study of a particular class of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and multinational firms (MNFs), that of services and 
supermarket firms. This focus contrasts sharply with most previous works on FDI, 
which have concentrated on manufacturing FDI and manufacturing firms. While the 
empirical works on FDI have also typically used aggregated data in conjunction with 
econometric methods to establish statistically significant determinants, this dissertation 
in addition has looked more deeply at micro economic analysis. This dissertation is also 
different from previous works because it has considered FDI from various perspectives, 
including not only from the well-known perspective of the FDI theory but also from a 
firm specific approach of vertical integration and regulation. In contrast to the macro and 
aggregative results of the FDI approach the results stemming from the micro 
methodology are disaggregated and firm specific. 
The key feature of the aggregate FDI approach taken here is a service- 
manufacturing distinction. Based on that distinction it is shown that there is a difference 
in the magnitude of the variables (relative to their standard errors) between services and 
manufacturing FDI in Malaysia and also for the UK. These results, which are 
established and explored in Chapter Five, suggest that at a macro level there is a service 
related result quite different from the manufacturing case for any government seeking to 
attract services as well as manufacturing FDI. One of the key variables to the services 
manufacturing distinction is the openness variable and this variable is also central in the 
context of regulation. 
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This dissertation has also looked at vertical integration analysis because MNFs 
and firms in the supermarket activity are vertically integrated or coordinated 
corporations spanning services as well as manufacturing related activities. In this context 
this dissertation has expanded on the earlier work on vertical integration by Hasan and 
Ryan (2003) and has also given a multinational dimension to that analysis. It has looked 
at the factors affecting the degree of integration or coordination between retailers and 
suppliers and ways in which a relative advantage in productivity may relate to a 
difference in the transfer price. Additionally it comprehends the distributional impact on 
profits, suppliers, workers and consumers. It is argued that in the multinational 
interpretations a net welfare gain to the host nation may only accrue to its consumers 
because profits of the MNFs may be taken out of the country and inputs may be 
outsourced, benefiting suppliers or workers from different nations instead of the host 
country. 
The micro economic approach has also looked at regulation mechanisms and 
ways in which the rate of entry of FDI and the MNFs may be regulated. In this context 
the openness variable, which is a standard and statistically significant variable in 
aggregate econometric approaches, is also a key variable in the micro regulation model, 
where it has a wider application including not only to tariffs on imports and exports but 
also on the rate of profits. In general the regulation model has shown how variations in 
the magnitude of taxes on the profits of MNFs may have an impact not only on the rate 
and magnitude of entry of FDI but also on the type of FDI (manufacturing or services) 
that is encouraged or discouraged by a host government. In a more specific analysis, the 
model has also looked at how market structures as well as the level of integration or 
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disintegration may be affected by varying the level of taxes and subsidies on the inputs. 
These outcomes on vertical integration and regulation, together with the macro 
aggregate results, may have implications both for theory and for policy, as well as for 
the way host government may manipulate these aspects. 
From the theoretical context this dissertation has made contributions to the study 
on FDI and the MNFs where the analysis has looked at both macro and the micro 
methodology. The macro analysis has looked at the services-manufacturing distinction, 
whereas in the disaggregated methodology services and manufacturing may be 
systematically integrated or coordinated and the services-manufacturing distinction is 
harder to draw. 
With regard to policy, this dissertation has looked at the implications for the 
determinants affecting FDI entry, the multinational interpretations on vertical integration 
as well as its distributional impact, and also regulation mechanisms. It was shown how 
results on the impact of regulating taxes and subsidies which may shape industrial 
structure leading to integration or disintegration may be crucial. In general the policy is 
to encourage the entry of FDI and the MNFs but with some trade-offs as these firms may 
drive out local firms. Finally the competition policy in Malaysia is not well developed 
and therefore not comparable or analogous to the more developed competition policy of 
the EU and the UK. Therefore there are good grounds for Malaysia to examine the well 
developed competition policy of these countries, as useful lessons could be drawn from 
the EU and the UK in particular, where the emphasis might be different. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background of the Dissertation 
This dissertation stems from my interests in regulatory policy on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and multinational firms (MNFs) in the services sector with 
particular reference to supermarket firms. Currently most literature and empirical 
studies on FDI and MNFs concentrate on the manufacturing sector and there is a lack 
of studies involving firms in services. This is in sharp contrast to the fact that the 
inflows of FDI and entry of MNFs in the services sector have become bigger and 
greater than those in the manufacturing sector' (UNCTAD, 2003). 
The entry of multinational supermarket firms into developing economies is a 
particular example of services related FDI. It is also a new phenomenon in FDI 
inflows that has brought structural changes and retail transformation inflicting radical 
change not only on traditional and small traders but also on local supermarket firms 
in the host country. These MNFs have made their presence felt through new 
techniques in organizing production activities, supply chain management and 
marketing where these technologies seem superior to existing techniques of domestic 
firms and as a result, they are able to gain market power and a dominant position vis- 
ä-vis domestic firms. 
1 On average, services FDI accounted for about two-thirds of total FDI inflows over the period 2000- 
2002. 
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Given the spread and scale of operation of the multinational supermarket 
firms, not only does this dissertation seem a path breaking effort in this area of 
research but also, the theoretical and analytical analysis, which this dissertation may 
contribute, seems timely. To my knowledge there are no previous studies that have 
looked at multinational supermarket firms which are vertically integrated 
multinationals spanning both manufacturing and services within the context of FDI 
and entry. Because the entry of multinational supermarket firms is of current and 
pressing concern to the government of Malaysia, this dissertation is timely, too, from 
a policy making perspective because it involves a variety of issues other than FDI, 
which have not been looked before. 
1.1 Methodology 
This dissertation will look at services FDI and in particular multinational 
supermarket firms from three approaches. Firstly, services FDI will be analysed from 
the perspective of the FDI literature, looking at both the theory and the empirical 
studies on the entry of FDI into the host country. In particular the purpose of the 
literature review and the empirical studies will be to identify econometrically the 
manufacturing-services distinction within the context of the FDI theory and 
multinational firms. In that context, two separate regressions on an aggregate FDI 
model of services and manufacturing FDI into the host country will be developed 
against some macro economic variables. One of the key variables to be included is 
particularly an openness variable reflecting the policy of the host country and 
measured by its imports plus exports to GDP. Time series FDI annual data from 
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Malaysia and the UK2 will be tested using regression techniques. The empirical 
results obtained from the two regressions will establish the manufacturing services 
distinction at an aggregate level. 
The-results from the aggregated approach suggest a strong case for 
disaggregation and a micro approach. This is especially the case since associated 
policy implications are arguably significantly microeconomic in character. In that 
context, recognising that MNFs are vertically integrated or coordinated structures 
spanning both services and manufacturing related activities, this dissertation will 
look actively at vertical integration. This is a micro methodology that will look at the 
lack of treatment of vertical integration with reference to MNFs in the FDI literature. 
This is the second approach that will draw upon a formal proof of the well known 
double marginalization results of vertical integration contained in Hasan and Ryan 
(2003) but from the context of multinational interpretations with extensions on 
quality, efficiency and the endogeneity of the transfer price in `make or buy' 
decisions. The results from the stylised facts are intuitive but useful conclusions 
could be drawn from the interpretations, with potential applications to supermarket 
firms. In addition, this dissertation will also examine the distributional impact of 
vertical integration with respect to profits, suppliers, workers and consumers and in 
the multinational interpretations it will be shown that the benefits may accrue to 
different nations and the net welfare gains to the host nation may not be significant. 
The third approach is to look at regulation in the context of entry of MNFs 
and also with potential applications to multinational supermarket firms. This will 
Z The UK is used as a comparator because it has long time series data. 
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relate back to the manufacturing-services distinction on the openness variable (in the 
econometric work) that may suggest a potential link to regulation of the host country. 
Regulatory parameters such as taxes and subsidies may have an impact on market 
structures leading to integration or disintegration and `make or buy' decisions and 
also optimal ways in which entry may be regulated. The results stemming from the 
macro and micro analysis may lead to some theory and policy implications in general 
and in country specific ways. 
L2-; Theoretical Framework 
The macro approach, which is relevant to study the entry of FDI and MNFs, 
is the FDI theory that was pioneered by the late Stephen Hymer (1960). Before this 
the most prevailing explanation of FDI was the neo-classical theory, namely, the 
Theory of International Capital Movements. Under an assumption that capital moves 
in response to changes in interests rates or profits differentials, each investor 
maximises his profits by investing where returns are highest. However, this 
investment theoretic approach of interest rate differentials could not explain the cross 
movements of capital between two countries, or in other words, why capital moves in 
two directions, even though interest rate may be higher in the other country. The 
neoclassical approach also neglected to recognise the role of MNFs and of market 
imperfections. 
FDI theory, instead, argued that in order to analyse FDI, one must also 
analyse MNFs. Hymer focused his attention on the MNFs as the institution for 
international production and moved towards an analysis of the MNFs based upon 
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industrial organisation theory. All other contributions to FDI literature (see for 
example, Vernon, 1966, Williamson, 1975, Buckley and Casson, 1976 and Dunning, 
1981,1991,1993) can be seen as an extension of Hymer's initial work because each 
theory is a result of an economist finding the previous theory lacking in some aspects. 
The best example of this is the work of Dunning (1991) who combined all other 
previous works and come out with the `OLI paradigm' (Ownership, Locational and 
Internalisation paradigm). 
However, as mentioned earlier, the literature on FDI and MNFs related to the 
various strands of the FDI theories focused on firms in the manufacturing sector, 
even though Dunning (1993) and UNCTAD (1998 and 2003) acknowledged that FDI 
in services is the fastest growing component of MNFs activities. This raises 
questions as to whether the FDI theory is adequate in explaining the 
internationalisation of service firms (including supermarkets). In this context authors 
such as Boddewyn et al. (1986) and Li and Guisinger (1992) have examined and 
investigated the applicability of the MNFs-FDI theory to service firms and concluded 
that the theory could be extended to explain the internationalisation of service firms 
as well. 
With regard to empirical works carried out to study the determinants of entry 
of FDI and MNFs, most were also on manufacturing FDI (see for example 
Chakrabarti, 2001, Billington, 1999, Culem, 1998, Govindan, 1997, Beer and Cory, 
1996, Lim, 1993 and Tsai, 1991). The only work so far that was related to FDI in 
services (including retail firms) was by Li and Guisinger (1992). These authors 
argued that FDI and MNFs are attracted to the demand side variables of the host 
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country, which include market size (GNP/GDP/Per Capita Income), wages, openness, 
interest rates, government policy, infrastructure, inflation, etc. The emphasis here is 
on the openness variable which is arguably a policy variable and which is central to 
the macro and also the micro approach, which relates to issues involving regulation 
and integration. Based on past empirical studies, equally important is the variable of 
market size of the host country, especially for market seeking types of FDI such as 
supermarket firms. These firms may be attracted to a large market and a fast 
growing economy. The empirical studies on FDI are basically sectoral and also 
aggregative rather than firm specific and micro. 
The micro approach which is identified in the methodology is the literature 
on vertical integration. There is a substantial and well-known work on this topic 
stemming from an earlier framework by Coase (1937) and advanced by Williamson 
(1971). Since then, the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of vertical 
integration has been ongoing. Authors on this topic include Spengler (1950), Arrow 
(1975), Clarke (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), Perry (1986), Hamilton and 
Mqasqas (1996), and Baumol (2001). Given that the emphasis in this dissertation is 
on supermarket firms, there is also a specialised literature arguing the benefits of 
vertical integration in the food supply chain where some well known authors on this 
topic include Etgar (1978), Perry (1989), Martin (1994) and Dobson and Waterson 
(1996). More generally these authors have argued that supermarket firms may 
integrate in order to obtain market power and a monopoly position. 
Within these theoretical contexts the general phenomena pertaining to vertical 
integration were explicitly modelled by Hasan and Ryan (2003). They have 
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developed a stylised model of vertical integration with applications to the 
supermarket activity. The model has provided a formal proof of the well known 
results of the double dividend arguments and also an extension incorporating 
conditions of quality, efficiency and the `make or buy' decisions. This dissertation 
will revisit the work of Hasan and Ryan but with further extensions not examined by 
them, where the focus will be on multinational interpretations. 
The micro analysis in turn will lead to an extension on regulation, 
acknowledging that regulatory issues are an essential part of government policy. The 
analysis may again refer to the openness variable which is a key variable in the 
services-manufacturing distinction that was developed in this dissertation (Chapter 
Five) which has a significant role in the regulatory context. The regulation 
mechanism developed in this dissertation is another variant that may be contrasted 
with the existing regulatory practices of Malaysia. 
The explicit regulatory mechanism which will be developed in this 
dissertation may make contact with the implicit regulatory idea of the contestability 
theory advanced by Baumol et al. (1982) and more specifically the contestability 
extension of Ryan (2000) which is in fact a refinement of the contestability idea. In 
the extension provided by Ryan, the regulators may vary the regulatory conditions to 
make the market more contestable for entry where this may be termed as regulated 
contestability. Ryan also distinguished between physical and financial contestability 
and between market and industrial contestability where each of these distinctions 
may refer to the conditions of entry and exit. 
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1.3 Organisation of the Dissertation 
The organisation of this dissertation is structured into eight chapters. After 
this introductory chapter, the next two chapters will give an overview on the 
regulation practices of Malaysia (developing) and UK (developed) and the industry 
structure, entry of the MNFs and market concentration of the retail and supermarket 
sector in Malaysia. Subsequently after these background analyses, the following four 
chapters, which are the crux of the dissertation, focus successively on FDI, the 
services-manufacturing distinction, vertical integration and regulation. The final 
chapter will conclude this dissertation with some implications for theory and policy. 
Prior to the core chapters and to provide further motivation for the focus on 
regulation and on supermarkets in this dissertation, Chapter Two will discuss 
government intervention and regulatory policy on FDI in Malaysia, focussing on the 
practices of a particular class of service firms, that is, the supermarket sector. A 
contrast between the regulatory practices of Malaysia and the UK is the main 
contribution of this chapter. It points out that Malaysia's competition policy is 
limited in scope, in contrast to the well developed regulatory framework of the UK. 
It also explains that Malaysia, like some other developing countries, has an 
idiosyncratic policy of imposing equity limits on foreign firms operating in its retail 
sector, whereas there is no such restriction in developed countries, such as the UK. 
The restrictive FDI policies in the retail sector in Malaysia are pursued in the context 
of encouraging the development of Bumiputera firms, as well as to encourage joint- 
ventures between local and foreign firms with a view to technology transfer. Under 
this policy, foreign firms operating in the retail and supermarket sector in Malaysia 
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are only permitted to hold 51.0 per cent equity with the balance of 49.0 per cent for 
Malaysians, including at least 30.0 per cent for the Bumiputera ethnic group. 
Within the regulatory framework, Chapter Three will assess the importance 
of the retail sector's contribution to the economy of Malaysia and that of developed 
economies such as the UK. The main focus in this chapter will be on the entry of 
multinational supermarket firms and its impact on market structure and concentration 
in Malaysia vis-ä-vis the UK. It shows that a concentrated market is more likely to 
be a barrier to entry for supermarkets in the UK rather than government intervention, 
as in the case of Malaysia, which now hosts several multinational supermarket firms. 
r Ater Four analyses the theoretical literature on FDI and points out that 
there are several variants of the FDI Theory, each of which is an improvement on the 
previous one. It is also argued that these variants are about manufacturing FDI and 
hence there is a need to look at the relevance of the FDI theory in explaining services 
FDI. The related discussions lead into a critique of the FDI literature, which is the 
main output of this chapter. / 
After reviewing the FDI theory, the services-manufacturing distinction of 
FDI into the host country will be discussed in Chapter Five. This will lead to the 
development of an aggregate model of FDI against several macroeconomic variables 
including market size, growth rate, inflation, interest rates, exchange rates, and also a 
variable on openness. The empirical results show quite different response to country 
specific locational determinants and one major result is the distinction between 
services and manufacturing FDI. In this context the openness variable is distinctive, 
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not only in the FDI model but also in the context of regulation which will be 
discussed in Chapter Seven. 
The results from the econometric methodology are aggregative and macro in 
analysis and these need to be complemented with an analysis looking at micro and 
firm specific approaches. Recognising that the MNFs and especially supermarket 
firms are vertically integrated or coordinated structures, Chapter Six will look at 
vertical integration, including not only the well known double marginalisation 
arguments, but also multinational interpretations incorporating quality, efficiency 
and `make or buy' decisions. The next significant contribution of this chapter will be 
on the distributional impact stemming from the impact of vertical integration on 
collective profits, suppliers, workers and consumers. This dissertation argues that in 
the multinational context, the distributional gains may benefit other nations and not 
only be confined to the host country, because profits may be repatriated and suppliers 
may be from other countries. 
Since the inflow of FDI and the rate of entry of the MNFs into the host 
country may be of policy concern to the host government, attention in Chapter Seven 
will be directed to regulation mechanisms. In this context the openness variable 
which is significant in the services-manufacturing distinction will also play a central 
role here. Chapter Seven will examine how the regulatory environment, such as 
raising or lowering the `openness level' on taxes, tariffs or subsidies, may not only 
affect entry and market structures but will also change the `make or buy' decisions. 
In fact, as Chapter Seven discovers, the openness variable may be used to 
discriminate between big foreign firms and small inefficient firms. In addition, this 
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chapter makes links to the implicit regulatory idea of the contestable market theory 
and in particular to the idea of regulated contestability. 
Finally, Chapter Eight concludes with a summary of the key results, together 
with some implications for theory and policy. Some of the main results are that there 
is a service-manufacturing distinction, with key determinants different in services in 
contrast to manufacturing; that services and manufacturing are systematically 
integrated and the impact of regulation on entry of FDI and industry structure. In 
terms of the theory implications, this dissertation has looked at FDI not only from the 
perspective of FDI theory but also in relation to vertical integration and regulation. 
There is a strong argument for disaggregation, not only because the determinants of 
FDI are different for services and manufacturing but because MNFs in services and 
manufacturing are argued to be systematically integrated, which the FDI theory has 
not looked at. The different but systematically interrelated approaches taken in this 
dissertation have strengthened the analysis on FDI and MNFs in the context of 
understanding multinational supermarket firms. In terms of the policy aspects, on the 
other hand, it has looked in general and also in the context of Malaysia, to the 
implications on government intervention, on the entry of FDI and the multinational 
supermarket firms, on vertical integration and distributional impact and also on 
regulation related issues. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND REGULATION 
IN THE RETAIL AND SUPERMARKET SECTOR 
2.0 Introduction 
The entry of foreign multinational supermarket firms into the Malaysian retail 
market is subjected to regulation and control. This policy is distinctive among the 
developing countries where certain sectors are highly protected and are meant for the 
locals. This chapter will examine the type of intervention in the retail sector and the 
regulation and control the Malaysian government imposed on firms operating 
especially in the supermarket activity. 
Section 2.1, of this chapter will be divided into two parts. Part one (2.1.1) 
will begin with the analysis of the various regulatory acts implemented by the 
Malaysian government in the retail sector, whereas part two (2.1.2) will discuss the 
interventionist administrative policy imposed on foreign multinational supermarket 
firms operating in the supermarket activity in Malaysia. The most distinctive policy 
is the equity regulation on foreign firms as a tool for protecting local entrepreneurs 
and also as a means of income distribution favouring the Bumiputera (Malay) group. 
Section 2.2 will look at the regulatory policies of other neighbouring developing 
countries. An important contribution of this chapter is in Section 2.3, where a 
contrast is made between the competition policy of the UK and the regulatory policy 
in Malaysia. In this context it will look at the links of the two regulatory mechanisms 
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to efficiency and innovation, which are not reflected in the regulatory practice in 
Malaysia. The concluding Section 2.4 will summarise the discussions and note that a 
policy that has links to innovation, efficiency and productivity is superior to any 
other regulatory policy without such linkages. 
2.1 Intervention in the Retail Sector 
Government intervention in general and regulation in particular are quite 
pervasive in the Malaysian economy, especially in the retail trade sector. According 
to Ariff (1991) much of the regulation and intervention revolves around the New 
Economic Policy (NEP, 1971-1990)3, aimed at eradicating poverty and restructuring 
of society, so that the pattern of employment, ownership and control in the economy 
will reflect the racial composition of the country. Therefore the main prong of the 
NEP is to redistribute income among the major ethnic groups in Malaysia, 
particularly favouring the Bumiputera. However, there have been some efforts since 
1985 to deregulate and decontrol the economy on an ad hoc or piecemeal basis. 
One would expect that with a large number of entries and exits, the retail 
sector is, in most cases, a sector in which there are few regulations on entry. But the 
fact is, this sector is often subjected to numerous regulations and one in which 
government interventions have been perverse. Pilat (1997) states that the main 
restrictions relate to requirements for setting up and opening a business, which 
3 The NEP (1971-1990) was formulated with the long-term objective of achieving national unity 
through two-pronged development strategies. The first prong is to reduce and eventually eradicate 
poverty by raising the income levels and increasing employment opportunities and the second prong 
aims at accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct the economic imbalance 
between ethnic groups in Malaysia (Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985). 
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include entry formalities (trade register), regulations on the establishment, extension 
and location of commercial premises, regulations on specific operations, opening 
hours, price controls and impediments to the establishment of large outlets. Most of 
these regulations, such as trade register4 are regarded as `formalities', and will not 
affect the market mechanism so much as price controls and the establishment of large 
outlets (economies of scale) have done. 
Regulatory controls in the retail-trading sector in Malaysia are of two 
different kinds, legislative and administrative intervention. While legislative controls 
are in the form of Acts passed by the Malaysian Parliament, the administrative 
interventions are in the form of policy decisions passed by the Cabinet. 
2.1.1 Legislative Acts 
The government intervenes in many markets, even in markets that are highly 
competitive, such as the retail sector. This intervention can take a number of forms. 
One of them is legislative controls aimed to protect consumers and to ensure ethical 
business conduct. In other words, these are public interest regulation and private 
interest regulation (Marsden and Wrigley, 1996). These two forms of regulatory 
frameworks will naturally collide with one another as they are basically protecting 
the interests of different groups in relation to one public good, especially in the food 
sector. Therefore, in a system of public interest regulation, the state has some direct 
involvement and is normally claimed to be the guardian of public welfare. To 
protect consumers against undue practices of retailers and to ensure ethical business 
4 In most OECD countries trade register is not a requirement for operating a business. 
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conduct, substantial legislation, has been enacted by the Malaysian government. 
These laws on domestic commerce include several Acts5, which are under the 
jurisdiction of The Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Malaysia 
(MDTCA) as follows: 
i. Price Control Act 1946; 
ii. Control of Supplies Act 1961; 
iii. Weights and Measures Act 1972; 
iv. Trade Description Act 1972; 
v. Direct Sales Act 1993; and 
vi. Consumer Protection Act 1999. 
A major instrument in ensuring an ethical business practice which will also 
help in protecting consumer welfare in Malaysia is The Price Control Act 1946 and 
the Control of Supplies Act 1961. The Price Control Act 19466 together with the 
subsidiary legislations made under it are used to fix a reasonable price of goods at 
any condition and at the same time to give equal opportunities to consumers to obtain 
basic information before any decision to buy the goods is being made. The Control 
of Supplies Act 1961 empowers the controller to determine the supplies of essential 
goods are easily available at a reasonable price in any situation. This Act also 
provides the MDTCA with the power to control the supply, importation, distribution 
and marketing of essential goods and the essential power to ration the supply. Under 
this Act, seven food items are controlled at all times while 24 food items are 
5 There are other acts which protect consumer interests which are enforced by MDTCA and also by 
other ministries. 
6 Similar to the Resale Prices Act 1976 of the UK. 
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controlled only during festive seasons (Appendix 2.1). The main objective is to 
protect consumers against unscrupulous traders that will tend to increase prices and 
hoard essential goods that are required during the festive periods. These two acts are 
therefore the `government's arm' in its efforts to enforce good business practices 
against anti-competitive conduct. 
Instead of depending on market forces of supply and demand, the two acts are 
also a mechanism to control inflation and to keep prices in the food industry low in 
order to help and protect the welfare of the public. According to Carlton and Perloff 
(1990), this kind of price control measure has an income distribution effect. The 
literature on price control measures (see for example Jervis, 1949) explains that there 
are several principal reasons for government to control the prices of food items. 
These are to protect sellers and buyers of the commodity, to fix a "just" price 
(presumably to be the equilibrium price based on demand and supply), to improve 
the market mechanism-especially when price signalling fails, to protect certain 
classes of the community, to alter the commodity on the market and lastly to reward 
political supporters. In this regard Pickering (1974) states that the price determined 
by the regulatory mechanism is termed as a `just price' between consumers and 
producers or retailers. However, such regulation, according to Hay and Morris 
(1993), could never equal or replicate the optimality conditions associated with 
perfect conditions which are minimum cost of production, price equal marginal cost, 
zero supernormal profits and no unfulfilled demand at the price set. Therefore only 
minimum regulatory condition is required if firms are competitive and markets are 
contestable. Even then, the regulations are aimed at safeguarding the competitive 
process. 
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In the above context there are several ways in which prices may be 
controlled. Stead et al. (1996) have listed some measures which include the setting 
of maximum and minimum prices based on cost and margins, taxation, subsidies and 
control of supplies or sales. With regard to price setting, the case of the poultry 
industry of Malaysia is a good example, where the maximum farm-gate price of 
poultry and the retail price of chicken were set by the Government, under the Control 
of Supplies Act, 1961. Another food item where government control is pervasive is 
rice. At the farm level, the government sets minimum prices of paddy to protect 
producers income from falling, while at the market level, the government sets 
maximum prices of rice from rising above a certain level to protect consumers' 
welfare. Since rice is the staple food in Malaysia, the government has to ensure that 
the prices are within the income of the public. In that context the rice market is 
divided into three categories, namely, standard grade, premium grade and super 
grade. A price ceiling (maximum price) is set for the standard grade rice, to ensure 
the population, especially the lower income group, has access to cheap rice within 
their means, while the prices of premium and super grade rice are left to be 
determined by market forces. This policy is not uncommon because according to 
Stead et al. (1996) many developing countries pursue a policy of price control on 
basic foodstuffs in order to protect the country's poor. 
Supermarkets in Malaysia hardly sell the lower (standard) grade rice and may 
only stock a small quantity of high quality packed rice (Bucklin, 1986). Their 
abandonment of the rice market to the independent rice dealer is due to government 
regulation, where rice is a controlled item under the Control of Supplies Act 1961. 
According to Bucklin, this is because the gross margin of about 6.0 per cent obtained 
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from selling rice is not attractive to the supermarkets. However in some OECD 
countries such as Belgium, Iceland, Mexico and Turkey, price controls on certain 
food products are sometimes implemented in response to specific situations. 
The effect of setting maximum prices below the equilibrium prices as a 
means of keeping prices down for the consumers will result in shortages and will 
lead to a black market. In contrast, the effect of setting a minimum price (a price 
floor) above the equilibrium price will lead to a surplus and may also encourage 
smuggling as a means of obtaining similar goods (where prices are lower) from a 
neighbouring country. 
One significant development where the Malaysian government has 
undertaken to ensure consumer protection and to safeguard consumer interests was 
the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act in 1999. As provided for in the Act, 
the Consumers Claims Tribunal and the National Consumer Advisory Council were 
established in November 1999 and April 2000 respectively. The basic aim of the 
Consumer Claims Tribunal was to preside on and expedite the settlement of claims. 
The National Consumer Advisory Council, on the other hand, was to advise the 
Government on consumer issues, as well as promotion of consumer protection and 
awareness. 
2.1.2 Administrative Policy 
The second kind of intervention in the Malaysian retailing sector is with 
regard to the equity ownership of the retail firm and guidelines on the operations of 
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the supermarket activity. The Malaysian Government regulation in the ownership of 
firms can be traced as far back as 1974, when the then Prime Minister announced the 
Guidelines for the Regulation of Acquisition of Assets, Mergers and Take-Overs of 
Companies and Businesses along the lines of the NEP. It is important to note that the 
rationale of these guidelines had no links to economic efficiency but was rather for 
the pursuit of socio-economic objectives of income distribution and the restructuring 
of society. Understandably, in 1970, about 63.0 per cent of the share capitals of 
limited companies were foreign-owned. The Bumiputera owned less than 1.0 per 
cent, public trust agencies 1.6 per cent and the balance (34.4 per cent) were held by 
non-Bumiputera, of which the majority was held by the Chinese (Foreign Investment 
Committee, 1999). According to Hasan (1980), the underlying causes for the 
imbalances in the ownership of assets were the open character of the Malaysian 
economy and its historical development on the basis of exploiting natural resources 
for export, which led to substantial foreign ownership of the economy. This 
ownership policy is one of the main prongs of the NEP, the objective of which is to 
restructure the Malaysian society so that the identification of race with economic 
function is reduced and eventually eliminated7. 
Through the NEP, wealth distribution was equitably set at 30.0 per cent for 
the Bumiputera, 40.0 per cent for non-Bumiputera and 30.0 per cent for foreign 
equity. This was the overall target to be achieved by 1990. The result of this policy 
action substantially increased the percentage share holding of the Bumiputera in the 
retail business, from 4.2 per cent in 1975 to 32.3 percent in the 1990, an increase of 
' Government of Malaysia, Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, (p. 7), Kuala Lumpur. 
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670.0 per cent. According to Ariff (1991) the NEP has resulted in huge economic 
rents accruing to the Bumiputera group. 
The implementation of the equity policy is through administrative controls, 
such that foreign firms are required to seek the approval of the Foreign Investment 
Committee (FIC) for any transactions which lead to 15.0 per cent ownership or more 
of the voting power in a Malaysian company and businesses or transactions 
exceeding in value of the sum of RM5.0 million. However in certain sectors such as 
the supermarket business, foreign interests are allowed to hold up to 51.0 per cent 
equity where the balance (49.0 per cent) is to be held by Malaysian and at least 30.0 
per cent is to be held by Bumiputera. Some foreign supermarket firms may enter the 
Malaysian market without a local partner. A grace period of five years will be given 
to these foreign firms to seek local partners and in the event of their failing to find 
suitable partners, appeals to extend the grace period may be allowed where proofs of 
failed negotiations are required. The process of identification and matching with 
suitable local partners is slow and has often ended up in failure. This has had 
repercussions on the business activity of the foreign firms, since work permits for the 
foreign personals will not be extended and proposals for further expansion of 
business activity, such as the opening of additional stores, will be held back. The 
entry of the multinational supermarket firms will be discussed further in Chapter 
Three. As an example, the entry of the UK supermarket chain, Tesco, into the 
Malaysian retail sector was well conceived. Prior to entry, Tesco had already 
identified its local partner, a diversified Malaysian public listed company more 
involved in plantation and properties than anything to do with supermarket activity. 
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With regard to the administrative policy, Thomas (1982), states that 
government policy intervention into the affairs of multinational corporations in 
developing countries is in two aspects: partial equity ownership and through 
requirements for increasing the domestic value-added and employing host country 
nationals. His study reveals that a company's size and its strategic importance to the 
host economy were positively related to intervention. The equity regulations in 
Malaysia as argued by the policy makers were not designed to stifle foreign 
investment activity, but they have given rise to some concern. Foreign investors, in 
particular, have found it difficult to comply with the FIC guidelines, particularly in 
finding credible local company with financial capability and of similar activities. 
However according to Ariff (1991), policy makers argued that the equity policy has 
never been a negative factor, citing the creditable growth rates as well as FDI inflows 
during the 1980s as evidence. Critics (see Jomo, 1990) however, claimed that the 
Malaysian economy could have grown at a faster pace, had it not been for the NEP 
and the equity policy. The equity policy is not only peculiar to Malaysia and 
according to Khor (2000) most developing countries have policies that regulate the 
entry of foreign firms and impose restrictions to foreign investors on a sector by 
sector basis. Their justification is simple, often on the grounds of national 
development. 
In addition to the equity policy of the FIC, there are also guidelines pertaining 
to the operation of the supermarket activity which is also implemented by the 
MDTCA, Malaysia. The first is with regard to the minimum floor space requirement 
which requires hypermarket to have at least 8,000 sq. metres, while supermarkets 
must be more than 2,800 sq. metres. Secondly, the guidelines also require foreign 
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companies to have a minimum capital requirement, which refers to the company's 
shareholders fund for each different type of retail operations as in Table 2.1 as 
follows: 
Table 2.1 
Types of Retail Business and Minimum Capital Requirements 
Types Floor Space Capital 
(sq. metres) Requirements 
Hypermarkets/Department >8,000 RM10.0 million 
Stores 
Supermarkets >2,800 RM5.0 million 
Speciality Outlets - RM1.0 million 
Source: Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, Malaysia, 1996. 
However, the Malaysian Government on 10 April 2002 froze the approval of 
new supermarket/hypermarket development by foreign firms with immediate effect 
pending the drafting of a new guideline. The decision to do so was based on the 
findings by an independent consultant (AC Nielsen), who found that the existing 
large supermarkets/hypermarkets have detrimental effects and significantly affect the 
business of small retail outlets operating near to them (Utusan Malaysia [a], 2002). 
It was found that hypermarkets affected the sales of 58.0 per cent of the retailers in 
the neighbouring areas where hypermarkets were located. In terms of prices, 35.0 
per cent of the retailers lowered their prices in response to competition from the 
supermarkets/hypermarkets. It was announced that the decision by the Malaysian 
Government to freeze new approvals of foreign supermarkets/hypermarkets is a 
move towards an orderly planning and development of these entities in areas away 
from small retail outlets. However the Government recognised the importance of 
foreign supermarkets/hypermarkets as a source of retail innovations which could 
provide linkages to the other sectors in the Malaysian economy. Besides bringing in 
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foreign investment, the Government argued, these supermarkets/hypermarkets 
provide job opportunities and help to promote the export of local products to their 
overseas outlets (Utusan Malaysia [b], 2002). The temporary freeze was therefore 
lifted on 24 April 2002 and new Guidelines (in contrast with the old Guidelines) 
were announced by the Government as shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 
New Guidelines on Hypermarkets/Large supermarkets 
New Guidelines (effective on 24 April 2002) Old guidelines (1 November 1995) 
1. Issued and Paid-Up Capital not less than Issued and Paid-Up Capital RM5.0 
RM50.0 million. million-RM10.0 million. 
2. To be located 3.5 kilometres outside town - 
centres. 
3. Serving a population of at least 350,000 - 
people. 
4. Floor space greater than 8,000 sq. metres. No change. 
5. At least 30.0 per cent of the floor space - 
allocated for selling local products. 
Source: Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Malaysia, 2002. 
NB: Under the new guidelines all foreign hypermarkets/large supermarkets must have a floor 
space of at least 8,000 sq. metres. 
Four new changes have been introduced in the new guidelines, particularly to 
slow down the expansion of foreign hypermarkets/supermarkets in Malaysia. The 
first is the imposition of a higher paid up capital from RM 10.0 million to RM50.0 
million. The imposition of a higher paid up capital will affect not only foreign firms, 
but even more so, local firms, since they are partners in the joint-venture (JV) 
companies. They will have to contribute 49.0 per cent or RM24.5 million8 of the paid 
up capital as compared to RM4.9 million under the old guidelines. In addition to the 
paid-up capital, local firms must also contribute 49.0 per cent towards the cost of 
8 49.0% out of RM50.0 million 
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development of the supermarket/hypermarket and also on its expansion later on. Not 
many local firms have the capacity to raise the required amount and this may pose 
difficulty to foreign firms in finding a financially capable local partner. 
Secondly, the zoning of hypermarkets/supermarkets in out-of-city centre and 
edge-of-city centre sites was introduced to protect small high street retailers, 
especially convenience shops. Thirdly, hypermarket/supermarkets are only allowed 
to operate in a population catchment area of at least 350,000 people. The saturation 
calculation in determining the number of supermarket and population is based on the 
French experience. At the moment there are on average 580,900 inhabitants per 
hypermarket in Malaysia, but in certain cities, for example, Kuala Lumpur the ratio 
is 233,000 inhabitants per hypermarket. Fourthly, is a requirement at least 30.0 
percent of the net selling area must be allocated to local products. This is a move to 
promote local products and to encourage local production. This is not something 
new; according to Alexander (1989), in order to be successful, foreign retailers must 
adapt to the culture of the host country. After all, the products that they sell are 
meant for the local people and therefore these should be local products. 
The success of the equity policy depends significantly on the ability of local 
entrepreneurs to contribute their share of the capital needed in the JV company. 
Besides Jaya Jusco (a public listed company with 51.0 per cent of its shares held by 
its Japanese parent company and 49.0 per cent by Malaysian public) and Tesco, the 
other foreign firms are facing difficulty to comply with the FIC guidelines. In the 
case of Makro, its local partner diluted its shareholding from 49.0 per cent to 35.0 
per cent mainly because of its inability to provide further capital for expansion. For 
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Carrefour, the local partner had to withdraw its entire 49.0 per cent equity due to 
financial difficulty, and this left Carrefour without a local partner for the time being. 
Three other foreign owned supermarket companies, Topps, Giant and Wellsave, are 
still looking for suitable local firms. 
From the above analysis it shows that the equity policy is not effective in 
increasing local participation in foreign firms, particularly when it involves a 
substantial amount of capital throughout the business operations. The other 
observation is that since the equity policy is only an administrative procedure, which 
is not governed by laws, therefore a non-complying foreign firm is not illegal under 
Malaysian laws. This may be the reason why some foreign firms have not taken the 
equity policy seriously. However, through persuasion and out of respect for the 
policy of the host country, most foreign firms will abide by the equity policy. 
2.2 Regulatory Policy of Other Developing Countries 
The restriction on foreign ownership (or equity policy) is not peculiar to 
Malaysia but applies also to other developing countries as well. Other neighbouring 
countries that have similar polices are, for example, Thailand, Brunei, Indonesia and 
China. Thailand's equity policy is more stringent than Malaysia's. In those activities 
which are reserved for Thai nationals, such as supermarket retailing, aliens' (foreign) 
participation is only allowed up to a maximum of 49.0 per cent (Allen et al., 1988) in 
contrast to 51.0 per cent in Malaysia. In practice, however, the equity held by 
Llbo 
25 its" 
foreign companies is greater but is hidden under Thai nominees9. In Brunei, foreign 
companies are allowed up to 70.0 per cent equity in the retailing industries, whereas 
in China, a 50: 50 JV company between local and foreign firms operating in the retail 
sector is normally recommended (Luo, 2000). In addition, only well established 
commercial multinationals are permitted to do business in the Chinese retail sector 
and imports of goods are also restricted to only 30.0 percent of their total annual 
sales. In this context, we may say that the policy in Malaysia is more relaxed than in 
China. By contrast, in Indonesia, while certain sectors remain closed to foreign 
investment, the country adopts a more liberal policy stance than Malaysia to sectors 
such as large-scale retailing, distribution and wholesaling. Indonesia's FDI policy is 
governed primarily by its Foreign Investment Law No. 1 of 1967 and amended by 
Law No. 11 of 1970. Under this investment rule, foreign firms are permitted to own 
100.0 per cent of the issued and paid up capital of new established firms and are only 
required, within 15 years from the commencement of commercial operation, to divest 
at least a nominal value of 5.0 per cent of the paid up capital to an Indonesian entity. 
But with its unstable political environment, this liberal FDI policy of Indonesia's, is 
not high on the list of foreign multinational retailers. To date, only two major 
multinational grocery retailers are present in the Indonesian market, namely, Makro 
which entered in 1991 and Carrefour in 1998. 
With respect to the equity regulation, Sternquist (1997) argues that even 
though, wholly owned subsidiaries are preferable to foreign firms, a joint venture is 
9 See also the study by Martinussen (1988) [cited in Caves 1996] - on India's policy of allowing only 
40.0 per cent foreign equity in the consumer goods industry resulted in manipulation. The balance 
60.0 per cent of the shares were in fact held by the MNFs but hidden under the disguise of an Indian 
nominee company. 
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often necessary when entering a different cultural environment. Caves (1996) states 
that, even without a local-ownership policy, the risk involved in doing business in the 
developing countries can itself cause the MNFs to forgo full ownership. According 
to Reuber (1973), some firms may require the equity of local partners in order to 
conduct negotiations with the host government and to accelerate the penetration of 
the markets and sometimes their capital contributions are needed as well. 
In the next chapter, we shall see that even with regulations on equity 
ownership and guidelines on the entry of foreign MNFs such as supermarkets, these 
factors do not deter the entry of these firms into the economies of the developing 
countries, at least in the case of Malaysia, which is now host to several foreign 
supermarket firms. This is in sharp contrast to the empirical findings of De Mello 
(1997) who found that local contents and equity requirements act as deterrents to 
FDI. In this context we have looked at Indonesia's regulation which is more liberal 
vis-ä-vis the regulation policy of Malaysia but noted that more multinational 
supermarket firms are attracted to the economies of Malaysia than Indonesia. In the 
light of these arguments, other factors or determinants may play a significant role in 
attracting the MNFs, which this dissertation will look at more deeply in the context 
of the services-manufacturing distinction in Chapter Five. 
2.3 Competition Policy in UK and Regulation in Malaysia -A Contrast 
The aims of the various acts in Malaysia which were discussed in Section 2.1 
are among others to provide a code of ethical business conduct and trade practices 
and to protect consumers' welfare. On the other hand, the equity policy imposed on 
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foreign MNFs involved in the retailing activities in Malaysia has the aim of 
restructuring the corporate ownership of firms, as well as to redistribute economic 
wealth to the Bumiputera. In these two mechanisms, there is no regulation to 
promote fair business practices, or to synthesize efficiency and competition among 
the firms. 
Given that Malaysia's competition policy is not well developed10, there is no 
equivalent of the UK Competition Commission to oversee or administer any 
competition rules or regulations, including the monitoring of restrictive business 
practices, abuses within the market or possible cartel actions. In other words there is 
no institutional framework in Malaysia whose function is to maintain, promote and 
oversee effective competition in the retail trade. Therefore, anti-competitive activities 
in Malaysia are not per se illegal and no specific documented records of such 
practices are collated, although they are known to exist. In this context, any abuses 
within the market committed by the MNFs cannot be prosecuted because the existing 
laws cannot completely prohibit or control such practices and in this case local 
retailers without market power may be forced to exit. 
While every industrial country has a competition policy (Caves 1982), in 
contrast most developing countries are hesitant to have one. This is especially 
because of its negative implications which may work to their detriment by placing 
local firms on the same playing field as MNFs which possess technology and capital 
(Wheare and Adcock, 2001). Therefore, the benefits of introducing a competition 
10 Malaysia has sector based competition regulation in the communication and multi media and the 
energy sector only (see Lee, 2002 and 2004). 
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policy must be carefully weighed to accommodate the developmental needs of the 
nation and to ensure that such a policy is not used to the unfair benefit of any firms. 
Besides Malaysia, another (neighbouring) country without a competition policy is 
Singapore. Thailand and Indonesia, however, do have competition policies but the 
effectiveness of these policies will also depend on the level of sophistication of the 
instruments to execute them effectively. Often developing countries with competition 
policy have limited implementation ability (Hoekman and Holmes, 1999). This is 
consistent with the argument of Singh and Dhumale (1999), who state that the 
competition policy of the kind practised by the UK or the US could not just be 
plucked and implemented in developing countries, especially as these countries are at 
different levels of economic development. 
The EU and within it, the UK, have some of the most advanced and well- 
developed competition policies. The UK competition policy is governed by the 
Competition Act 1998 (which came into force on 1St March 2000) and in some 
circumstances is complemented by the Enterprise Act 2002 (which repealed the Fair 
Trading Act 1973). Prior to this, competition policy in UK was defined by four 
pieces of legislation, namely the Fair Trading Act 1973, the Competition Act 1980, 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 and the Resale Prices Act 1976. The first 
two dealt with the `monopoly' problem, the third with collusion and cartels and the 
fourth with vertical (price) restraints (Hay and Morris, 1991). However the 
Competition Act 1998 replaces the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976, the Resale 
Prices Act 1976 and most of the Competition Act 1980. The UK Competition Act 
1998, which is a subsidiary of the EU legislation, incorporates the provisions of 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. Article 81 which replaces the Restrictive Trade 
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Practices Act, 1976, prohibits anti-competitive agreements while Article 82, which 
replaces the Resale Price Act 1976, prohibits the abuse of a dominant position in a 
market. 
Within the competition policy of the UK or the EU, the mere holding of a 
dominant position or market power, whether single firm dominance or joint 
dominance, is not unlawful. However, it is the abuse of that dominant position that 
results in an infringement of the competition acts. Under the monopoly control 
provisions, the UK has for jurisdictional purposes confined itself to a simple market 
share test where it is triggered by a 25.0 per cent market share. Under the 
competition policy, there is no exemption to the abuse of dominant position but the 
Competition Act's abuse of dominant position provisions do not penalise a company 
that has captured a dominant share of the market because of its better performance or 
in other words because of its efficiency and innovation, where the resulting benefits 
are passed down to consumers in terms of lower prices. 
In its current context the three main pieces of legislation that Malaysia has in 
its retail trade sector are inadequate because the legislation does not cover the issues 
of competition, innovation, market power and dominant position. The existing laws 
only empower the regulator to stabilize the prices of essential goods and to protect 
consumer interests. As a result, the issues facing the supermarket sector in Malaysia, 
where foreign multinational supermarket firms are dominating the market share, have 
not been addressed because in this context Malaysia has no particular view or policy 
on dominant position but has a strong view on innovation. This view is reflected in 
its policy on foreign participation in the wholesale and retail trade, which has 
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explicitly spelt out innovation as its main objective in attracting FDI in the retail 
trade sector as follows: 
`to encourage the modernisation and increase the 
efficiency of the industry and its continued 
contribution to the growth of the 
economy'(MDTCA, 1996, p. 6) 
However the Malaysian government is committed to have its own 
competition policy which will be called the `Fair Trade Practices Policy' (Eight 
Malaysia Plan, 2001-2005). The fair trade policy and law will be formulated to 
prevent anti-competitive behaviour and the abuse of market power, similar to the UK 
competition policy. It will consist of two components, namely, consumer protection 
(already embodied in the Consumer Protection Act, 1999) and competition 
regulation. Malaysia's fair trade policy will prevent firms from protecting or 
expanding their market shares by means other than greater efficiency in producing 
what consumers want. This policy will come into force in the near future. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the extent of government intervention in the retail 
and supermarket sector between a developing economy, Malaysia, and the practice of 
developed countries such as the UK. The practices are not only different but are also 
at the extreme between one and another because Malaysia's competition policy is 
limited in scope, unlike that of the UK, where the policy is well developed. 
Malaysia's retail regulation depends mostly on three acts (Price Control Act 1946, 
Control of Supplies Act 1961 and Consumer Protection Act 1999) to bring order to 
its retail trade practices as well as to protect consumer welfare. In contrast the 
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competition policy of the UK which incorporates the EU competition legislations 
(Article 81 and Article 82) is essentially about market structure, company behaviour 
and levels of performance, all of which relate to efficiency and competition in the 
market. The goal is to enhance consumers' interests through lower prices, better 
quality and more choice without direct intervention in the market, in contrast to the 
practices in Malaysia. 
As in most other developing countries, Malaysia has an idiosyncratic policy 
of imposing equity regulations on foreign retail firms, in contrast to the UK's open 
market policy and retailers who wish to enter the market can in most cases do exactly 
as they wish. The exceptions to this in the UK are the large supermarkets or 
supercentres which are constrained by land-use planning on the grounds of space use 
and various dimensions of impact and these have similarities to the guidelines in 
Malaysia such as zoning of hypermarkets/supermarkets in out-of-city centre and 
edge-of-city centre. 
Malaysia, on the other hand, cannot act against firms having market power or 
a dominant position because Malaysia does not have a policy on this, whereas in the 
EU and so in the UK, dominant position and abuses of market power will be 
unlawful from the outset. Exemptions will require proofs of promoting technical or 
economic progress and efficiency gains and allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefits. This means encouraging firms to improve productivity, to reduce 
prices and to innovate and rewarding consumers with lower prices, higher quality 
and wider choice. This may also promote the international competitiveness of the 
domestic market. It was also argued in this chapter that a sound competition policy 
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and law could contribute to providing an attractive environment for FDI by 
establishing a stable and transparent legal framework of the kind familiar to foreign 
investors. 
But despite regulations and government interventions, the retail sector, 
especially the supermarket activity in Malaysia, has attracted the entry of six 
different multinational supermarket firms beginning in the early 1980s with the entry 
of Jaya Jusco from Japan. The entry and diffusion of these multinational supermarket 
firms signal that the retail sector of Malaysia is attractive and therefore important to 
look at. This will be the subject of the next chapter, where the central focus will be 
on the entry of this type of services FDI and multinational supermarket firms, which 
have captured a sizeable share of the supermarket activity in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MALAYSIAN RETAIL AND SUPERMARKET SECTOR - AN 
OVERVIEW AND ENTRY OF FDI AND MULTINATIONAL FIRMS 
3.0 Introduction 
Chapter Two has discussed the legislative framework and the extent of 
government regulation in the retail and supermarket sector and highlighted the 
limited regulatory power of the existing legislation (Acts) which Malaysia has in 
terms of enhancing consumer welfare as well as protecting local firms against global 
competition, for example, firms in the supermarket sector. That regulatory practice 
has been contrasted with the competition policy of developed countries, especially 
the EU and in particular the UK. The other peculiar policy in Malaysia is with 
regard to the local equity imposed on foreign firms operating in the retail sector in 
Malaysia which is considered as a tool for income distribution favouring the 
Bumiputera group, in contrast to the open policy of the developed economies. 
This chapter will examine two things. First, Section 3.1 provides an 
overview of the Malaysian retail industry. This includes a discussion on the growth 
of the retail industry and its contribution to the economy, the types of retail 
establishment, their employment contribution as well as the ownership structure. 
Within this broad context the contribution of the retail sector of Malaysia will be 
contrasted with that of the UK retail industry in its contribution to the economy. The 
second part, which is in Section 3.2, is the main contribution of this chapter, which 
will focus on the development of the supermarket sector in Malaysia. A prominent 
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part of the analysis in this section will be on the entry of foreign multinational 
supermarket firms that have contributed to the growth, development and change in 
the food retailing sector. These firms have also gained significant market share in 
Malaysia because of their efficiency and innovation in the retail industry. In this 
context, this section will also examine the concentration of the supermarket sector, 
which will be contrasted with the supermarket sector in the UK. The entry of these 
firms also signals a new type of FDI and MNF, that of services, in contrast to the 
familiar type of manufacturing FDI. Section 3.3 concludes the chapter. 
3.1 Overview of the Retail Industry. 
3.1.1 Number of Retail Establishments 
The retailing industry consists, by definition, of the activities involved in the 
selling of goods to the ultimate consumer for personal or household consumption 
(Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 1993 and National Statistics UK, 2000). It is the 
principal link between the producers and consumers. The official statistics, however, 
do not include the `informal' retail sector, which encompasses roadside hawking, 
peddlers, bazaars, stalls, and wet markets. In 1980 there were 90,040 retail 
establishments in Peninsular Malaysia, but 13 years later (1993), the figure had 
grown to 154,080 retail establishments, an increase of 71.0 per cent over that period. 
However, in the year 2001 there was a slight decline of 0.25 percent from 1993 to 
153,700 retail establishments. The increase in the numbers of retail establishments 
for the period 1980-1993 was basically influenced by factors such as the robust 
growth of the economy, the increase in population as well as the increase in the per 
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capita income of the people. During that period, the per capita income rose steadily 
from less than RM5000 in 1980 to more than double in the early 1990s. The main 
reason for the decline in the numbers of the retail establishments for the period 1993- 
2001 may be partly attributed to the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998), which saw 
the exit of many retailers. In contrast, there was a steady decrease in the numbers of 
retail enterprises in UK for the period 1989-1992. In 1992 the number of retail 
enterprises in the UK was nearly 10 per cent less than in 1989 (European 
Commission, 1996). According to the European Commission, the declining trend 
reflected an increasing rationalisation in the UK retail trade and with no formal 
barriers to business entry or exit, fluctuations in business numbers are a rule. 
3.1.2 Industry Growth 
The Malaysian wholesale and retail sector grew at an average rate of nearly 
10 per cent until the Asian financial crisis, which saw the sector's growth decline to 
7.7 per cent in 1997 and a negative growth of 2.0 per cent in 1998. However in 
terms of its share to GDP, it still maintains its double-digit contribution at more than 
12.0 per cent (Table 3.1) and this has been continued for the last nine years since 
1992 (Ministry of Finance, 2000). In fact the retail sector's share of GDP, especially 
during the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, contributed quite significantly towards 
the rapid recovery of the Malaysian economy. In 1997, the retail and wholesale 
industry share of GDP was 12.3 per cent, while in the year 2000 (after the crisis) it 
was up by 0.5 per cent to 12.8 per cent. 
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Likewise in the UK, a similar trend was also reflected in the wholesale and 
retail sector contribution to GDP. The sector's contribution was 14.0 per cent of 
GDP in 2000, the same as in 1999. In France, the contribution of the wholesale and 
retail trade sector to GDP was slightly less than in the UK, at 12.0 per cent in the 
year 2000. For some other EU countries, the contribution of the wholesale and retail 
trade to GDP in the year 2000 is reflected in Table 3.2. The sector's contribution to 
GDP ranges from 11.0 per cent in Germany and Sweden to 14.0 per cent in the UK. 
Table 3.1 
Contribution of the Wholesale, Retail and Catering Sector 
to Malaysia's GDP. 
(1992-2000) 
Year Average 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Average Growth 
Rate of Wholesale, 
retail, hotel and 
restaurant sector 
Per Cent 
Share to 
GDP 
1992 7.8 11.1 12.0 
1993 8.3 11.1 12.4 
1994 9.2 8.0 12.2 
1995 9.4 10.1 12.3 
1996 8.6 9.4 12.4 
1997 7.7 7.0 12.3 
1998 -7.5 -2.0 12.9 
1999 4.3 1.0 12.9 
2000 5.0 4.5 12.8 
Source: Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs: Study 
On the Impact of Hypermarket on Retailing (1999) and Ministry of 
Finance Malaysia: Economic Report 1999/2000. 
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Table 3.2 
Contribution of the Distributive Trade Sector 
to the Economy of some EU Countries 
(2000) 
Country Share of 
Distribution 
Output in Total 
GDP 
Belgium 12.0 
Denmark 13.0 
France 12.0 
Germany 11.0 
Sweden 11.0 
United Kingdom 14.0 
Source: United Nation Statistics Division. 
In terms of sales turnover, the retail sector is particularly sensitive to 
economic instability, being hit harder than average in times of economic recession. 
For example, during the height of the financial crisis in Malaysia, retail sales took a 
dip from RM46.5 billion recorded in 1997 to RM37.2 billion in 1998, a decline of 
11.0 per cent. However with recovery in aggregate demand, the wholesale and retail 
sector made a quick revival in 1999, registering a positive growth of 1.0 per cent and 
in 2000 it was well on a positive growth path of nearly 5 per cent from the crisis 
year, with registered sales of RM44.0 billion. 
Among the actions taken by the Malaysian government to boost the retail 
sector during the crisis period were a "Buy Malaysian Campaign" aimed at reducing 
imports and strengthening the economy and granting more permits to retailers to 
carry out bargain sales at great discounts" l to stimulate consumer spending. 
It is subjected to abuses because of the difficulty in enforcement to check on the original price and 
the price offered after a discount. 
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3.1.3 Types of Retail Establishments 
The growth of the retail sector over the years was due to deliberate 
government planning12 which subsequently resulted in a gradual change in the 
Malaysian retailing industry. In town centres modern shopping complexes including 
supermarkets and departmental stores have been developed, dwarfing the pre-war 
building of shop-houses. Behind the back alleys of the shopping complexes are the 
street vendors and hawkers. This characteristic is also ubiquitous in many other 
South East Asian countries. 
One of the important peculiarities of Malaysia's retail industry is the 
domination of small retail outlets. Table 3.3 indicates the types of retail 
establishments in Malaysia over the past three decades (1980-2001). It can be seen 
that 91.3 per cent of the total trading outlets in 2001 consisted of small grocery retail 
shops (Figure 3.1), which sell provisions and other daily necessities such as rice. 
This figure is 1.9 per cent higher compared to 1980 and 1.1 per cent more than in 
1993. According to Akehurst and Alexander (1996), even in developed economies 
small retail operations will still remain an important element in the retail structure, 
but not as dominant as in developing countries. 
12 Malaysia has been implementing successive five years development plans starting from the first 
development plan in 1967 till now, into the eight development plan (2001-2005). The implementation 
of these development plans has spurred economic growth. 
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Table 3.3 
Types of Business Establishments in Peninsular Malaysia and Sales Value 
1980,1993 and 2001 
1980 1993 2001 
Business % of % of % of % of % of % of 
Establishments total total total total total total 
estab. sales estab. sales value estab. sales 
value value 
Supermarket/ 0.10 1.76 0.60 22.80 1.40 44.31 
Hypermarket 
Department stores - - 0.10 11.80 0.60 9.83 
Mini market 2.54 18.91 2.50 7.50 1.50 6.87 
Retail shops 89.40 47.50 90.20 47.30 91.30 36.70 
Others* 7.96 31.83 6.60 10.60 5.20 2.29 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Survey on Wholesale, Retail and Catering. Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 1982,1993 
and 2001. * Such as newspaper agents, convenience stores, and other small retail outlets. 
The slight increase in the percentage share of small retail establishments for 
the year 2001 in Malaysia may be due to the increase in consumer demand and also 
to the viability of these outlets, mainly because of the small capital requirements and 
operating cost needed in running such outlets. The risk involved in operating a small 
business is minimal compared to bigger retail establishments. The increase also 
reflects the need for such outlets to serve the consumer markets in Malaysia, 
especially in the growing urban areas catering for different classes of society (Allen 
et al. 1988). 
Figure 3.1 
Number of Retail Formats 2001 
Malaysia 
92% 
o Retail shops s Mini markets Q Supermarkets Q Others 
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However findings from the Seventh Malaysia Plan (1996-2000) show that the 
percentage share of the establishment of small retail outlets in the rural areas in fact 
declined by 5.8 per cent during the 1990-1995 period as compared to urban areas, 
which registered an increase of 9.1 per cent during the same time. This suggests that 
retailing activities in the rural areas are not expanding, most probably due to the low 
rural income and also possibly due to rural-urban migration. 
Comparing the sales figures in the three periods (1980,1993 and 2001), 
Table 3.3 shows that sales volume from small retail outlets declined slightly from 
47.5 per cent in 1980 to 47.3 per cent in 1993 but registered a significant drop in 
2001 to 36.7 per cent. Sales from other retail formats except supermarkets also 
decreased. As the number of supermarkets in Peninsular Malaysia has increased 
significantly over the past 21 years, it is not surprising to see that the role of small 
retail grocery shops is beginning to decline. In 2001, retail provision shops 
constituted 91.3 percent (or 46,540 establishments) with total sales value of 36.7 per 
cent (RM7.46 billion) or equivalent to an average of RM160,300 per retail shop, 
which represent only 1.3 per cent of the total sales of a supermarket. Most of these 
small retail formats are set up in urban centres where they face stiff competition from 
the supermarkets/hypermarkets sector. The small retail outlets are owner operators 
and often lack capital to offer a large variety of goods and furthermore consumers 
only buy smaller quantities from them. Table 3.3 suggests that the decline in sales 
from small retail outlets have been taken up by the supermarkets/hypermarkets, 
which registered a two fold increase during that period. It can be seen that in 1980 
supermarkets captured only 1.76 per cent of the total sales volume, as compared to 
22.8 per cent in 1993 and 44.31 per cent in 2001. 
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In terms of numbers of establishments, there were 716 
supermarkets/hypermarkets in 2001 in contrast to 349 supermarkets in 1993 and only 
60 supermarkets in 1980. Most of the local supermarkets are small relative to 
foreign owned supermarkets. However, before 1980, modern retail outlets such as 
supermarkets, which were few in number, were only concentrated in the capital city, 
Kuala Lumpur. They served the affluent and the expatriates, mostly Japanese and 
Americans, working in Japanese and American multinational corporations (Jackson 
1979). In the 1970s there were only 11 supermarkets in Malaysia, mainly because of 
the low levels of income and the lack of patronage of such markets by the low and 
middle-income groups (Bucklin, 1986). 
The significant increase in the total sales value of the supermarkets in 
Malaysia between the three periods could be attributed to the rapid economic 
development that Malaysia has undergone. Beginning in the 1980s onwards, the 
Malaysian economy was growing at the rate of 8.0 per cent (except during the two 
recessionary years of 1985 and 1986 and the crisis years of 1997-1998), as compared 
to an average growth of 7.0 percent in the 1970s. The per capita income of the 
population was also much higher, an average of nearly US$4300 in the 1990s period 
as compared to only US 1000 in 1973 (Bucklin, 1986). The population was 23.3 
million in 2000, which was 117.0 per cent higher than in 1970. Bucklin argued that 
there is a direct statistical relationship between economic growth and the changing 
choice of consumers' retail formats. One can also assume that the retail formats of 
developing countries will come to resemble more closely those of current developed 
countries as economic development proceeds and average per capita income rises. 
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In contrast, for example, in the UK only 62.0 per cent of retail enterprises in 
1992 were small single outlet retailers, whereas in France, only 50.0 per cent of the 
numbers of retail enterprises in 1990 were small retail businesses, comprising 
traditional neighbourhood stores and street markets (European Commission, 1993). 
The falling numbers of small retail business is also the trend in all other EU 
countries, illustrating the process of concentration and consolidation in the sector 
(European Commission, 1997). This development is clearly shown in a steadily 
declining trend in the number of retail enterprises and an increase in their average 
size. In France, the number of retail businesses in food retailing is decreasing faster 
than in non-food retailing. This is because of the expansion of the hypermarket and 
supermarket retail formats, which in 1989, had already captured a market share of 
over 50 per cent for food products (European Commission, 1997). 
The contrast between the market share of small retail outlets and that of 
supermarkets is even more significant in the UK than in Malaysia. While grocery 
stores in the UK captured only 11.0 per cent of total grocery sales in 1980, the share 
of superstores and large supermarkets had increased tremendously to almost 75.0 per 
cent of the grocery market in 1993 (European Commission, 1993). In fact the four 
largest grocery retailers in the UK, measured by sales from reference stores in 
1998/1999, have a market share of 71.0 per cent, with Tesco having a dominant 
position with 24.6 per cent, followed by Sainsbury (20.7 per cent), Asda (13.4 per 
cent) and Safeway (12.5 per cent). This is understandably the case as these four 
supermarket chains control around 43.0 per cent of total store numbers (Competition 
Commission, 2000). However, the rate of growth of supermarkets and superstores is 
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now slowing down, reflecting the slow growth in demand for food in the UK 
(Competition Commission, 2000). 
In Jackson's' 3 (1979) view, there is a regular pattern in retail distribution that 
is unique at each stage of economic development, such that as development 
progresses, the retail format will also change. What was lost in the sales volume in 
the other retail formats is being captured by other retail operations. According to 
Jackson (p. 274): 
"as the economy advances or becomes more 
developed, a modem distributing system, 
represented by large scale retailing units will 
absorb gradually functions performed 
previously by the `traditional' informal system, 
with its market traders and small stores, so that 
these become progressively less significant and 
eventually survive only as relict features. " 
The large-scale retailing units referred to by Jackson are the modern retail 
formats such as supermarket chains with efficient and mass retailing systems. Before 
1980, retailing was very much the trade of the small retail businesses and other retail 
formats such as grocery stores, convenience stores, hawkers and peddlers and wet 
market traders. These types of retail formats are features of low retail development 
and their relative importance in overall distribution diminishes as the economy 
advances. Mittendorf (cited in Jackson) explained that, as general levels of income 
rise, chain stores and supermarkets become increasingly important in the urban food 
supply system. 
13 Jackson (1979) undertook a study to conceptualise the relationship between retail system and the 
development process - mainly in the light of evidence from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
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Daniels (1993) argued that the structure of retail distribution is also related to 
consumer demands, which are influenced by the level, structure and trends of 
consumption as well as the elements that influenced the purchasing habits of 
consumers. In support of this argument, the European Commission (1993) states that 
the retail system in a country is influenced primarily by the standard of living of its 
people, as measured by per capita GDP. 
In the above context Jackson (1979) also argued that, as the economy grows, 
the population will become more affluent and its consumption pattern will change. 
Therefore the role of small retailers and other informal retailers such as hawkers and 
peddlers will decline as increasing use is made of large retail outlets such as 
supermarkets. The structure of the retail trade also reflects the cultural characteristics 
of the society it serves, while technological development has brought radical change 
in the retail trade (European Commission, 1993). Thus, as the economy grows, the 
retailing sector becomes more sophisticated. This statement correctly matches the 
pattern shown by sales volume registered by supermarket chains both in UK and in 
Malaysia. However the dualistic nature of the retailing formats in developing 
countries will remain, as small retail outlets are complementary elements to 
supermarkets. 
3.1.4 Employment 
In terms of employment generation, a total of 897,000 people were employed 
by the retail trade sector in 2001, representing 9.5 per cent of the total workforce in 
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Malaysia (Table 3.4). Even during the crisis years of 1997 and 1998, the sector's 
contribution towards total employment remained unchanged from before the crisis 
years. In fact in 1998 the share was much higher (9.9 per cent) than in 1997 (9.7 per 
cent) suggesting that more people were engaged or employed in the wholesale and 
retail sector during the crisis as compared to the other sectors of the economy. But in 
general the overall share of the retail and wholesale sector to the total workforce has 
remained fairly constant for the period 1993 to 2001, reflecting that the sector grew 
at constant rates over the years, as reflected in Table 3.1. In terms of retail labour 
productivity, it increased steadily over the years, reaching its peak in 1997. Although 
it took a dip in the crisis year (1998), it has steadily recovered since the crisis. 
In contrast, the retail and wholesale sector in the UK employed 14.4 per cent 
of its total labour force in 1991. This is not surprising, given that the overall UK 
market for groceries was worth around £90 billion in 1998 (Competition 
Commission, 2000), whereas in Malaysia, a comparatively small market, the 
turnover of the retail sector is only RM45.1 billion or an equivalent of £7.5 billion in 
2001. Likewise, in other EU countries, such as France, the retail and wholesale 
sector employed an estimated 12.3 per cent of their total labour force in 1990. 
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Table 3.4 
Workforce in Wholesale and Retail Trade, Malaysia 
(1993-2001) 
Year Total Wholesale Retail Total % Total Productivity 
workforce wholesale Sales Total sales 
& Retail In Retail - 
(000) (000) (000) (000) (R1VI workforce 
000)* (RM) 
1993 7498 253 500 753 10.0 34000000 45000 
1994 7603 262 517 779 10.2 37000000 47000 
1995 8024 261 515 776 9.7 40000000 52000 
1996 8416 274 542 816 9.7 42000000 51000 
1997 8805 287 568 855 9.7 43000000 50000 
1998 8563 286 565 851 9.9 32000000 38000 
1999 8869 285 575 860 9.7 34000000 40000 
2000 9200 294 586 880 9.5 36000000 41000 
2001 9430 305 592 897 9.5 38000000 42000 
Source: 1. Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, Malaysia (1999): Study on the 
Impact of Hypermarket on Retailing; 
2. Malaysian Retailers Association, and 
3. Economic Planning Unit, Malaysia. 
* Figures are in real value. 
3.1.5 Ownership Pattern 
Another important characteristic of the retail and wholesale sector of 
Malaysia is with regard to the ownership pattern (Table 3.5). Ethnic Chinese 
resident in Malaysia are the main players in the industry, controlling 53.3 per cent in 
wholesale and more than 75.0 per cent in the retail sector in 1975. During the same 
period, foreign ownership in the wholesale sector was also high at 36.0 per cent and 
11.4 per cent in the retail sector. In contrast, the Malays (Bumiputera), controlled 
only 1.7 per cent and 4.2 per cent respectively. If one considers urban areas as the 
areas where most trading takes place, the Chinese share in ownership is even more 
significant. The Bumiputera are considered as "outsiders" in this predominantly 
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Chinese controlled sector (Allen et al. 1988)14. This does not augur well for the 
Malaysian Government policy to promote an equitable ownership pattern in the 
corporate sector, especially where one ethnic group dominates a particular sector. 
Table 3.5 
Percentage Share in Ownership of the Retail and Wholesale Industry 
Peninsular Malaysia 
1975 1990 2001 
Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail 
Bumiputera 1.7 4.2 10.2 17.1 17.1 40.7 
Chinese 53.3 77.3 85.2 80.7 80.7 58.1 
Indians 9.0 7.1 3.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 
Foreign 36.0 11.4 1.6 1.0 1.0 0.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985), Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991 -1995) and 
Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 2001. 
Under the NEP 15, which was formulated in 1970 (after the racial riot in 
1969), the Bumiputera should be represented in all sectors of the economy and must 
hold at least 30.0 per cent equity interests. The income growth objective of equitable 
sharing of the expanding economic cake is one of the major prongs of the NEP. The 
uneven distribution of economic wealth between ethnic groups in Malaysia is well 
documented. The incidence of poverty according to ethnic group was highest among 
the Bumiputera, which stood at nearly 74 per cent among the poor groups in 1970. 
According to Jomo (1990), a contributory factor, which led to this phenomenon, was 
basically that the Bumiputera, who were rural-based, were more involved in 
subsistence agriculture and paddy farming, while their Chinese counterparts, who 
were basically more urban, were involved in commercial activities. The 
identification of race with economic function could be traced to Malaysia's historical 
14 The Chinese controlled 56.0% while the Malays owned 35.0%. 
15 See Chapter Two for explanation. 
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pattern of economic development brought about by the British during its colonial era, 
for 83 years. Rudner (1979) and Jomo (1990) state that the many existing 
differences reflecting uneven development between ethnic groups could be attributed 
to the crucial formative decades under colonial rule, which shaped the economic 
structure. However, after independence, as a result of the government's deliberate 
policy action through the creation of a commercial and industrial community among 
the Bumiputera, their percentage share in ownership in both the retail and the 
wholesale industry has shown significant improvements. In 2001 there was a marked 
increase in Bumiputera equity in the retail sector, as compared to in 1975 and also in 
1990. However, the achievement of Bumiputera equity in the wholesale sector was 
still short of the 30.0 per cent target set in the NEP. But there was a marked 
reduction of foreign ownership in the wholesale and retail sector in 1990 and 2001 as 
compared to in 1975. The small percentage of foreign ownership left in the retailing 
activity is mostly involved in the supermarket/hypermarket sector and speciality 
store operations. 
Table 3.6 shows that 90.0 per cent of the retail establishments in Malaysia in 
1980 and more than 80.0 per cent in 1990 were categorised as having a sole 
proprietor type of ownership. These retail establishments are small family run 
traditional shops and are the major form of business entity in the domestic retail trade 
sector in Malaysia. In contrast, only 45.0 per cent of the distributive trade enterprises 
in UK in 1991 were single outlet retailers. 
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Table 3.6 
Legal Status of Retailers in Peninsular Malaysia 
1980 and 1990 
Legal Status 1980 1990 % change 
Nos. of % Nos. of % 
Establishment Establishment 
Sole Proprietorship 80531 89.4 85041 82.3 5.6 
Partnership 7148 8.0 11470 11.1 60.5 
Company 1854 2.1 6200 6.0 234.0 
Co-operatives 389 0.4 215 0.2 -44.7 Others 115 0.1 405 0.4 252.0 
Total 90037 100.0 103,331 100.0 
Source: Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 1982 and Sixth Malaysia Plan, 1991-1995. 
The sole proprietorship which corresponds to small retail operations will 
remain an important element in the retail structure of developing economies. 
However, even though their number constituted more than 90.0 per cent of the total 
retail establishment in 2001, their retail sales only constituted 37.0 per cent of the 
total sales (see Table 3.3). On the other hand there was also an increase in the 
number of partnership and companies involved in the retail industry in 1990. The 
need to form partnerships and companies can be attributed to several reasons, 
including the scale economy effect, to pool capital requirement and also to comply 
with the local equity requirement imposed by the Malaysian government on foreign 
owned retail companies, especially on supermarket chains, as was discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
The partnership and company entity are involved in large-scale retailing such 
as department stores and supermarkets, while the co-operative format, which was 
popular in the 1980s as a form of business entity, fell out in the 1990s, largely 
because of its failure to sustain membership. This form of business entity was more 
popular in the agriculture sector than the other sectors. From the regional pattern of 
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development in Malaysia, large and medium size retailers are mostly concentrated in 
four major areas: Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Penang and Johor Bahru. These areas 
have the highest population concentration and no doubt have the greatest number of 
supermarkets and large retailers, including multinational supermarket firms. 
The preceding section has discussed the importance of the retail trading 
sector and its contribution to the Malaysian economy, with comparisons and 
contrasts to the retail sector of developed economies such as the UK. The next 
section will look at the development and the impact of entry of the multinational 
supermarket firms into Malaysia. The main focus will be on the dominance of the 
multinational supermarket firms vis-ä-vis local firms in terms of market share, as 
well as issues on the socio economic benefits that the host country may derive from 
the entry of these firms. 
3.2 The Supermarket Sector 
3.2.1 Supermarket Development in Malaysia 
The supermarket-retailing concept was first introduced in Malaysia in 1964 
with the opening of the Weld Supermarket -a joint venture company between Cold 
Storage Creameries and Fitzpatrick Ltd, UK. In terms of equity holdings, The Weld 
Supermarket was almost entirely held by foreign interests [MeTaggart - cited in 
Othman, 1987]. It marked the beginning of a foreign retailing involvement and of 
FDI in the grocery sector in Malaysia. The `foreignness' of the first supermarket was 
not only in terms of ownership but also with regard to its customers, because it was 
heavily patronised by European and American expatriates. The local people at that 
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time were not used to modem retailing and preferred wet markets where local 
products could be obtained fresh and cheap. The lack of response from the local 
people towards supermarket retailing was reflected by the slow growth of the 
supermarket development during that period. It was not until three years later, in 
1967, that a second supermarket, which was locally owned and known as Emporium 
and Supermarket Holdings, was opened. 
In the eighties a supermarket boom took place in Malaysia. It was also the 
beginning of the era of modern retailing in Malaysia. During that period, the total 
number of supermarkets was estimated at 127, of which at least 35.0 per cent were 
located in Kuala Lumpur and the surrounding areas (Othman, 1987). It was also the 
period when Malaysia's average GDP growth per year was in the region of 8.0 per 
cent 16. That period also saw rapid development taking place in both the government 
and the private sectors. The private sector undertook development of shopping 
complexes mainly in Kuala Lumpur and other major towns in Malaysia, while the 
government spearheaded the public sector spending with developments of 
infrastructure, especially roads, electricity and telecommunications throughout the 
country. 
In contrast, the supermarket-retailing concept in Europe started much earlier 
(Pasdermadjian, 1954). Its origin in the UK was firmly rooted in the twin processes 
of industrialisation and urbanisation (Lancaster, 1995). For example, in the UK, the 
first supermarket was established by Sainsbury in Croydon in the 1950s. This was as 
16 Sixth Malaysia Plan, 1991-1995. 
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a result of a visit by Alan Sainsbury in 1949 to the US, where he was impressed by 
the self-service concept of the US grocery retailingl7. Since then, the number of 
supermarkets in UK has increased tremendously, from only 80 supermarkets in 1957 
to almost 4500 in 2000 (Competition Commission, 2000). 
3.2.2 Entry of Foreign Supermarket Firms into Malaysia 
Japanese retailers were quick to take advantage of the opportunity to expand 
their home grown supermarket concept into Malaysia, partly because of the strong 
economic outlook and also partly as a by-product of the "Look East Policy" 8 
adopted by the Malaysian government during the eighties. Initially this policy was 
widely believed to refer to a changing foreign orientation and reference point (from 
`west' to `east') in a wide variety of matters. The specific aim of this policy was to 
emulate Japan's and South Korea's `economic miracles' in terms of economic 
development, especially industrialisation and the establishment of Japanese style 
sogoshosha trading agencies. In the process, the Japanese and Korean companies 
were to transfer their technology and management expertise to Malaysian companies 
and counterparts. 
Subsequently, in 1984, two supermarket companies from Japan, namely Jaya 
Jusco and Kimisawa Supermarket started their operations in Malaysia. This was 
17 According to Hunt (1983) the supermarket concept in America was introduced much earlier than in 
the UK 
18 The `Look East Policy' was initiated by the Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed in 1981 to 
learn from the experiences of Japan in the nation building of Malaysia. He considered that the secret 
of Japanese success and its remarkable development lies in its labour ethics, morale, management and 
technological capability. 
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followed by three more supermarket companies, namely Chujitsuya (1985), Hankyu 
Jaya (1986), and Yaohan (1987). Beside companies from Japan, there was also a 
company from France that opened a supermarket in Kuala Lumpur in 1987, known 
as Printemps supermarket 19 . 
It was not until the early 1990's that other major international supermarket 
companies began to realise the market potential of developing economies such as the 
economies of Asia (including Malaysia) and Latin America (Reardon et al. (2003). 
According to Dawson (1993) and Akehurst and Alexander (1996) the retail 
revolution of cross-border retailing is a phenomenon of the 1990s and was a period 
of retail internationalisation. Reardon et al. (2003) also pointed out that the tidal 
wave of retail FDI was due to the global retail multinationals, namely, Ahold, 
Carrefour, Tesco and Wal-Mart and regional multinationals such as the Dairy Farm 
Group. 
Among the major multinational supermarket companies making their entry 
into Malaysia in the 1990s were Carrefour from France, Dairy Farm Group from 
Hong Kong and two from Holland, namely Makro and Ahold Tops. Tesco is a more 
recent entrant to the grocery retail market in Malaysia, having entered in 2000. The 
entry of these foreign supermarket firms is also a new source of FDI for Malaysia. 
The mode of entry, however, differs. While Jaya Jusco, Makro, Carrefour, and lately 
Tesco entered via "greenfield" investments, the Dairy Farm Group of Hong Kong 
19 Kimisawa, Chujitsuya, Hankyu Jaya and Printemps supermarkets have all closed down. Yaohan 
supermarket became a listed public company in 1996 and was known as Aktif Lifestyle Corporation. 
More than 80.0 per cent of its shares are held by Malaysians. 
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and Ahold (Tops) of Netherlands entered into the Malaysian market through 
acquisitions of local supermarkets firms. The Dairy Farm Group acquired Giant 
supermarket in 1999, a long time family business developed by the Teng family way 
back in 1974 and it also acquired Wellsave supermarkets in early 2001. However, as 
was discussed in Chapter Two, foreign supermarket firms operating in Malaysia are 
required to form a joint-venture company with local firms, in contrast to free entry in 
the UK market that is provided for under the EC and the UK competition laws. 
From Table 3.7, it is interesting to note that none of the local firms in 
Malaysia that participated as partners in the joint venture (JV) company have 
relevant expertise and experience in the supermarket activity. These local companies 
are property developers, plantation companies or investment holding companies. 
Othman (1987) argued that such JV would help to train local partners and the 
transfer of technology. But critics argued that the local partners are just "window 
dressing" or just tools used to comply with the equity regulation of the government 
and perhaps are only interested in the dividends and profits. 
Table 3.7 
Foreign Supermarkets and Local JV Partners in Malaysia 
Supermarkets Year of Foreign Local Firm Main Activity 
Entry of Local Firm 
Jaya Jusco* 1984 Aeon Group, Japan -- 
Tops** 1985 Ahold, Netherland PPB Group Plantation 
Makro, 1992 Makro, Netherland PKNS Development 
Carrefour, 1994 Carrefour, France Individual Investment 
businessman*** 
Giant 1994 DFI, Hong Kong **** - 
W eiisave - "I' 1,11o11 r uiig - 
Tesco 2000 Tesco, UK SD Holdings Investment 
Holding 
*Jaya Jusco is a public listed company. Its local shareholders consist of individuals and many local firms and 
public institutions. 
**Ahold acquired 65.22 per cent of Tops from PBB Group in 1996 and in 2000 PBB Group had divested its 
entire shareholdings of 34.78 per cent to Ahold. 
***Had since withdrawn from the JV company in 2001 and currently Carrefour Malaysia is held 100% by 
Carrefour, France. 
****DFI Hong Kong acquired 100 per cent equity of Giant TMC in 1999 and has yet to identify a local partner. 
*****Acquired by DFI Hong Kong in early 2001 and has yet to identify a local partner. 
Source: Annual Reports of the various companies and Foreign Investment Committee Malaysia. 
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It was also in the early 1990s that foreign supermarkets such as Aldi, Lidl and 
Netto and Wal-Mart entered the UK grocery market (see Daniels, 1993 and 
Competition Commission, 2000). Aldi and Lidl are two major German discounters. 
Aldi opened its first store in the UK in April 1990, followed by the Danish retailer, 
Netto, in December the same year and Lidl in 1994. However these companies 
entered a different segment of the UK grocery market (the lower end discount 
sectors) and catered for a different category of customers in terms of social class and 
income group. They aim to sell well below the prices of the market leaders and have 
a considerably smaller range of goods. The entry of these three firms into the UK 
was through `greenfield' investment, while the entry of Wal-Mart, a US grocery 
retailing chain, was through the acquisition of Asda in July 1999. 
According to some authors (see Alexander, 1989, Daniels, 1993, Akehurst 
and Alexander, 1996, Goldman, 2001 and Reardon et al. 2003) the 
internationalisation of supermarket firms may be attributed to both supply side and 
demand side variables. Some of the demand side variables are market size, income 
per capita, economic stability and the openness policy of the host country. 
Underdeveloped international markets provided not only valuable growth 
opportunities but also opportunities for sourcing. This underlies the importance of 
potentially large market opportunities abroad over and above marginal opportunities 
at home. The push factors or the supply side determinants that have encouraged firms 
to internationalise are FDI as well as MNFs and technology, saturation of the 
domestic markets, the desire to export a particular retail offering which will occupy 
an unfilled niche in a foreign market and restrictions imposed by the home 
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government. The saturation of the home market argument is determined by its 
market size and the absorptive capacity of its economy. 
In terms of problems encountered in the host markets, site acquisition, 
different regulatory conditions, different consumer tastes and different social 
conditions were clearly emphasised (Goldman, 2001). In the context of Malaysia the 
only significant entry barrier is the equity policy on foreign ownership, whereas for 
the UK, Alexander (1989) and Wrigley (1993) found that it was the high 
concentration of market power and capital in the hands of few retailers that hugely 
raised entry barriers. 
3.2.3 Market Structure 
The major players in the supermarket/hypermarket sector in Malaysia consist 
of five foreign owned companies and four local companies20 (Table 3.8). In the year 
2000 the five foreign companies had 73 supermarkets/hypermarkets or 51.0 per cent 
of the total number of major supermarkets, while the 4 local companies owned 49.0 
per cent. Together there were a total of 144 major supermarkets/hypermarkets21 as of 
early 2000, as compared to more than 4500 in the UK, which constitutes only 3.2 per 
cent of that in the UK. The supermarket sector in Malaysia is increasingly 
20 Wellsave was acquired by DFI in early 2000. 
21 As defined by the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, Malaysia, a large 
supermarket/hypermarket must have a minimum floor space of 8,000 square metres of selling area; 
refrigeration facilities for frozen food and goods must be price marked. The minimum floor 
requirement is a guide for operators in order to be recognised as large supermarkets or hypermarkets. 
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multinationalized (foreign-owned) but in Latin America, multinational supermarket 
firms constitute roughly 70-80 per cent of the top five chains in most countries 
(Reardon et al. 2003). This indicates that the growth of the supermarket sector in 
Malaysia and in Latin America is significantly driven by FDI from outside these 
regions. This is very different from supermarket diffusion in Europe and especially 
the UK, which is driven by local capital. 
In addition to the major supermarkets there are also smaller supermarkets in 
Malaysia that are primarily financed by domestic capital and which have an area of 
less than 8,000 square metres. These will not be considered in the analysis of market 
concentration in this chapter. The minimum store size required for a one-stop shop 
in the UK is 15,000 square feet (Competition Commission, 2000) and this is also the 
standard set by the MDTCA of Malaysia22 
From Table 3.8, for the period 1997-2000, foreign 
supermarkets/hypermarkets controlled more than 63.0 per cent of the major 
supermarket business in Malaysia. Giant supermarket, which is owned by the Dairy 
Farm Group, have a market share of more than 24.0 per cent for the period 1997- 
2000 in contrast to the locally owned, The Store supermarket, with a turnover of 20.0 
per cent for the same period. The four largest supermarket retailers in Malaysia, 
measured by shares of turnover in 1999/2000, are Giant ( 26.6%), The Store (21.6%), 
Makro (11.6%) and Jaya Jusco (10.6%). Foreign retailers control three of these 
supermarkets, with a market share of nearly 49 per cent. The four supermarkets, 
22 See Table 2.2, page 23. 
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however, accounted for 70.4 per cent of sales in 1999/2000. Wellsave, a local 
supermarket with seven outlets, captured only 1.1 per cent of the market shares and 
was later acquired by the Dairy Farm Group in early 2001. 
In contrast the market share of the four `foreign owned' firms in the UK, 
namely Asda, Aldi, Lidl and Netto, was only 16.1 per cent of the grocery market in 
the year 1998/1999. If the market share of Asda (13.4 per cent) which is owned by 
Wal-Mart of US is excluded, the market share of the other three foreign 
supermarkets is only 2.7 per cent and this posed no threat to the UK owned 
supermarket firms, unlike the situation in Malaysia. 
This chapter has calculated the market concentration of the major 
supermarket chains in Malaysia (Table 3.8). As defined by Clarke (1995) market 
concentration refers to the degree to which a particular market or industry is 
concentrated in the hands of a few large firms. Therefore a market is said to be more 
concentrated, the fewer the number of firms in the market or the more unequal the 
distribution of market shares. There are a few indices for measuring market 
concentration. The strengths and weaknesses of the concentration indices are well 
documented (see Clarke, 1995) but their usefulness depends on the appropriateness 
to what the index is to measure. One such index is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
or HHI which has the merit of combining information about the market shares of all 
firms in the market and not just the largest four or the largest eight firms. As 
compared to other concentration indices, Scherer and Ross (1990) and Martin (1994) 
state that the most used summary measure that combines elements of both firm 
numbers and inequality is the HHI, given by the formula: 
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n 
HHI= S, 2 
where Si is the market share of the ith firm. 
According to Scherer and Ross (1990), by squaring the market share, the HHI 
weights more heavily the values for large firms than for small firms. Therefore, this 
means that if data of market shares of very small firms are unavailable, the resulting 
error will not be large. However it is crucial that the largest sellers' market shares be 
measured accurately. 
According to the Competition Commission (2000) an HHI of up to 1,000 
indicates a market that is relatively not concentrated, a value between 1,000 and 
1,800 indicates moderate concentration and a value of 1,800 and above is taken to 
indicate high concentration. The HHI for the major supermarket/hypermarket firms 
in Malaysia for the period 1997-2000 ranged from 1,509 to 1,649 indicating a 
moderate degree of market concentration. However this figure is only an estimate of 
the major supermarket firms which does not include small supermarket firms. In 
addition most of these major supermarket firms are located only in major towns in 
Malaysia. For the UK, even though the national HHI as a whole stood at 1,506 for 
the 1998/1999 period, the HHI for the local groceries market was 2,135 and therefore 
the market is heavily concentrated 23. This means that although the retail industry in 
the UK is broadly competitive, significant local concentration and monopoly power 
exist at local level. Food retailing is even more concentrated in other EU countries 
such as Norway, Finland and Switzerland, where only three enterprises have a 
23 A pure monopoly would have an 11111 index of 10,000. 
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market share of 80.0 per cent of the grocery segment (Pilat, 1997). In the context of 
Malaysia, the top four major supermarkets have 71.0 per cent of the supermarket 
share and in the Latin American countries the top five chains have 65.0 per cent of 
the supermarket share. 
Table 3.8 
HHI of Major Supermarkets/hypermarkets in Malaysia 
Company Country Nos. of 
Outlets 
Turnover (RM Million) 
2000 (%) 1997/98 1998/1999 1999/2000 
Jaya Jusco Japan 7 (4.9%) 603.2 (13.1%) 692.5 (13.5%) 679.7 (10.7%) 
Carrefour France 6 (4.2%) 388.8 9 (8.4%) 544.9 (10.6%) 563.6 (8.9%) 
Giant Hong 13 (9.0%) 953.3 (20.6%) 1326.1 1688.7 
Kong (25.8%) (26.6%) 
Topps 
Makro 
Tesco* 
Dutch 
Dutch 
UK 
39 (27.0%) 
8(5.6%) 
- 
97.2(2.1%) 
788.9 (17.1%) 
- 
155.3 (3.0%) 
724.2 (14.1%) 
- 
363.7 (5.7%) 
736.1 (11.6%) 
- 
Total - 73 2831.4 3443.0 4031.8 
Foreign (51.0%) (61.3%) (67.0%) (62.7%) 
Ocean Local 14 (9.7%) 407.0 (8.8%) 377.8 (7.3%) 576.5 (9.0%) 
The Store Local 32 (22.2%) 1006.1 943.9 (18.3%) 1386.3 
(21.8%) (21.6%) 
Xtra Local 5 (3.5%) n. a n. a n. a 
Supercenter 
Aktif Local 5 (3.5%) 302.0 (6.5%) 293.2 (5.7%) 358.8 (5.6%) 
Wellsave** Local 7(4.9%) 72.4(l. 6%) 87.4(l. 7%) 73.0 (1.1%) 
Other Local 8 (5.5%) n. a n. a n. a 
supermarkets 
Total Local - 71 1787.5 1702.3 2394.6 
(49.0%) (38.7%) (33.0%) (37.3%) 
Total Local - 144 4618.9 5145.3 6426.4 
& Foreign (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
HM - - 1509 1592 1649 
C4 - - 72.6 71.7 70.5 
*Its first store was opened in May 2002. 
**Acquired by the Dairy Farm Group of Hong Kong in early 2001 
Source: Various Company Reports. 
In grocery retailing, size will effectively affect cost and prices (Hirsch and 
Votaw, 1952). McClelland (1962) and Arndt (1975) also argued that large 
supermarkets may be more efficient than smaller retail firms because they are able to 
use superior organisation and administrative efficiency such as bulk purchasing 
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which tend to reduce cost and modern capital equipment such as refrigeration. These 
may relate to the efficiency and productivity enhancing resources associated with 
multinational firms, which this dissertation will look at specifically in the context of 
vertical integration (Chapter Six) and regulation (Chapter Seven). In another study, 
Setälä (2000) also found that economies of scale exist in grocery retailing, as 
indicated by lower prices in large stores than smaller ones, where the average price 
and cost difference between large and small stores is about 10.0 per cent. However 
while supermarkets were clearly more efficient than smaller food stores, further 
economies of scale would diminish with increasing size. In contrast a study 
undertaken by Gripsrud (1982), which relates price behaviour and store size in 
grocery retailing, found that prices of large stores was not uniformly lower than in 
small ones. This result was supported by Cotterill (1986) who found a negative 
relationship between the area of selling space and the price level. 
The main contrast of the supermarket sector between Malaysia and the UK is 
with regard to the domination of foreign capital (Malaysia) over domestic capital 
(UK). Another difference is that the retail sectors in Malaysia and the UK are at 
different stages of development. This may relate to the different level of economic 
development between the two countries. However the supermarket sector 
development in the developing countries such as Malaysia is increasingly resembling 
that of developed countries in terms of market structure, which is oligopolistic, with 
just a handful of giant companies controlling the market. 
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3.2.4 Socio-Economic Benefits of Multinational Supermarkets 
The expected `trickle down effect' from the entry of multinational 
supermarket firms as envisaged by the Malaysian government will be the transfer of 
technology and management expertise, employment creation, development of local 
suppliers and low prices to consumers (MDTCA, 1999). Within these contexts 
certain efforts made by the Japanese supermarket firm, Jaya Jusco, may reflect some 
expectations of the benefits that may be derived from the entry of multinational 
supermarket firms. In terms of manpower training, Jaya Jusco has various 
programmes such as sending qualified local staff for one year's training in the 
various aspects of retailing in Japan and the effect may be the diffusion to the local 
firms if they hire workers who have been exposed to the technology of the 
multinational supermarket firms. This is consistent with the evidence found by Glass 
and Saggi (2002) on the mobility of workers from multinationals to host firms. 
Besides capital, the entry of these foreign supermarkets also created 
employment opportunities in Malaysia. For example, since the entry of Makro into 
Malaysia in 1992, its 8 hypermarket chains have provided a total of 1540 jobs to the 
local people, while Carrefour, with 6 hypermarkets, provided employment 
opportunities for 2,300 Malaysians (1994-2000). The opening of each Carrefour 
hypermarket meant an additional 400 jobs would be created. Tesco will also create 
the same number of job opportunities for each of its hypermarkets in Malaysia and it 
is estimated that a total of 6,000 jobs will be created for its 15 hypermarkets by the 
end of 2005 (Utusan Malaysia, 2002). In addition to employment creation, the long 
term effect due to entry of these multinationals may benefit the local workforce in 
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terms of skills and efficiency. Nevertheless, at the same time, the opening of each 
hypermarket will also cause unemployment in the small business sector because 
some of the retail stores are unable to compete and will have to close down. 
The type of employment creation by the multinational supermarket firms is, 
however, more oriented towards unskilled labour, as 73.0 per cent are in this 
category, while only 12.0 per cent of the locals employed are in the managerial and 
professional group. Even though Jaya Jusco of Japan has been in Malaysia since 
1984, its Chief Executive Officer is still Japanese, as are other top managers such as 
the Financial Controller. The same is true of Carrefour, France and all other foreign 
supermarkets in Malaysia. The absence of Malaysians as chief executive officers in 
these foreign supermarkets may be attributed to the lack of local expertise in the 
retailing sector and also partly to the policy of the MNFs to maintain foreign control 
in the decision making posts. 
Where sourcing of goods is concerned, local suppliers may or may not benefit 
from the multinational presence. At least in the case of Malaysia, it was reported by 
Bernama (2004) that multinationals as well as local supermarket firms preferred to 
sell imported products rather than the produce of local producers. In this context, the 
MDTCA of Malaysia has urged local producers to be competitive with imported 
goods, as well as to improve the quality and packaging of their products. This may 
relate to the `make or buy' decisions where it is cheaper to `make' or import than 
acquire from local suppliers, which this dissertation will look at more deeply in the 
context of vertical integration in Chapter Six. 
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The presence of large foreign supermarkets/hypermarkets in Malaysia also 
affected the businesses of small retail outlets and their business dropped between 
20.0 to 25.0 per cent in the year the supermarket/hypermarket opened (Damis and 
Poosparajah, 2002). A similar estimate was also reported by Pickering (1972), who 
argued that the effect of a hypermarket on trade loss would probably vary from zero 
per cent to at least 25.0 per cent. The Star (2002) reported that over the three years 
since 1998, more than 3,000 provision stores in Malaysia closed down. These small 
businesses found it difficult to compete with the low prices that 
supermarkets/hypermarkets are able to offer to consumers. 
3.3 Conclusion 
The importance of the retail sector in terms of its contribution signifies that it 
is an integral part of the country's economy. In Malaysia, small retail formats are 
still a dominant part of the retail structure. By contrast in the UK these small outlets 
are becoming less important as their roles are being taken over by large store formats 
such as supermarkets and hypermarkets. As the standard of living in developing 
countries improves, increasing trends towards the use of modern retailing 
characterised by supermarkets/hypermarkets have become more significant, 
beginning in the early 1990s. A similar trend appears to have emerged in Malaysia. 
The supermarket retailing concept in Malaysia was started by FDI and was 
initiated by a UK firm in the early 1960s and later followed by Japanese firms in the 
early 1980s. The success of these foreign firms attracted some local firms to open 
their own supermarket chains. But these early supermarkets were small and the real 
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wave of cross border international retailing of supermarket firms started only in the 
early 1990's, particularly in developing economies such as in the Latin American 
countries and the East and Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia. The new 
wave of foreign capital in the supermarket sector was spearheaded by large 
multinational supermarket firms, namely, Ahold, Carrefour, Wal-Mart, Macro, Dairy 
Farm and Tesco, driven by saturation and intense competition in the home markets. 
However, the demand pull factors of the untapped developing markets characterised 
by a large and expanding market provided another stimulus for entry into these 
economies, of which Malaysia is a recent phenomenon. 
The entry of the multinational supermarket firms into Malaysia has radically 
changed the retail sector from a traditional and sleazy outfit into a modern and large 
scale retail concept. These firms have also captured more than two thirds of the 
supermarket share vis-a-vis local supermarket firms because of their efficiency and 
related technological advantage. 
While the major players of the supermarket sector in developing countries are 
in the hands of foreign owned firms, it was different for the UK, where its major 
supermarket firms are from home grown capital. Therefore, since the driver of the 
supermarket development in the developing economies was substantially FDI from 
outside these regions, the next chapter will look at the FDI theory in explaining the 
internationalisation of supermarket firms. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT THEORY 
4.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish to what extent existing FDI theories 
can be useful in explaining the internationalisation of multinational supermarket 
firms whose activities span primary, secondary and tertiary sectors in the host 
country. 
The main conclusion will be that, while useful, the existing theories of FDI 
have not addressed the issues of vertical integration or coordination in ways which 
might be appropriate for application with reference to supermarkets in particular. 
Nor do existing FDI theories focus on issues of regulation. The existing empirical 
works on FDI are aggregated and it will be argued that aggregated approaches are 
not well suited to issues with reference to entry conditions and regulation at the 
industry level. 
Within these contexts, Section 4.1 of this chapter will enrich our 
understanding of the definition and measurement of FDI as well as of MNFs, since 
these two are interrelated. A_review on the general theoretical framework and the 
literature of FDI will be presented in Sectio A. 2. 'This will provide a benchmark of 
the scope and limitations of the existing FDI literature in explaining the entry of the 
MNFs into the host country. The main contribution of this chapter is in Section 4.3. 
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This section will evaluate whether the literature on FDI theory is adequate to explain 
retail internationalisation, especially which involves supermarket firms and inter- 
industry linkages between other sectors as well as regulation in particular. 
4.1 Definitions and Measurement of FDI 
4.1.1 Definitions 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1993, Section 359) defines FDI as 
"an investment that reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident 
entity in one economy in an enterprise resident in another economy"24. The lasting 
interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor 
and the foreign enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the 
management of the enterprise (UNCTAD, 1998). Similarly, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO, 1996 p. 46) states that: "FDI occurs when an investor based in 
one country (the home country) acquires an asset in another country (the host 
country) with the intent to manage that asset". This WTO document goes on to 
argue that it is the management dimension which includes the elements of influence 
and control and the effective voice of decision making that distinguishes between 
FDI and other types of foreign investment such as portfolio investment25. 
24 See also OECD (b) 1996, definition of FDI. 
25 See also Casson (1979) who distinguished FDI from other forms of foreign investment on the basis 
that it involves not only ownership but also effective foreign control. 
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From the perspectives of Dunning (1996) and IMF (1985), FDI generally 
involves the transfer of a package of resources, including technological, managerial, 
marketing expertise and entrepreneurship in addition to capital: these may have an 
even greater impact than the capital flows on a recipient country's production 
capabilities. Daniels and Radebaugh (1998) argued that financial capital is not the 
only means for the investor to gain equity, as technology, expertise and markets can 
be exchanged for an interest in foreign company. This implies that FDI does not 
only involve financial capital but also physical as well as human capital such as 
management expertise and entrepreneurial skills, which are more important to the 
supermarket activity. De Mello (1997)26 adopts a broader perspective of FDI which 
includes licensing and franchising. His justification for doing so is based on the 
grounds of the recent growth of FDI in the service sectors. However De Mello did 
not mention specifically the types of the service sectors he was referring to. 
Although FDI as defined by Dunning (1996) and IMF (1985) constitutes a 
package of resources, only financial capital is emphasised and recorded by the 
IMF27. This implies that non financial capital transfers are not captured in terms of 
their worth in `monetary values. ' Needless to say there are difficulties even in the 
compilation of financial capital data, particularly in the case of developing countries, 
where governments do not always have the necessary machinery to collect such 
statistics on a systematic basis, 28 what more to include non financial capital transfers 
26 See De Mello (1997 p. 4) for the broader perspectives of FDI definition. 
27 UNCTAD (1998 p. 289) - as defined by the IMF, FDI is a balance of payment concept 
involving 
cross border transfer of funds. 
28 For this reason, UNCTAD 'S World Investment Report relies partly on information provided by the 
home countries rather than on host country information. 
69 
such as human capital as well as technology transfers. Even FDI data collected by 
the IMF and OECD are not fully comparable (World Bank, 1979). 
4.1.2 Modalities of FDI 
WTO (1996) and Kojima (1978) identified three main modalities of FDI 
which foreign firms or MNFs undertake in host countries: 
i. New equity capital 
Equity capital is the value of the MNFs investment in shares in a host country 
enterprise either wholly (greenfield investment) or in a certain proportion. 
An equity capital stake of 10.0 per cent or more of the ordinary shares in an 
incorporated enterprise is normally considered as a threshold for the control 
of assets or for having an effective voice in the management of the enterprise 
and is recorded as FDI (Fry, 1993 and IMF, 1993). Any foreign investment 
not meeting this condition is considered to be a portfolio foreign investment. 
The United States adopted this definition of FDI in its International 
Investment and Trade Services Act (Buckley and Clegg, 2000). However 
Caves (1997) found that countries differ in regard to the minimum percentage 
of equity ownership that they count as a `direct investment' that has control 
over facilities. For example, some may regard foreign ownership of 20.0 per 
cent in an enterprise as constituting "control" while others may consider 50.0 
per cent or more as signifying control. However Berle and Means (1967) 
define `control' as something distinct from both management and 
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ownership29. In Malaysia, an acquisition by a foreign firm of 15.0 per cent or 
more of the voting power in a local enterprise requires the approval of the 
Government, since this is regarded as having control of the enterprise (The 
Foreign Investment Committee, 1999). While a greenfield mode of market 
entry was popular in the 1950s and the 1960s, beginning in the mid 1980s, 
mergers and acquisitions were the major mode of foreign market entry 
(World Investment Report, 1997). 
ii. Reinvested earnings 
These are the MNF's share of affiliate earnings (subsidiary) not distributed as 
dividends or remitted to the parent MNFs. These earnings are assumed to be 
reinvested in the affiliate. Reinvested earnings generally constitute a smaller 
proportion of these flows (IMF, 1985) as compared to equity capitals. In 1996 
equity capitals accounted for 78.0 per cent. 
iii. Other capital 
This refers to short or long term borrowing and lending of funds between the 
parent company and its subsidiary and is an important mode of `cheap' 
financial resources for the subsidiary company. This cheap and easy access 
to financial capital is rather pertinent to the MNFs entering foreign markets, 
where the risks are high. 
29 For a detailed discussion see Berle and Means (1967 p. 66), Chapter V: The Evolution of Control. 
As defined by the authors, control lies "in the hands of the individual or group who have the actual 
power to select the board of directors (or its majority), either by mobilising the legal right to choose 
them ..... or 
by exerting pressure which influences their choice. " 
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These three modes of market entry identified by WTO and Kojima again 
refer only to financial capital. They do not include other forms of capital such as 
expertise and human capital and also technology transfer. This again implies that the 
export of such capital did not enter the FDI statistical data sheet of the host country. 
As such it can be argued that the amount of FDI flows is underestimated and if all 
forms of capital flows are taken into account, then figures compiled by international 
bodies such as the World Bank and the IMF are possibly grossly inadequate in 
estimating FDI flows3o 
4.1.3 Relations between FDI and the MNFs 
Dunning (1996) argues that before the FDI theories were developed, 
economists saw FDI as a phenomenon that was a direct consequence of the MNFs. 
For that reason one cannot fully understand either the MNFs or FDI without the other 
and in any case a definition of MNFs is also needed. Lall (1976) states that the exact 
meanings of the terms `transnational' or `multinational' have not been clearly 
defined. He emphasised three distinct areas in order to characterise the Transnational 
Corporation (TNC)31, namely, economic, organisational and the motivational 
dimension. These dimensions may be interpreted to include entrepreneurship and 
managerial skills, thus incorporating both physical and human capital. Definitions 
by Dunning (1996), Caves (1982 and 1997), Todaro (1989), Hertner (1986) and 
30 Markusen (1991 p. 15) argues that " ............. the 
book value of FDI investment which is basically 
a valuation of investment in plant and equipment, reveal only limited information about the true value 
of the investment. To the extent that a major feature of FDI is the transfer of technology, management 
know-how, marketing networks, and so forth, recorded values of FDI may seriously underestimate the 
true economic value........ 
31 Many authors use them interchangeably for the same meaning. 
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Buckley and Casson (1976) of the TNC refer to enterprises which own or control 
value added activities in two or more countries and for which the usual mode of 
ownership and control is by FDI. In contrast, McManus (1972) argued that the 
expansion of firms abroad is not foreign investment, which is an international 
transfer of capital, but it is the extension of managerial controls over certain 
activities. 
Although there is no universally accepted definition of a MNF, the definition 
put forward by the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) 
is broad and refers to all enterprises which control assets - factories, mines, sale 
offices and the like-in two or more countries32 (UNCTC, 1978 and 1984). Again, 
here, only physical assets are being emphasized to represent control but control may 
also be non-physical such as management control, which is more effective in 
decision making then merely controlling assets, since assets can be leased from other 
firms which in turn can be used for production. Thus it can be argued that MNFs 
which control assets do not necessarily control the management. Walters and Blake 
(1992) defined MNFs as all firms, industrial, service or financial, doing international 
business of all types within a myriad of international structures. The term is 
sometimes qualified by specifying that firms should have a certain minimum level of 
overseas activities, either in terms of the number of countries in which they operate 
or the proportion of production, assets, or employment overseas, and they should be 
of a certain minimum size. 
32 UNCTC used the term Transnational Corporation, TNC instead of MNF. 
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MNFs are incorporated or unincorporated enterprises comprising parent 
enterprises and their foreign affiliates that can be classified to be of the horizontal or 
vertical type according to their motive of operations (UNCTAD, 2001). In general 
terms, horizontal MNFs conduct FDI in order to have access to some host country 
market, while vertical FDI is undertaken to reap benefits from international factor 
price differences and also because of factor endowments such as the extractive 
industries. In this context it was argued that if MNFs were exactly identical to 
domestic firms, they would not find it profitable to enter the domestic market. From 
the preceding discussions, a summary of the definitions of MNFs by the various 
authors is presented in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 
Defmitions of MNFs 
Authors Definition 
McManus (1972) 
Lall (1976) 
UNCTC (1978 and 1984) 
Buckley and Casson (1976), Caves 
(1982,1987), Hertner (1986), 
Todaro (1989) and Dunning (1996) 
Walters and Blake (1982) 
UNCTAD (2001) 
4.2 Theories of FDI 
An extension of managerial control over 
certain activities abroad and not FDI which is 
an international transfer of capital. 
Three distinct dimensions of MNFs, namely, 
economic, organisational and motivational. 
An enterprise which controls assets in more 
than one country in any field of activity. 
An enterprise which owns or controls activities 
in more than one country. 
An enterprise doing international business of 
all types and of certain minimum size. 
An enterprise comprising parent firm and its 
foreign affiliates that is involved in horizontal 
or vertical activities in the host country. 
In the previous section the focus was on the definition of FDI and the 
methodological deficiencies in capturing the actual extent of `capital' flows, the 
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modalities and also the extent to which firms could be categorised as having `MNF 
status' and which could not. In this section we turn to the literature on the theory of 
FDI and how this theory can be linked to the internationalisation of supermarket 
firms, especially with regard to entry into and regulation in the host country. 
4.2.1 The General Context 
Ever since the internationalisation of capital and the activities of the MNFs 
began, so there were theories that seek to explain the process involved. According to 
Dent (1997), the theory of international production can be traced as far back as 1909, 
when Alfred Weber published his work on the Theory of the Location of Industries. 
Lall and Streeten (1977) had earlier identified two `pure' economic theories, which 
in their `rigorous' neo-classical form may be relevant to the analysis of foreign 
investment, that of the trade-theoretic approach in its familiar Heckscher-Ohlin form 
and the micro-economic theory of the firm approach. Later Kojima (1978) and also 
Huang (1997) identified three major strands in the literature on the theories of FDI 
and the MNFs: the industrial organisation approach, the business administration 
approach or the theory of the firm and the product cycle approach. The latest 
approach to explain international production was the Global Competition Theories, 
where the world economy is viewed as a single market and production area (Dent, 
1997). To accommodate such an enormous literature of international production and 
capital flows, Dunning et al. 33 (1986) agreed that different schools of thought will 
33 See Table 2.1 (pp. 21-24): Development of the Theory of International Production - draws upon six 
different strands of thought: Theory of Capital Movements, Trade Theory, Location Theory, Theory 
of Industrial Organisation, Theory of Innovation and Theory of the Firm. 
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have different approaches to explaining international production and FDI, partly 
because of the different historical circumstances surrounding their origins. 
But according to Dunning (1993), prior to the 1960s, there was no established 
theory of the MNFs or of FDI and attempts to explain the activities of the MNFs 
outside their national boundaries represented an amalgam of various approaches and 
of country specific studies. The approaches identified in Dunning (1993) are the 
theory of capital movements (Iversen, 1935), empirical country specific studies of 
locational choice starting with Southard (1931) and the modifications to neo-classical 
trade theory initiated by Williams (1929). These approaches could not be considered 
as distinguished theories of international production because the ownership and 
internalisation advantages of the firm were not integrated into their analysis, 
although these two advantages are considered as an integral part in explaining 
international production (Dunning et al. 1986). This probably explains why Weber's 
Theory on the Location of Industries was hardly mentioned in textbooks on FDI and 
MNFs. 
In the trade theory, foreign production can be a substitute for exports, as it 
can influence the terms of trade and thus change the whole pattern of production and 
specialisation. However in the neo-classical world of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade 
traditional model, there is no space for FDI. This theory stipulates that any 
disequilibrium in the prices of goods or factors across countries brought about by 
different factor endowments and comparative advantage would be immediately 
corrected by international movements of goods. A country tends to export those 
goods, which are intensively the country's abundant factor and to import goods, 
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which are intensively the scarce factor. But the trade model does not explain why 
MNFs prefer to set production facilities in countries endowed with abundant 
resources. It also ignores the dimension of management, productivity and also of 
control and the issue of ownership did not matter. 
Drabek (1998 p. 11) for example concluded that having surveyed the 
empirical literature, the link between trade and FDI was ascertained: "I have 
compiled what I believe to be all the major studies that address the question of the 
extent to which trade and FDI are substitutable or complementary........... and most 
of the literature points to the case of complementarities". This is understandable 
because traditionally trade and FDI theories have been developed separately. The 
theory of FDI tries to explain why a firm invests in particular countries and uses the 
notion of ownership, internalisation and location advantage as determinants of 
investment choice. In contrast, trade theory, which was developed much earlier, is 
constructed on the premise on why countries trade with others, and stressed the 
principle of comparative advantage as the determinant of trade patterns. 
The most influential among the early approaches in explaining FDI was the 
theory of international capital movements. The international flow of capital or direct 
investment was entirely explained within the neo-classical theory of international 
capital movements (Dunning, 1985). Like other forms of international investment, 
FDI was seen as a response to differences in the rates of return on capital. According 
to this arbitrage theory, capital is assumed to be transacted between independent 
buyers and sellers, without the MNFs coming into the picture and most crucially 
without any intentional value of managing the investment. This assumption is far 
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from the reality of investments undertaken by the MNFs, where the element of 
control and ownership are important factors for international investment, especially 
when it involves the transfer not only of financial capital but also of physical capital, 
embodied in technology. The argument that technology transfers can be effected 
through licensing rather than FDI may not be preferred by the MNFs, especially 
when there are greater returns from direct investments and in cases which involve 
protected technology. Dyker (1999) argues that the MNFs are more liberal in their 
technology transfer policies in the early stages of a particular development but less so 
as the development matures. In the light of the above discussion and the subsequent 
discussion below, the development of the FDI theory may be presented as in Table 
4.2. 
Table 4.2 
Mainstream Theories of FDI 
Before 1960 After 1960 
Alfred Weber (1909) and Southard (1931) - Stephen Hymer (1960) - Theories of 
Theory of the Location of Industries. Industrial Organisation. 
Williams (1929) - Theories of Trade. 
Vernon (1966) - Product Life Cycle Theory. 
Iversen (1935) - Theory of Capital Williamson (1975,1979) and Buckley and 
Movements. Casson (1976) - Theory of the Firm (draws 
upon the work of Coase, 1937). 
Dunning (1971,1993) - Eclectic Paradigm - 
`OLI' - Ownership, Locational and 
Internationalisation 
Dicken (1992) - Global Shift Paradigm 
To discuss the development of the FDI theory, the following section will 
examine five major variants of the theory (section 4.2.2 to section 4.2.6) starting 
from the pioneering work of Stephen Hymer (1960). The purpose of this discussion 
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is to understand the scope of FDI and its effectiveness in explaining the entry of 
international capital especially that of multinational supermarket firms into the host 
country, where they are subjected to regulation and control, at least in the case of 
Malaysia. 
4.2.2 The Pioneering Work of Stephen Hymer 
As pointed out by Dunning (1993), the theory of FDI was only developed 
after 1960 and this was acknowledged by Yamin (1991) who states that the 
dissertation of the late Stephen Hymer (1960) is generally acknowledged to be a path 
breaking work and the foundation in the reformulation of the theory and the 
economic analysis of FDI and the MNFs. Hymer explains the formation and the 
economic activities of the MNFs based upon the industrial organisation theory. In 
Hymer's view, whilst the prevailing explanation of international capital movement 
relied exclusively upon a neo-classical financial theory of portfolio flows where 
capital moves in response to changes in interests rate (or profit) differentials, such 
differences could not explain FDI, despite the evidence of sectoral cross investment 
and the existence of large MNFs with intra-industry trade. 
Hymer argued that the unique feature of FDI is a mechanism by which the 
MNFs maintain control over productive activities outside their national boundaries. 
That is: FDI means international production. He was also the first to expose the 
deficiencies of the capital arbitrage theory. The main flaw of the neo-classical 
theory, according to him, was its inability to explain why MNFs transfer their 
intermediate product such as knowledge or technology among their units across 
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different nations, while still retaining property rights over such assets. It was also 
unable to explain why maintaining ownership specific advantage is important to the 
MNFs. 
Hymer also observed that the capital theory was inconsistent with several 
obvious patterns in the behaviour of the MNFs. First the United States had long 
shown net exports of FDI but at the same time also received net inflows of portfolio 
capital. But how could equity capital be cheap and portfolio capital dear in the 
United States? Second, the capital theory is also unable to explain why MNFs move 
in both directions across national boundaries and some countries are both home bases 
for many MNFs and host to many subsidiaries controlled abroad. Finally, if FDI was 
due to pure arbitrage of capital, large financial intermediaries should be prominent 
participants. However non-financial companies make up most of the crowd in the 
form of manufacturing companies. Furthermore, an international difference in 
expected returns is not sufficient to induce FDI (Caves, 1982). Under perfect 
markets, an increase in the short run profits in one country would not induce an 
influx of international investment. Instead, it would attract new entrants that would 
eliminate any excess profits. Perfect markets and MNFs are not compatible (Hymer, 
1960, Kindleberger 1969). In the words of Kindleberger (1969), direct investment 
belongs more to the theory of industrial organisation than to that of international 
capital movements. Hafbauer (1975) reinforced the statement when he argued that 
foreign investment depends on demand elasticities and factors of production, not just 
capital-cost differences. The neo-classical financial theory also failed to explain the 
two way flows of capital between countries with similar factor proportions 
(Cantwell, 1991). If interest rate is all that matters in capital movements, then why 
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does the MNF borrow in the host country, even when the rates are higher than in the 
home country? (Dunning, 1998). 
The thrust of Hymer's thesis can be summarised in two inter-related 
statements. First, FDI is not simply inter-country flows of capital, responding to 
interest-rate differentials. Second, in order to explain FDI it is also necessary to 
explain why firms find it profitable to control firms in other countries. It follows 
from these that the movements of capital associated with FDI are not simply a 
response to higher rates of interest in the host countries but a means of providing 
financing for international operations undertaken in the host countries. Firms that 
invest abroad are firms that possess rent yielding ownership advantages such as 
technology that could take advantage of the technology deficient country or the 
expanding host market economies. But why do firms choose FDI and not licensing 
or exporting? Hymer explained that, in the presence of market imperfections, FDI is 
preferable to exporting and licensing as a method of exploiting the rents inherent in 
the advantages firms possess, unlike the situation in a perfect market where the latter 
would be preferable to FDI. In addition Pavitt (1971) argued that licensing, 
exporting and joint ventures give other firms legal rights and technological 
knowledge which can be used against the licensor. 
In Hymer's view, the MNF is a creature of market imperfection, which uses 
its ability of superiority, searching for control in imperfect markets in order to 
maximise profits and to remove competition, or to exploit an advantage. As 
Cantwell (1989) argues, Hymer saw the firm as an active agent raising entry barriers, 
market power and colluding with other firms in the same industry for the purpose of 
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strengthening their oligopolistic power to capture maximum returns from their 
ownership advantages. Since Hymer contended that FDI is the preferred mode for 
entry by the MNFs in foreign markets, this contention will pose interesting questions 
on the reception of the host countries especially on the welfare implications of FDI. 
Many researchers34 have touched on this aspect, especially with regard to developing 
countries. 
Hymer's notion of FDI and the MNFs was not free of critics. The main one 
focused on its limited explanatory power, which cannot predict the country pattern of 
FDI or its industrial pattern (Aliber 1970). This critic goes on to say that the theory 
lacks an element of "foreignness" in the sense that the theory does not incorporate 
any of the factors that distinguish national economies in its explanatory variables. 
Lall (1977) for instance argues that for FDI to occur, ownership advantages may be a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition. The theory is also criticised for explaining 
only the initial act of FDI and not its growth. Besides, this theory pays little attention 
to the locational decisions of the MNFs, nor does it explain why, in spite of their 
advantages, some MNFs fail to internationalise and become successful MNFs. Also, 
Hymer did not focus on any particular advantage and whether all particular 
advantages were equally important and suitable as a basis for FDI and international 
operations. A related point is that the advantages possessed by the MNFs could be 
exploited not only through FDI but also by exporting, which Hymer did not 
sufficiently examine. It cannot be denied that the possession of advantages is a 
34 See the chapter on the Transfers of Technology by Balasubrmanyam (1989), Pavitt (1971), 
Blomstrom (1983) and also Caves (1996). 
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necessary precondition of FDI; for example, the advantage of having a scale 
economy is a precondition for the internationalisation of supermarket firms. 
Other theories of FDI that build upon the work of Her and which are 
influential in explaining the internationalisation of capital and the MNFs are 
discussed below. 
4.2.3 Product Life Cycle Theory 
One of the antecedents of the FDI literature is the product life cycle theory 
pioneered by Vernon (1966). The main ingredients behind Vernon's product life 
cycle theory involves three stage interactions between technology, international 
production and trade or in the words of Kojima (1978), the product life cycle theory 
is about the process of "innovation, growth and maturity". The theory described the 
production of a product in America, a technologically advanced country with factor 
endowments of highly skilled labour and R&D resources matched with a highly 
sophisticated demand. The chain reaction to this technological leadership led to 
mass production and bulk sales leading to the export of the product to other 
developed countries. As demand expands, the mature stage of the product is 
reached; the product becomes standardised and instead unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour become important. This allows production to be located in the importing 
country based on a lower cost location, most probably that of cheap labour in 
developing countries. The type of industries usually involved tended to be 
industries, which had no great need of sophisticated industrial environment. 
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Therefore the ideas of Vernon emphasise the factor cost advantage of host countries, 
especially the locational dimension. 
But in a critique of this theory, Kojima (1978) argued that since the theory is 
about the process of "birth, growth, maturity and decline of individual commodities", 
its relation with FDI is not clear. The export of standardised products to importing 
countries did not justify FDI. Secondly, the question may also arise: At what stage in 
the product cycle is there reason for FDI to be undertaken? Vernon's product cycle 
theory is not based upon the principle of comparative cost, which allowed FDI to 
take place. The third argument put forth by Kojima is that there was no mention of 
such important factors as the relation to the economy of the investor country to that 
of the host country, nor of the joint-venture development of both the host and 
investing country, that is, comparative cost. Another critique, by Clegg (1987), 
claimed that the product cycle is not, in itself, a complete theory of FDI, as it does 
not explain the ownership of production. Later, Vernon (1971, p. 108) himself 
acknowledged that "by 1970, the product cycle model was beginning in some 
respects to be inadequate as a way of looking at the US-controlled multinational 
enterprise". But Dunning (1993) supported the theory by contrasting it to other 
economic theory of foreign production and FDI, which are static and only explain 
production at discrete points of time, rather than the path of change between this 
points of time; therefore the product cycle theory is somewhat more dynamic. It 
relates the changing propensity of firms to engage in FDI as the product they produce 
moves from the initial stage to its mature stage. This theory can be further criticised 
on the ground that it only refers to firms engaged in production. However, it neglects 
firms in services, especially retailing firms such as multinational supermarket firms, 
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where the products involved are not just `finished goods' but more importantly it also 
involves, managerial and entrepreneurship skills. 
4.2.4 Theory of the Firm 
The next theory that was used to explain FDI is the Theory of the Firm. It 
was an early theory which draws upon the work of Coase (1937), who argued that 
firms are created because the additional costs of organising them is cheaper than the 
transaction costs when individuals conduct business with each other using the 
market. Therefore firms should conduct internally only those activities that cannot be 
performed more cheaply in the market or by another firm. The transaction costs 
referred to are the costs of carrying out market exchanges, which include contracting, 
the cost of searching, negotiating and policing agreements. For Williamson (1975), 
market failure due to high costs of transacting is the outcome of the co-existence of 
three main factors: bounded rationality, opportunism and asset specificity which give 
rise to high transaction cost. Williamson argues that these three conditions are 
frequently present simultaneously in today's market economies, resulting in market 
failures. To avoid all these, MNFs prefer to establish subsidiaries abroad through 
FDI. 
Kojima (1987) argues that this theory views the activities of FDI as a natural 
consequence of the growth of a firm. Therefore as the firm widens its territorial 
horizons, such as in international markets, its entire organisation changes. It may 
involve strengthening and creating new business division in the firm such as an 
export section, or international business division, and the next stage will be the 
85 
setting up of subsidiaries in other parts of the globe. Dunning (1971) added that 
firms, which are international in operation, may have competitive advantages over 
domestic firms. They can draw upon their management experience in different 
economic environment. Even if the firm faces new challenges and problems, it is in 
a better position to overcome them. In this context, Buckley and Casson (1976) 
argue that firms internalise in order to avoid market imperfections and minimise 
transaction cost. They identified five aspects (pp. 37-38) of market imperfections 
that call for internalisation, one of the critical aspects being government intervention 
or regulation in rates of income and profit. In this regard, Dunning (1971) cited an 
example of how a firm is able to minimise its world tax burden by manipulating its 
intra group prices, by reporting high profits in a low tax country at the expense of 
profit in a high tax country. A firm may also internalise when facing imperfect 
markets for its intangible assets such as its technology and human capital and will 
therefore internalise the advantages that it owns rather than leasing or selling them. 
Therefore the internalisation theory evolves from the concept of market failure. 
Firms thus prefer FDI rather than other modes such as licensing to maximise the 
gains from the firm's advantage. 
4.2.5 Eclectic Paradigm 
Perhaps the most notable among the variants of the FDI theory is the "eclectic 
paradigm" approach developed by Dunning (1971 and 1993). It is based on the 
theories of industrial organisation and of location and of the firm and is popularly 
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known as the `OLI paradigm'35. According to Dunning (1971), the eclectic 
paradigm resulted from his dissatisfaction with existing theories of international 
production: the Hymerian approach, the product cycle theory and the internalisation 
theory. The general proposition is that a country's MNFs are more likely to engage 
in FDI (international production) if three conditions are satisfied. These are net 
ownership specific advantages or competitive advantages (Hymer, 1976); locational 
advantages that the host country offers to the investing firm (Vernon, 1966) and, 
lastly, the ability of the firm to internalise those advantages (Coase, 1937, 
Williamson 1975, Buckley and Casson, 1976). The eclectic paradigm, in other 
words, is interested in identifying and evaluating the most significant variables 
affecting the firm production if it carries out FDI. The advantages identified above 
vary according to country, nature of activity and the characteristics of the firm. 
The concept of ownership advantage is especially important to the eclectic 
paradigm. Dunning (1971) identifies these into two types: first, property rights and/or 
intangible asset advantages which amongst others include product innovation, human 
capital, and technology and second, "common governance" which includes firm size 
and multinationality. The product innovation and firm size advantages are what Bain 
(1956) had earlier identified as economies of scale and product differentiation in his 
study of barriers to entry. In addition, Dunning states that the decision by firms to 
invest abroad will also depend on the location specific advantages offered by the host 
country. These include market size, cheap labour, investment incentives, the level of 
infrastructure development and also regional markets (some of these variables will 
35 The OLI paradigm refers to ownership, locational and internalisation advantages. 
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appear in the FDI model in Chapter Five). The investing firm will therefore evaluate 
the arrays of locational specific advantages of the host country before deciding the 
location that will yield the maximum return from internalising its assets (such as 
economies of scale). Under the `eclectic paradigm' it could be argued that FDI is a 
means of transferring resources, for example, capital, management and technology 
between countries but within the same firm. But one of the main criticisms of 
Dunning's eclectic paradigm approach is that it includes so many variables that it 
loses any operationality. According to Dunning, this is inevitable as a consequence 
of trying to integrate the different motivations behind FDI into one general theory. 
He further added that "the eclectic paradigm is not to offer a full explanation of all 
kinds on international production but of ingredients of particular types of foreign 
value added activity" (Dunning, 1991, p. 125). Further analysis suggests that the 
`OLI paradigm' by Dunning was in fact an amalgamation of the various variants of 
the FDI theories put together. In this context Dent (1997) argued that the `OLI 
paradigm' can be further criticised on the grounds that it only offers a series of inter 
related factors for international production by firms, rather than providing a deeper 
explanation for it. In the context of explaining the OLI paradigm to the supermarket 
firms, ownership advantage is important to multinational supermarket firms for the 
purpose of internalising their superiority in terms of economy of scale advantage, 
entrepreneurship skills, management as well as marketing expertise. Supermarket 
firms will definitely depend on the suitability of locational choice as well as 
internalisation expertise to ensure success. The OLI paradigm, however, does not 
explain why some firms are vertically integrated or coordinated, as in the case of 
firms in the supermarket sector which this dissertation will turn to in Chapter Six. 
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4.2.6 Others 
Besides the above mainstream theories of FDI, Dent (1997) identified other 
variants associated with international production and MNFs activity. These include 
The New International Division of Labour (NIDL) and the Global Competition 
Theories. The NIDL theory hinges on the specialisation of labour but fails to explain 
the two way flows of FDI and the complexity of issues relating to the 
internationalisation of firms. Global Competition Theories as described by Dent are 
made up of four strands of ideas which focus on the current nature of global 
competition, not so much between states but more so between MNFs. Dent states 
that among the protagonists of this theory was Dicken (1992) on the global shift 
paradigm which describes the globalisation process as essentially the outcome of 
technological advances where the MNFs are the primary agents of globalisation. The 
process has been further accelerated especially as a result of the more liberal policy 
stance that has swept most countries across the world. According to Mohamad 
(2002) the emphasis of globalisation appears to be on the free flow of capital and 
trade and goods and services, where products are no longer distinguishable or 
identifiable with their country of origin. These global competition theories are 
contemporary paradigms and have become a catch-all concept to describe a range of 
trends and forces leading to openness, integration and interdependence of economies. 
This explains why now firms are less dependent on the characteristics of their home 
country but more dependent on their degree of multinationality. 
As the foregoing discussion on FDI theory shows, the contributions which 
emerged from the work of Hymer (1960) complement rather than competing with 
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each other. The rich literature on the theory can therefore shed considerable light on 
the ability of the theory to explain the internationalisation of service industries 
including multinational supermarkets firms located in Malaysia, which hosts several 
of them. It is especially significant here that, as Dunning (1993) pointed out, FDI in 
services are the fastest growing components of MNFs activities in developed as well 
as developing countries. 
4.3 FDI Theory and Internationalisation of Supermarket Firms -A Critique 
This section will be devoted to examine the applicability of the FDI-MNFs 
theories in explaining the internationalisation of supermarket firms with regard to 
entry and regulatory issues in the host country, as well as its inter industry linkages 
with the other sectors of the economy. The issue of linkages is important because 
supermarket firms are not `stand alone' firms and are highly dependent on other 
firms to provide the final goods for resale. 
The discussion in the preceding section leads us to say that all of the various 
variants of the FDI theory discussed above concerned FDI in production or 
specifically the manufacturing sector. Surprisingly, economists appear to have 
largely ignored the importance of the FDI theory beyond the manufacturing sector 
and only in the 1990s did scholars of international business began to realise the 
relative neglect in studies on the determinants of FDI in services36. It will become 
clear below that the studies that were done on services did not critically explore and 
36 Dunning (1993 p. 243) - especially in empirical studies. 
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evaluate the relevance of the FDI theory to those studies. They take for granted that 
the FDI theories can readily explain their interests. There is a strong historical 
reason for the insufficient attention of the FDI theory to the service sector. Firstly, 
Dunning (1993) argued that because manufacturing was the economic activity that 
was first to be pursued by the developed countries, therefore it is the first to be 
internationalised as compared to other economic activities such as services and 
especially retailing firms. The non-manufacturing firms are "followers" rather than 
leaders. Another reason is that agriculture and manufacturing have always been the 
central focus of attention in the context of growth and development, while services, 
especially from firms involved in retailing, have often been viewed as an area of low 
productivity and limited technological progress and as an appendix to other activities 
(Sauvant, 1996). Thirdly, the internationalisation of supermarket companies (apart 
from Japan) only began to take off in the early 1990s, for example in the case of 
Malaysia and also in the other parts of the developing world (Reardon, 2003). 
Therefore this presents a new phenomenon in terms of the nature of FDI inflows 
(before this, supermarkets only involved local capital). Sauvant (1996) and Jones 
(1996, p. 15) pointed to the fact that "the existing literatures are heavily biased 
towards manufacturing MNFs, and to a much lesser extent MNFs active in extractive 
industries". This can clearly be seen from the pioneering work of Hymer (1960) on 
manufacturing MNFs of the United States and also on subsequent works. 
Even in developing countries such as Malaysia, works drawing on standard 
FDI literature and FDI statistics in the manufacturing sector are well documented as 
compared to other sectors of the economy (Ariff, 1992). The arguments put forward 
earlier by Kirchbach (1982) also found that MNFs involvement in the service sector 
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of developing countries37 has received very little attention. He was correct when he 
predicted that MNFs in the tertiary sector would be more dominating in the 1980s as 
compared to investment in the primary and manufacturing sector. Of the seven 
empirical studies surveyed by De Mello (1997), on the FDI determinants, all except 
one were done on the manufacturing sector. From the above statements, therefore, it 
may be argued that the over concentration of empirical studies on manufacturing FDI 
at the expense of empirical studies, especially on retailing, points to the emphasis of 
the FDI theory on manufacturing. The other point is, if service FDI differs from 
manufacturing FDI, this limits the use of FDI models in manufacturing to explain 
FDI in services. Even empirical studies on the FDI theory tend to be concentrated on 
the demand side determinants of what attracts FDI in the host countries, rather than 
the supply side determinants of why MNFs invest abroad. But this can be readily 
understood, from the perspective of host countries, especially developing economies, 
where the supply side determinants are taken as given and in addition researchers 
may find it less interesting to study the supply side factors. Perhaps what are more 
important to the host country are factors that attract the MNFs into their shores, 
which will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
It is evident, therefore, that tests of the applicability of the MNFs-FDI 
theories to service MNFs over a broad range of service-industries38 have not received 
the attention given to industries in the manufacturing sector. There are also short 
comings in the FDI theory in general as Graham (1978) argued that a unified theory 
37 The developing countries referred to are Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. 
38 Only Li and Guisinger (1992) have undertook a study on the determinants of FDI in nine service 
industries including wholesale and retail. 
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of FDI is lacking in explaining why FDI and MNFs takes place. More recently Jones 
(1996) suggested that MNFs' involvement in the services sector including the retail 
sector needs more research, especially with the globalisation of world business 
activity. Despite the fact that the internationalisation of retailing activity was a major 
feature of the 1990s (Davies and Jones, 1993) even Dunning (1993), put little 
emphasis on FDI activity that does not fit under the "manufacturing" or the 
"resource" seeking category. While it is to be recognized that some studies have 
been done on the evolution of non-manufacturing MNFs' activity, the interest shown 
by researchers in this area, especially by economists, is still minimal and insufficient 
and not in proportion to the importance of services FDI and the MNFs in the service 
sector. This should not be the case, especially in the light of the fact that the services 
and consumer sector is currently the fastest increasing component of MNFs' 
activities, as was mentioned earlier, and a new source of FDI inflows in the case of 
Malaysia. FDI in services constituted nearly 50.0 per cent of the world's stock of 
FDI, estimated at US$1.9 trillion in 1992 (Sauvant, 1996) and the percentage was 
slightly more in 1997 (World Investment Report, 1998) but has surged to more than 
two thirds in the period 2000-2002 (World Investment Report, 2004). It must also be 
emphasised that 85.0 per cent of all FDI in services is in two groups of services- 
trade related activities and banking and finance (UNCTC, 1988). 
However the "export" of consumer based FDI will depend among others on 
the level of economic development of the host country. Therefore, MNFs which are 
involved in retailing will not risk opening overseas subsidiaries if the market of the 
host country is small and the purchasing power is low. This argument is supported by 
the findings of Luo (2000), on the retail prospect of foreign owned supermarkets in 
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China. He states that, given the increase in purchasing power, the retail sector has a 
good outlook, when crowds are lining up at discount stores like Makro and Wal- 
Mart. Sauvant (1996) also found that the demand for consumer service FDI has 
grown resulting from increasing income per capita and other factors such as 
economic development and changes in policies of host governments. On the other 
hand, retailers invest in foreign markets due to saturation in the home market and the 
desire to export a particular retail offering which will occupy an unfilled niche in a 
foreign market. The fact is, this new wave of FDI is gaining momentum, especially 
so in developing countries, where more and more foreign FDI is operating in the 
retailing sector or specifically in the supermarkets and hypermarket activity. In this 
respect Dunning (1993) has pointed that the world of international business in the 
early 1990s was a very different one from that of the late 1950s or even the 1970s. 
This new wave of FDI could be related to the different stages of economic 
development countries might go through and how the significance of the MNFs 
activity changes with economic development (Sauvant 1996). Therefore the resulting 
"globalisation" of economic activity has emerged as an important new reality 
(Bhagwati, 1997) which the existing theory of FDI must be able to capture and adapt. 
Since new forms of investment have emerged, especially in service industries 
(including wholesale/retail distribution, financial services, real estate) which have 
grown much faster than FDI in manufacturing (World Investment Report, 1998), the 
theory has so far failed to predict this. Studies on service FDI are even more 
interesting, given the fact that it is a more heavily regulated sector, especially in 
developing countries, as compared to the manufacturing sector. Malaysia is a good 
example of this. As was discussed in Chapter Two, while FDI in manufacturing is 
not subjected to an equity limit, all forms of services FDI and supermarket activity in 
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particular are subjected to equity restructuring which limits foreign ownership in this 
sector, especially in developing countries. 
Even though Dunning (1993) argues that the neglect of empirical research in 
service FDI is misplaced, he agrees that there have been few substantive works 
written on the internationalisation of the services sector. He quotes a few examples, 
including telecommunications, but again misses the retail sector, especially 
multinational supermarket firms. He argues that the apparent neglect of services 
arises because many services are, in fact, supplied by goods producing firms and it is 
therefore difficult to distinguish between specialised service MNFs and MNFs that 
produce services. Nevertheless there are certain characteristics that Dunning 
identified as being distinctive to MNFs activity in services. Firstly, intra-firm 
specialisation such as the international division of labour has not occurred to the 
same extent in the services sector. The second argument is that most FDI in services 
`follows' rather than `leads', investment in goods. This is true in the case of finance 
and insurance service firms, especially Japanese service firms in support of Japanese 
manufacturers (Dent 1997). But in the case of other service sectors such as 
multinational supermarket firms, this second argument lacks credibility because 
supermarket firms do not follow the manufacturer. Instead multinational supermarket 
firms `lead' the local supermarkets in terms of scale economies and advancement in 
innovation and product branding. Thirdly, Dunning (1993) argued that many services 
MNFs are not capital intensive and their value added is best measured by sales 
figures, net output or employment. This argument may be contested. Multinational 
supermarket companies investing in the host country are not the `one off type of 
investment. Initially the investment to build one supermarket may be small relative 
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to investment made in plants and machinery of the manufacturing firm. But, as the 
host economy grows, the supermarket firms may find it necessary to add more 
outlets to serve the market demands of the host country and this needs additional 
capital outlays which, when added with previous investments, will also be 
substantial. 
Alexander (1989) also agreed that even though international retailing is not a 
new phenomenon, the study in this particular area is still under-researched. He 
pointed out that Woolworths' operation was introduced into the UK from the US in 
the first decade of the 20th century and the French Group, Carrefour has operations in 
other European countries and South America. FDI inflows have diversified in its 
sectoral composition over the 1980s, away from the historical preponderance of raw 
materials, extractive industries and manufacturing and into other sectors such as 
mass retailing and services (Bhagwati, 1997). 
The FDI theory is macro and aggregated in approach and, as such, issues 
concerning vertical integration or coordination that may be relevant to supermarket 
firms, which is micro in analysis, are not looked at by the FDI theory. However the 
earliest and most persistent form of backward vertical FDI undertaken by firms based 
in developed economies was with regard to the resource extracting type of activities 
obtaining minerals and agricultural products from third world countries which were 
needed to feed downstream processing firms in the developed countries (Hennart, 
1991). These are vertically integrated firms that have production units located in 
different nations and have the management skills and technologies which could 
control firms in other countries. However according to Yamin (1991) FDI theories 
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and empirical works did not discuss MNFs investments in the host countries from the 
vertical integration point of view but only looked at FDI from the macro 
perspectives. 
The empirical works on FDI and the econometric models developed by other 
authors that will be discussed in Chapter Five are also about aggregate FDI. This is 
not to say that the empirical models are not useful but rather that at best they only 
provide partial answers to the question on entry but not on specific entry such as 
firms in the supermarket activity. The importance of vertical integration/coordination 
issues with regard to supermarkets can be realised based on the advantage of 
synchronising the successive stages of production and marketing with respect to 
quantity, quality, timing of product flows and on the `make or buy' decision. The 
more subtle aspects of the vertical integration and coordination arguments will be 
analysed in Chapter Six. 
The other issue concerning the FDI theory is that too much emphasis is given 
to financial capital flows, to the neglect of the measurement of non financial capital 
such as expertise and entrepreneurship, which is embodied in human capital. While 
financial capital flows as well as physical capital such as plants and machinery can 
be easily measured, the equivalent financial value of human capital or `soft 
technology' is not accounted for in the measurement of financial capital. For 
example, Dyker (1999) argued that the transfer of technology into the host country 
depends on the `soft technology' or human capital. But this is not accounted for in 
FDI inflows. In the context of services firms the `soft technology' which is embodied 
in human capital is more obvious than the physical capital. With this perspective, it 
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may be argued that the essence of supermarket internationalisation involves not only 
the international transfer of capital but, more importantly, the international extension 
and expansion of managerial control over subsidiaries abroad. 
In the light of these arguments, how do service FDI and multinational 
supermarket firms fit into the theory and definition of FDI and the MNFs? 
According to Boddewyn et al. (1986), to answer this question, two conditions must 
be met: first, MNFs must be involved in FDI; secondly, FDI means the transfer of the 
factors of production (ownership or equity dimension as well as resources which 
includes physical as well as human capital) and must include an element of control 
(not necessary ownership) of the foreign subsidiaries abroad. If these conditions are 
not met, these firms will simply be called an "international company" engaging 
either in portfolio investment or in foreign trade. Boddewyn et al. suggest how a 
new definition of the MNFs by the United Nations (1984)39 can remove this 
confusion. This new definition of the multinational enterprise by the United Nations 
which does not involve foreign equity or control such as licensing, franchising and 
management contract could not be brought into the MNFs category. In other words, 
to be recognised as an MNF operating in the host country, it must have the element 
of foreign equity and/or foreign control and multinational supermarket firms have 
these features. The definition given by Buckley and Casson (1976) is that since all 
economic activity is about "adding value", and since to add value is to provide a 
"service", therefore all firms, whether extractive, industrial, commercial, financial, 
39 According to the new definition, Transnational Corporations (also known as MNFs) are enterprises 
comprising entities in two or more countries regardless of the legal forms and fields of activity of 
those entities, which operate under a system of decision making permitting coherent policies and a 
common strategy through one or more decision making centres and in which the entities are so linked 
by ownership or otherwise and to share knowledge, resources and responsibility. 
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retail, etc are essentially service firms. Therefore, all firms are "service" firms and 
all MNFs are ultimately "service MNFs" in some respect (Boddewyn et al., 1986). 
As such, there is no difficulty in fitting the retail firm in the current definition 
of MNFs, but what about the theoretical aspects, how does it fit into the existing 
theory of FDI? Perhaps Dunning's (1981) "eclectic paradigm" theory of FDI may 
provide the answer. As explained by Dawson (1993 p. 27), "Dunning (1981) in a 
general consideration of direct foreign investment, irrespective of sector, suggest 
three factors that together are of importance in establishing whether a firm develops 
direct investment in international operations (i. e. establishes shops of its own)". The 
three factors identified by Dunning's are ownership specific, location specific and 
internalisation advantages. 
Boddewyn et al. (1986) also suggest that, although the existing theory of FDI 
and the MNFs may be applied to service and retailing MNFs, the application must be 
done with caution because of the distinctive characteristics of firms involved in 
international services. While some concepts may be borrowed from the literature on 
industrial internationalisation, their applicability to the retail sector remains limited. 
This is understandable because the rapid phase of internationalisation of the 
supermarket firms is relatively new by comparison with the manufacturing sector. In 
a related study, Li and Guisinger (1992) investigated the applicability of the MNFs- 
FDI theory on nine service multinationals including wholesale and retail. As in any 
other empirical works on FDI, the emphasis is on the demand side determinants that 
influence investment decision of the MNFs into the host country. Consistent with 
previous theoretical discussions (such as by Boddeywn et al. 1986), the empirical 
99 
findings of Li and Guisinger (1992) suggest that the existing theory of FDI and 
MNFs can readily explain international service industries in the confinement of the 
restricted aggregated FDI theory. Even if consumer service multinationals operating 
in the supermarket activity can fit into the perceived theory of FDI and the MNFs 
and as such no separate paradigm for explaining FDI and MNFs in this sector is 
needed40, however, the FDI theory fall short of providing comprehensive answers to 
the question of entry by vertically integrated firms such as supermarkets. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the various definitions of FDI by many different 
parties including the IMF and economists and in general FDI is a long term 
investment which involves control and constitutes a package of resources including 
not only financial but also physical and non physical resources. However in reality 
the statistical measurement of FDI differs widely amongst countries in terms of 
comprehensiveness, timeliness and reliability. Within this context only financial and 
physical capital are included in the FDI statistics. These are more obvious in 
manufacturing FDI but less so in the context of firms in services, such as 
supermarkets, where human capital is more significant (than physical capital) but not 
included in the FDI measurement. The bearers of these cross border investments or 
FDI are MNFs, which are referred to as firms that have subsidiaries in more than one 
country and where the parent firm have control over them. 
40 This contention is supported by Vida and Fairhurst (1998) but on a more cautious note. 
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The literature on FDI theory has been analysed from the perspectives of a 
variety of sub-disciplines of economics, including international trade theory, 
industrial organisational theory and the theory of the firm. As well as Hymer's work, 
other variants including the `product life cycle theory', theory of the firm, the 
`eclectic paradigm' and the global shift paradigm have been reviewed. Each variant 
is an improvement on the earlier works. Throughout, it has been stressed how almost 
exclusively the FDI theory draws upon the internationalisation of multinational firms 
in the manufacturing sector, with little attention to the increasingly important 
services FDI. Therefore, there is a concern about whether the FDI theory is robust in 
explaining the internationalisation of other economic activities such as multinational 
supermarket firms, which may differ from manufacturing firms. This theory is also 
macro in approach and as such it has not looked at issues on vertical 
integration/coordination or regulation at the industry level, which are crucial for 
policy makers, particularly considering the tradeoffs between innovation and the 
impact of entry on local firms. 
This is not to say that the FDI theory is not useful, but the fact that it is 
aggregative and macro in methodology suggests that a disaggregated and micro 
approach may be helpful to complement the aggregated analysis which this 
dissertation will look at in Chapter Six. However policy makers may find that the 
FDI theory is useful in the context of establishing the determinants that attract FDI 
entry, where it may have implications to macro policy and this will be pursued 
econometrically in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN MANUFACTURING AND SERVICES FDI 
5.0 Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to establish a distinction between 
manufacturing and services FDI inflows. This work follows directly from the last 
chapter where it was found that established FDI theories and empirical studies make 
no distinction between firms in manufacturing and firms in services. Section 5.1 will 
begin with a discussion of some of the existing FDI models with respect to the 
variables included in the models as well as the sector and the country of study. 
Following a summary of earlier works in Table 5.1, the main contribution of this 
chapter will be in Section 5.2. This section will investigate the relationship between 
services as well as manufacturing FDI against some macro economic variables, using 
regression techniques. The results of these regressions with respect to the 
significance of the macro economic variables are summarised in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 
and will be discussed in Section 5.3. Diagnostic tests for the relationships developed 
in the preceding section will be discussed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 consists of a 
summary and conclusion and will wrap up this chapter. 
The main finding in this chapter is that, both for Malaysia and for the UK, 
there are differences between services FDI and manufacturing FDI. This in turn will 
provide links to the topics of regulation and of policy which are key themes in 
Chapter Seven. Before that, in Chapter Six, this dissertation will develop the point 
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that, even though the determinants of manufacturing and services related FDI are 
different, in practice they will also be systematically related because investing firms 
are commonly vertically integrated multinationals. In particular, in the case of 
supermarkets, manufacturers and retailers are interrelated by decisions determined by 
the transfer prices stemming from double or multiple marginalisation arguments of 
kinds systematically developed in Chapter Six. With that context it is worth 
emphasizing that the purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence of systematic 
differences between determinants of manufacturing FDI and determinants of services 
FDI at the aggregate level. By contrast, it is the purpose of the next chapter to argue 
more subtly that, despite differences at the aggregate level, in practice manufacturing 
and services are likely to be systematically interrelated at the micro level. 
5.1 Existing FDI Models 
This section will examine seven FDI models which represent existing FDI 
models regarding entry decisions of FDI into specific sectors as well as into specific 
types of countries (developed as well as developing countries). The main reason for 
reviewing these models is with a view to comparing and contrasting the determinants 
that will be used in the aggregate model that may influence entry decisions of 
services and manufacturing FDI with the examples of the UK and Malaysia. 
One of the models is by Beer and Cory (1996) on the locational 
determinants of US FDI in the European Union (EU). They investigated two 
dependent variables; total US FDI in the EU and US FDI in manufacturing and both 
models covered the periods 1977-1989 (11 years) and for 11 of the 12 European 
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countries41. Data were gathered from the U. S. Department of Commerce, the IMF 
and the World Bank Tables. Estimation was by Generalised Least Squares (GLS) 
but the F-tests are from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The mathematical 
expression for the model is given by: - 
Y, =ao +a, GNPt_1 +a2[gGNPit_i -gGNP... r_t]+a3[WP; r_, -WP, r_, ]+a4EXPt _l 
+a5INTEit +a6[GROSSI1 -GROSSt,, t_1 +a7[TAX; t_I -TAX, t_1]+a8TAR1 +a9CUL; +e; t(5.1) 
[where Y1 is US FDI in country i during period t, GNP, _, refers to market size, 
gGNP,,, _1 - gGNP, _, 
is the growth rate differentials between country i and the US at period 
t-1, WP,., 
_ý - 
W, P,,,, 
-, are wages 
divided by productivity differential between country i and the 
US at period t-1, EXP, r_, 
is export divided by GNP (openness variable) of country i at period 
t-1, INTE,; refers to differential interest rate, GROSS,, - GROSS,,, t-, 
is the differential of 
gross fixed capital formation to GNP of country i and the US at period t-1, 
TAX; 
r_1-TAXSt_1 
is the tax rate differential between country i and the US at period t-1, 
TAR, is tariffs and CUL; is cultural similarity] 
Two regression results were obtained for the two dependent variables. Of 
the nine variables used in both the regressions, only three variables in both 
regressions were positive and significant. These are: the openness variable (EXF, _, 
), 
the export variable (EXP; t_1) variable and the cultural variable (CUL; ). While the 
market size variable is positive and significant in attracting US FDI in 
manufacturing, this variable was not significant for total US FDI. This suggests that 
different types of FDI are attracted to different determinants. The growth rate and 
the gross fixed capital formation variables, however, do not have the expected 
positive signs in both regressions, indicating that these variables are not important in 
attracting FDI inflows in this analysis. 
41 Except Luxembourg 
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Govindan (1997) developed a model for the determinants of manufacturing 
FDI in Malaysia. He argued that the inflow of FDI into Malaysia was attributed to 
the country's open trade and investment policies and its locational advantages. 
Using time series data for the period 1970-1995 which were obtained from the 
Malaysian Industrial Development Authority, he estimated three equations by 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) methods as follows: 
FDIQ 
a+ ßGDPGR + 
0M 
- 2INFL - WAGE + cpTAX + wNNEP (5.2) Q GDP 
FDIQ 
=a+QGDPGR+ 
ýM 
-&NFL-NAGE+17SMLL+cpTAX+wNEP (5.3) Q GDP 
FAQ 
=a+ , 
ßGDPGR + 
GD 
+ ENFL - YLAB + coTAX + WNEP (5.4) 
[where 
FýQ 
is the share of output of foreign firm in total manufacturing output, GDPGR is 
the annual rate of growth of GDP in real terms, 
GP 
is imports as percentage of GDP (openness 
variable), INFL is the annual rate of inflation, WAGE is the average monthly wages per 
employee in manufacturing, TAX refers to percentage of projects approved by the government 
with incentive to total projects approved, NEP is the government equity ownership rate, 
SKILL is labour productivity in manufacturing and LAB refers to unit labour cost (index)]. 
The results of the estimated equations showed that the rate of growth does 
not exert a major influence on manufacturing FDI in Malaysia. Only the openness 
and the labour coefficients were found to be statistically significant in attracting 
manufacturing FDI in Malaysia. 
Tsai (1991) developed a model for the determinants of FDI in Taiwan. 
From his review of the empirical literature, Tsai argued that the potential demand 
side determinants in Taiwan consist of the domestic market, incentives policies and 
cheap labour. Besides the demand side variables, he also argued that supply side 
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arguments play a crucial role in determining FDI inflows. Time-series data of 28 
years for the period 1958 to 1985 were used to obtain empirical results by means of 
an OLS technique using the logarithmic formulation. He estimated two equations as 
specified below: 
FDI = f(AY, Dl, D2, D3) (5.5) 
RFDI = g(RAY, RPCGDP, D3) (5.6) 
[where FDI refers to actual flow of FDI into Taiwan in a given year, AY is annual change of 
GDP in Taiwan. D1 and D2 represent the two major economic policy changes related to FDI 
during 1958-85, RFDI refers to actual inflows of FDI into Taiwan in a given year divided by 
FDI in all Least Developed Countries (LDCs) or non-oil exporting LDCs in the 
corresponding year, RAY is the annual change of GDP in Taiwan divided by the annual 
change of GDP in all LDCs or non-oil exporting LDCs in the corresponding years, 
RPCGDP refers to the per capita GDP in Taiwan in a given year divided by per capita GDP 
in all LDCs or non-oil exporting LDCs in the corresponding year, D3 is a dummy to 
represent periods with export-oriented FDI and period with domestic market-oriented FDI]. 
Using (5.5) Tsai found that the ever growing domestic market is a crucial 
determinant for FDI in Taiwan. However, using equation (5.6), he found that 
Taiwan's relatively outstanding economic performance as reflected in the expanding 
domestic market and ever increasing per capita GDP was not attractive to FDI. Thus 
he argued that the supply side determinants were more important than market size. 
As such, a demand side model such as equation (5.5) cannot adequately explain the 
phenomenon of FDI, at least for the case of Taiwan. 
Lim (1983) developed a model to test whether fiscal incentives are 
necessary to attract FDI in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The study used 
cross-sectional data for 27 LDCs for the period 1965-1973. The model was 
estimated by OLS using the logarithmic formulation as follows. 
F= f(IG, ME, ED, GR) (5.7) 
[where F is the average of the annual per capita total FDI, IG refers to incentives package 
(dummy variable), ME is the average of the annual percentage shares of minerals in the 
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LDCs total merchandise exports, ED refers to the level of economic development measured by per capita GDP while GR is the rate of economic growth]. 
The coefficients of ME and ED were statistically significant while IG 
(incentives package) had an unexpected negative sign. The GR variable was not 
statistically significant, which suggests that FDI here is more concerned with per 
capita income rather than economic growth or incentives. 
A model with the purpose of explaining locational determinants of FDI 
among industrialised countries was developed by Culem (1988). Six industrialised 
countries were chosen, namely, US, Germany, France, UK, Netherlands and 
Belgium. Each observation pertained to a bilateral relationship, from country a to 
country b, or vice versa, for a given year. The sample pooled cross-section and 
chronological annual data over a 14 year period and the choice of countries and of 
years were basically determined by the availability of data. Two models were used to 
explain locational determinants of the overall sample of bilateral FDI flows among 
the six industrialised countries, locational determinants of US FDI with the other five 
countries, locational determinants of the European FDIs in the US and intra 
European FDIs. The two models were tested, one `without differentials' on the 
growth rate and labour cost and the other `with country differentials' on the growth 
rates and labour costs. The models were as follows: 
FDäab 
=a+a jyb_l + a2öyb + a3STRb + a4ULCb + as( yäb 
)_1 + a6(INTb- 
INTw) +E (5.8) 
FDäab 
_ bo +blyb_, + b2(6yb-8ya) + b3STRb + b4(ULCb-ULCa) + bs( yäb 
)_1 + 
Y 
a6(INTb- INTw)+ y (5.9) 
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[Where 
FDIab 
= FDI flow from country a to country b, Ya is the gross national product of Ya 
the investing country a, yb = real GNP of host country lagged one period, 8yb = annual 
growth rate of the real GNP of the host country, 6ya refers to the growth rate of the real GNP 
of the investing country, STRb = share of 1968 tariff rate of host country, ULCb = unit 
labour cost of host country, ULCa refers to unit labour cost of investing country, ( 
Xab a)i- 
export from source to host country divided by nominal GNP of source country lagged one 
period (openness variable) and INTb-INTO nominal interest rate differential between host 
country and the rest of the world] 
Only the complete sample results will be discussed here. All the estimated 
coefficients are statistically significant in both equations except the tariff rate STRb 
which has the opposite sign in equation (5.8). It appears that investors in 
industrialised countries prefer a big and expanding market, and even among 
industrialised countries, a high unit cost of labour is a significant deterrent to inward 
FDI. 
Chakrabarti (2001) developed a model to test the determinants that attracts 
FDI to search for empirical linkages between FDI and a variety of economic 
variables. According to Chakrabarti, the literature on FDI is not only extensive but 
controversial as well. He developed an econometric model (controlling for market 
size) on cross country data (135 countries - for the year 1994) on eight determinants 
of FDI via the relationship: 
FDI = ß1 + #2 X +....... ßi Xt (5.10) 
[FDI is FDI inflows, the eight determinants tested are market size (controlling variable), 
taxes on profits, industrial wage rate, imports plus exports to GDP (openness), relative 
exchange rate, average tariffs on imports, annual change of GDP, per capita value of exports 
less imports ($US at current prices)] 
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Chakrabarti found that, besides market size, the openness variable, 
industrial wage index and the per capita value of exports less imports are positive 
and significant. 
A model developed by Li and Guisinger (1992) is of particular interest here 
since it is specifically service sector related. They tested the applicability of the 
MNFs-FDI theories with reference to the locational determinants of service MNFs 
over nine service sectors42 based in Japan, Western Europe and US. They compiled 
data on investment decisions of 168 service firms in nine sectors over the period 
1976-1986. Data were obtained from publications of the United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations, 1988. A single mode143 was developed on the entry 
determinants of those firms over two periods (1976-1980 and 1980-1986) using a 
logistic regression method where: 
P[FI=1] _ 
1 (5.11) 
{1+exp[-(ßo+ß1GDP+ß2FDI +ß1CD+ß4OPEN+ß5ICI +ß6OLIGOP+ßGSIZE)]} 
[P[F1=1] = the probability that a service MNF increased its number of affiliates from 1976 
to 1980, GDP = market size, FDI = the home country business presence, CD = cultural 
distance, OPEN = openness of the home country to the establishment of new foreign service 
subsidiaries, ICI = international competitiveness of the service industry, OLIGOP = global 
oligopolistic reaction in the host country measured by the ratio of the number of other 
foreign service firms with affiliates in industry i, host countryj, besides the service MNFs in 
question divided by the total number of all parent service firms that could establish affiliates 
in industry i, host countryj, SIZE = growth of size of service firms is measured by the annual 
growth rate in revenues (sales)]. 
Only the overall analysis of the model will be summarised here. The 
variables which were statistically significant in determining foreign investment 
decisions by firms are the market size (GDP) of the host country, the openness 
42These are insurance, reinsurance, wholesale, retail, accounting, advertising, construction, publishing 
and airlines. 
43 To avoid multicollinearity, two estimates are presented for each time period. 
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variable, the oligopolistic reaction and also the firm size. Notice that a wage variable 
is not included in this model, in contrast to the models of manufacturing FDI 
developed by Beer and Cory (1996) and Govindan (1997). By contrast with these 
models, too, the services model of Li and Guisinger (1992) also includes new 
variables such as oligopoly and firm size. 
The various types of explanatory variables used in the models discussed 
above are summarised and compared in Table 5.1 below. Since FDI inflows are 
country specific, so are the models. As such, variables which are important and 
significant for one particular country or region (between developed and developing 
countries) may not be important and significant or may have `opposite signs' in 
another country or region. One of the main reasons for this is that different countries 
and different regions are at different stages of economic development. In addition, 
Chakrabarti (2001) argued that the lack of a consensus on the relative importance and 
the direction of impact of the potential determinants of FDI may be explained in part 
by the fact that most authors have considered only a particular set of explanatory 
variables. 
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Table 5.1 
Comparison of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Beer and Cory Govindan Tsai Lim Culem Chakrabarti Li and (1996) (1997) (1991) (1983) (1988) (2001) Guisinger 
1992 
Dependent variables 
Manufacturing / / 
Services 
Aggregate FDI / / / / / 
Determinants 
Market size 
GNP 
AGNP/AGDP /+ /+ 
GDP 
Per capita GDP 
Wages 
Openness 
Export/GNP 
Imports/GDP 
M+X/ GDP 
Index (1-4) 
Interest Rates 
Fixed Capital Form. /+ 
Tax / / / 
Tariffs 
Culture 
Inflation / 
Govt. Policy 
Skill / 
Unit Labour Cost 
Minerals 
Competitiveness 
Oligopoly 
Size 
Per capita value of imports 
and exports 
Key: * significant 
+ opposite sign 
As was noted in Chapter Four, literature on FDI is heavily biased towards 
FDI in the manufacturing sector. So, too, are the models. Even models on 
manufacturing FDI tend to focus on the aggregate level rather than on specific 
disaggregated manufacturing types. Therefore it is not surprising to find that FDI 
models on specific service industries have not been developed. Even the model 
developed by Li and Guisinger (1992) with respect to the service industry is an 
aggregated model consisting of nine service sectors (This is perhaps not surprising 
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given that existing FDI models on manufacturing as was mentioned earlier was also 
on an aggregated basis). 
The various FDI models outlined above do not belong to any particular 
variant of the FDI theories but consist of an amalgam of various variants of the 
theories. As such, it can be argued that the entry of MNFs and the modelling of FDI 
into the host country cannot be explained by just one theory such as the "Product 
Life Cycle Theory", which hinges on comparative cost, but also draws upon other 
variants such as the "Theory of the Firm" approach on the advantage of 
internalisation. Dunning (1991) realised the incomplete approach of the various 
variants of the FDI theories and suggested an amalgam of the various variants where 
he came out with the "OLI paradigm"44. Therefore it can be argued that the FDI 
models that have been developed are based on Dunning's approach. However, even 
Dunning's paradigm was been criticised on the grounds that it still lacks deeper 
explanation of the entry of firms (Dent, 1997). 
Here it is worth emphasizing that no specific econometric model has so far 
been developed on the entry of multinational supermarket firms across countries, 
both in the developed as well as the developing countries. This is so despite the fact 
that, as was discussed in Chapter Three, the internationalisation of such firms was 
particularly noticeable and significant during the last decade, especially via the entry 
of these firms into the developing countries (including Malaysia). 
44Refers to Ownership, Locational and Internalisation advantages. 
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All of the empirical models discussed above agree on the importance of 
economic performance (GNP, GDP, OGNP and AGDP) in the host country as one of 
the main determinants in attracting FDI. The catalytic effect of proven economic 
performance as a measure of the domestic market can be captured by two economic 
variables, firstly the market size variables measured by GNP or GDP and secondly 
the growth variable (AGNP or AGDP). Other things being equal, the higher the level 
of economic development, the greater will be the domestic market and so the greater 
the opportunities for making profits and the incentives to invest. The interpretation 
of the market size hypothesis (GNP or GDP) emphasises the necessity of large 
market size for the exploitation of economies of scale necessary for large scale 
business and may be important for firms dependent on the host economy's market. 
In addition to the models developed above, especially by Tsai (1991), on developing 
country FDI models, other empirical studies of developing countries, for example, by 
Loewendahl and Loewendahl (2001), Estrin et al. (1997) and Yeung (1996) found 
that FDI in developing countries is primarily market seeking, where the goods 
produced are for the consumption of the host market. But this is contrary to the 
result obtained by Govindan (1997), that the domestic market is not a factor in 
attracting manufacturing FDI into Malaysia. This apparent contradiction is 
understandable because the manufacturing FDI that Malaysia has attracted is export 
oriented FDI and most of these industries are located in the export processing zones 
(EPZ) in Malaysia. Among the market size variables commonly used in these 
models is the absolute GNP in real terms, rather than GDP. This is to reflect the 
`true' domestic market which includes income from abroad. 
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The question of whether to use GNP, GDP or a growth rate variable has 
been debated by Root and Ahmad (1979) who suggest that even though commonly 
used, absolute GDP or GNP is a relatively poor indicator of market potential, 
particularly in many developing countries, since it reflects the size of the population 
rather than income. The use of per capita GDP may be appropriate since it reflects 
the income level of the population and this is probably an important indicator that 
multinational companies will consider. Models developed by Lim (1983) and Tsai 
(1992) used the market size approach as suggested by Root and Ahmad (1979) and in 
addition also include the growth rate variable (AGDP) to capture the opportunities a 
growing economy could offer to investors. 
Another problem with the market size theory is that the method for 
measuring a country's market size could be determined by at least four major 
indicators including also the population size. The use of GDP or GNP per capita 
estimates to measure a country market size could be misleading. For example, a 
small country like Singapore with a high GNP per capita may appear more attractive 
than neighbouring Malaysia whose GNP per capita is much lower, but the population 
in Malaysia is over 22 million and the aggregate spending may be higher compared 
to that in Singapore with 3 million people. However the inclusion of population size 
together with the other market size variables into one single equation may also lead 
to multicollinearity problems. In addition, only the models developed by Tsai (1991) 
take into consideration variations in the economy (for example events that affect 
growth) which could be captured using dummy variables. 
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A variety of measures of openness have been used by authors investigating 
the determinants of FDI (see Table 5.1). Four measures have been estimated here, 
namely, M/GDP, X/GDP, X+M/GDP and an index of 1-4 to reflect the variety of 
measures used by authors in this context. The openness variable is significant in all 
of the models that have this variable, as shown in Table 5.1, suggesting that this 
variable is robust in its relationship with FDI and that it is one of the key variables in 
attracting FDI inflows. It is also observed that models peculiar to developing 
countries include government policy or intervention as one of the explanatory 
variables, such as the models developed by Govindan (1997), Tsai (1991) and Lim 
(1983). By contrast, in models for developed economies (Beer and Cory, 1996, and 
Culem, 1988), no such variable is included. It may be that there is a much lower 
level of intervention or restriction with regard to FDI inflows in the developed 
economies in contrast to developing countries, as was discussed in Chapter Two. 
A limitation of the FDI models discussed above is that the models are time 
specific and so could only explain certain inferences at that specific time frame on 
the dependent and explanatory variables and may not be true for other time periods. 
This is not to say that the FDI models that have been developed are not useful, 
especially in the context of developing countries, where FDI is important. It only 
implies that those models could not be used to generalise phenomena at all time 
periods and that the explanatory power of those models is restricted to testing the 
`significance' of the variables affecting entry at that particular point of time only. 
Note that there is no mechanism in these models to discuss government regulation 
with regard to entry, apart from capturing it by a dummy variable, as in the models 
developed by Govindan (1997), Tsai (1991) and Lim (1983). However this does not 
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tell us much: it only indicates whether such a policy is significant or otherwise in 
relation to FDI inflows into the host country, which may be relevant in the context of 
macro policy suitable for policy makers. (This issue is considered further in the 
context of regulation and of policy in Chapters Seven and Eight). 
A more general issue, especially in the case of developing country, is that in 
practice, time series data may not be systematically collected and this may limit the 
development of model building using time series macro aggregate data. Indeed, time 
series data, especially for services FDI, is limited in Malaysia. But these limitations 
will not prevent this chapter from establishing a difference between services and 
manufacturing FDI in the context of Malaysia, which has not been done before. The 
main contribution is to identify the determinants that are associated with services 
FDI which might attract the entry of services MNFs, including multinational 
supermarket firms, from the perspectives of the FDI theory. 
5.2 Model Specifications 
This section will empirically investigate the manufacturing-services 
distinction with the purpose of establishing a difference between services and 
manufacturing FDI using regression analysis. An aggregate model will be developed 
based on an amalgamation of variants of the FDI theories in the spirit of the eclectic 
approach as espoused by Dunning. In Chapter Eight this specification and Dunning's 
work will be reconsidered from the perspective of entry decision by MNFs and 
implications for theory. 
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The model will take into consideration the observations on the existing FDI 
models that were discussed in Section 5.1. In addition it will include events45 that 
occurred during the study period and this will be reflected in the form of a dummy. 
This is a more realistic approach compared to the assumption that no such extreme 
event occurred during the study period. Secondly, the variables of the kind used by 
Li and Guisinger (1992) and Culem (1988) may not be appropriate to be replicated 
because the model developed in this chapter will use aggregate time series data 
instead of cross sectional firm data. 
The model will statistically test two dependent variables: (i) FDI inflows in 
services46 and (ii) FDI inflows in manufacturing. The main rationale, as was 
mentioned earlier, is to determine the service-manufacturing distinction by 
examining those variables that have an effect on the choice of location for 
manufacturing and for services FDI inflows and whether those variables are the same 
or different. Certain policy conjectures with respect to entry and regulation will 
emerge from this and will be pursued further by other means in subsequent chapters. 
From the discussion in Section 5.1, the variables that have been 
documented as being the most important determinants of FDI are the market size 
variable and the growth indicator, which can be measured respectively by GNP or 
GDP and growth rate. This is consistent with the hypothesis that developing 
countries with a high economic growth indicator show signs of an expanding 
as Financial crisis in Malaysia from 1997 to 1998. 
46 Data on service FDI will be used as a proxy for entry of MNFs in the services sector. 
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economy and of an increased market share, which in turn are important signalling 
mechanisms in attracting MNFs and FDI. The market size hypothesis assumes a 
positive association between FDI and the expected sales of MNFs. On the other 
hand, a non significant relationship between FDI and market size would mean that 
MNFs would be more concerned with exports than with supplying domestic markets. 
Since the openness variable of the host country is also found to be 
significant and widely used by others, as was discussed in Section 5.1, this variable 
will be one of the core variables to be estimated in the proposed model. The 
inclusion of this variable in the model may be argued from the point that the 
openness of the host country for MNFs, including multinational supermarket firms, 
means that there is freedom for imported goods to move within the international 
borders and leads to more choice for consumers. It is hypothesised here that the 
openness of the country as measured by the proxy of the ratio of exports plus imports 
to GDP will have a positive effect on determining FDI inflows. This measure of 
openness is used by Chakrabarti (2001 )47 while Beer and Cory (1996) and Culem 
have used exports to GDP as a proxy of openness and Govindan has used imports to 
GDP. Li and Guisinger (1992) used an index between 1 to 4 (1=most and 4=little) as 
an indicator of openness. (Sometimes other indicators have also been used for this 
purpose, such as the percentage of total current revenue that comes from taxes on 
international trade and transactions - see Billington, 1999). Here, imports plus 
exports to GDP [(M+X)/GDP] will be used as the measure of openness because this 
reflects the movement of goods from and into the host country. The coefficient is 
expected to have a positive sign and significant correlation to FDI. 
47 Buch and Lipponer (2004) have also used imports plus exports to GDP as a measure of openness. 
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Besides market size and openness, investment decisions by foreign investors 
are also influenced by macroeconomic instability, reflecting the presence of internal 
economic pressures (Schneider and Frey, 1985 and Govindan, 1997). The reason for 
including a variable to reflect this in the regression is that it allows for the possibility 
that an unstable economy in the host country might affect the investment decisions of 
international investors. The inflation rate will be used as a proxy for the degree of 
macroeconomic instability and the risk or uncertainty associated with it. On the 
other hand, higher inflation might also have a positive impact on the nominal 
dependent variable (Buch and Lipponer, 2004). The GDP price deflator will be used 
here as a measure of inflation. This has an advantage over CPI in that the GDP price 
deflator covers all final expenditure on domestically produced goods and services 
including households and governments, capital expenditure and exports (National 
Statistics UK, 2001). 
As was discussed in Chapter Four, Hymer (1960) argued that interest rates 
differential is not a factor in attracting FDI inflows. In order to incorporate Hymer's 
view, interest rate differentials, lending rates minus London Interbank Offered Rates 
(LIBOR)48 will be included to reflect the financial feature of FDI flows. The 
hypothesis is that lower interest rates in the host country will encourage investors to 
borrow funds in that country, resulting in lower FDI inflows. In other words, 
significantly more funds will flow into the host country whenever the prevailing 
lending interest rate (IR) in the host country is higher. The regression coefficient is 
expected to be negative. 
48 Representing rest of the world. 
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The other variable that has been the subject of intensive research is the 
relationship between FDI flows and exchange rates. The observation that FDI may 
be correlated with exchange rate movements tends to support a common belief that 
FDI may flow into the host country when the exchange rate of the host country is 
weak so that foreign firms are able to purchase the assets of the host country cheaply. 
In support of this argument are a number of empirical studies including Cushman 
(1985 and 1988), Caves (1989), Froot and Stein (1991) and Swenson (1994), which 
have found significant correlation between the depreciation of the US Dollar and 
increased FDI flows in the United States. Conversely, other studies exploring the 
relationship between measures of exchange rate movements and aggregate 
investments, including Ray (1989), Stevens (1992) and Blonigen (1997) have found 
little support for any correlation. At the same time, Blonigen (1997) also argued that 
one reason why most economists have rejected any links between exchange rates and 
FDI flows is that investment decisions are not solely based on price but also on the 
rate of return on investment and other macro economic conditions. We have also 
seen that, at the height of the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) when some of the 
Asian currencies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand) were 
devalued to less than half of their value, instead of seeing inward inflows of FDI, as 
assets were now cheap, the reverse took place - an outward flow of foreign funds. 
One of the reasons may be that the instability of the economy and the potential to 
deteriorate further, which would result in further devaluations of the currency, 
affected investors' confidence. With these perspectives, the real effective exchange 
rate index will be used in the model. 
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As mentioned earlier, the model that is developed in this dissertation will 
take into consideration events such as the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998) which 
affected the rate of economic growth for Malaysia. Figure 5.1 captures the changes 
characterised by a period of negative growth which corresponds to the Asian 
financial crisis. The inclusion of the crisis years in the form of a dummy variable 
(DI) makes the model more dynamic and is hypothesised to have a negative effect 
on FDI inflows. 
Figure 5.1 
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In accordance with the above discussions, the general mathematical 
expression for the purpose of establishing a distinction between services and 
manufacturing determinants of FDI may be written as follows: 
In FDI = ao + a, In GNI _1 
+ a2 In AGDP + a3 In INF + a4 In 
MD p+ 
a5 ln(IR -LIBOR) 
+ a6 In EX + a7Dl +y..................................................................................................... (5.11) 
where 
In denotes natural logarithm 
FDI = Total annual manufacturing FDI inflows and services FDI inflows in real terms (base 
year 1995) 
GNI_1 = GNI in real terms lagged one year (base year 1995). 
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AGDP49= annual growth rate 
INF = GDP price deflator as a proxy for inflation. 
M+X 
GDP = 
Openness of the host country expressed as the ratio of imports plus exports to 
GDP. 
Lending rates-LIBOR = Interest rate differentials between host country and LIBOR. EX= Real effective exchange rate index. 
D1= Dummy variable for financial crisis (1997-1998) 
This relationship is tested using Ordinary Least Square (OLS)50 regression 
using annual time series data for a 21-year period (1980-2000) for manufacturing 
FDI inflows and a 16 year period (1985-2000) for service FDI inflows (Appendix 
5.1) for Malaysia. For the purpose of comparison51 the model was also estimated 
using UK data for manufacturing and services FDI (Appendix 5.2), since data on 
these sectors are available for a much longer period of 26 years (1975-2000). 
The data for manufacturing FDI in Malaysia were obtained from the 
Malaysian Industrial Development Authority, whose data are based on approved 
foreign manufacturing projects (manufacturing FDI) for a particular year. The main 
disadvantage is that projects that have been approved may not be implemented in the 
same year, or at a1152. However this is the only available source of manufacturing 
data systematically collected by the Authority. Data on services FDI were obtained 
from the Central Bank of Malaysia. The data for UK FDI inflows for manufacturing 
and services sector were obtained from the National Statistics UK. Data on 
macroeconomic variables (the independent variables) were obtained from two 
49 AGDP is also included in the model to capture the growth effect. 
50 The OLS technique was chosen because it is one of the most well-known and the most suitable for 
time series data and for country specific purposes (Gujarati, 1995 and Stewart, 1991). 
s' The main reason for using the UK as a comparator is because the UK has a long time series data. 
52 To be consistent with the analysis of the other dependent variable, the lagged variable was not tried. 
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sources, namely, from World Development Indicators (2002) and the International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook, IMF (2001). 
5.3 Empirical Results 
Even though the openness variable, imports plus exports to GDP, was 
considered to be the most appropriate, regression analysis was carried out on all the 
openness variables (imports to GDP, exports to GDP and imports plus exports to 
GDP). These variables were included one at a time in the analysis while retaining 
other variables. Although imports plus exports to GDP is the main variable of 
interest here, the main aim is to show that all the openness variables, as mentioned 
above, are significant. This may relate to taxes, tariffs and subsidies that may have 
links to regulation that will be discussed in Chapter Seven. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 chart 
out the difference of the variables (significant or otherwise) between manufacturing 
and services FDI for the UK and Malaysia, where it is shown that all the three 
measures of the openness variables are significant. 
However only model 5.11 with imports plus exports to GDP (M+X/GDP) as 
the openness variables53 will be reported in detail here. The results for this model are 
as in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 for Malaysia and the UK respectively. The main reason 
for choosing this model is because it is the most appropriate measure of openness in 
the context of this dissertation, as it relates to the regulation parameters (imports and 
exports) that will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
53 See Buch and Lipponer (2004) and Chakrabarti (2001)-these two authors have used imports plus 
exports to GDP as the openness variable. 
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Table 5.2 
Determinants of Manufacturing and Services FDI Inflows in the UK* 
Services FDI UK Manufacturing FDI UK 
Variables t statistics t statistics t statistics t statistics t statistics t statistics 
Real GNL1 
AGDP --- /' /+ /+ 
Inflation /+ / /+ _ /+ /+ 
Exchange rate /// /- / 
Lending rates- /// // / 
Libor 
M/GDP / / 
X/GDP / / 
M+X/GDP / / 
Table 5.3 
Determinants of Manufacturing and Services FDI Inflows in Malaysia* 
Services FDI Manufacturing FDI 
Malaysia Malaysia 
Variables t statistics t statistics t statistics t statistics t statistics t statistics 
Real GNL1 /// // / 
AGDP --- /+ / /+ 
Inflation --- -- - 
Exchange rate --- /- / 
Lending rates- /// // / 
Libor 
DI (crisis) /// /- / 
M/GDP / / 
X/GDP / / 
M+X/GDP / / 
Key 
/= significant 
/+=significant with opposite sign 
-= not significant 
* The results are in Appendix 5.3 
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The Adjusted RZ of the estimates for manufacturing and services FDI inflows 
in the UK and Malaysia indicate that the model is significant overall. The impact of 
market size (GNI_1) on manufacturing and services FDI inflows in Malaysia is found 
to be statistically significant. The market size hypothesis is also consistent and 
significant for manufacturing FDI inflows for the UK. This confirms that market size 
is an important determinant of FDI in manufacturing. However, when the dependent 
variable is services FDI in the UK, market size as proxied by real GNI. 1 is positive 
but not significant. One possible conjecture is that the variable GNI_1 is not a good 
proxy for size in the case of services FDI for the UK. Other work where market size 
(GNI. 1) is positive but not significant is by Beer and Cory (1996). 
With regard to the growth rate variable that is measured by AGDP, the 
service-manufacturing distinction is apparent. The growth rate variable does not 
have the expected positive signs for manufacturing FDI, for either the UK or 
Malaysia, but has positive signs (although not significant) for services FDI for both 
countries. This finding differs from that reported by Culem (1988) and Tsai (1991). 
This difference might be explained by the fact that the models developed by Culem54 
and Tsai used total FDI inflows as their dependent variable, in contrast to the model 
developed in this chapter, which used manufacturing and services FDI inflows as the 
dependent variable. Studies using manufacturing FDI as the dependent variable also 
found that 4GDP is not a crucial factor in attracting manufacturing FDI inflows (see 
Govindan, 1997) and is also negative (see Beer and Cory, 1996). 
sa Culem (1988) also found that the annual growth rate is not significant when his dependent variable 
is EC FDIs in the United States. 
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Table 5.4 
Empirical Results of Real Manufacturing and Real Services FDI Inflows in Malaysia 
Variable manufacturing Services 
Constant -1.20 -52.39 
(-3.70) (-2.13) 
RealGNl 0.99 2.78 
(60.7)* (2.73)* 
AGDP -0.004 0.19 
(-2.55)* (0.64) 
Inflation 0.001 0.21 
(1.06) (1.05) 
Openness 0.68 1.89 
(M+X/GDP) (12.30)* (2.99)* 
Interest Rates -0.01 0.14 
(-2.35)* (2.89)* 
Exchange Rates -0.22 -0.69 
(-2.42)* (-1.10) 
DI -0.15 -0.78 
(-3.09)* (-1.78)** 
Adj. R2 . 90 . 93 
F 35.5 42.7 
DW 1.62 2.21 
Table 5.5 
Empirical Results of Real Manufacturing and Real Services FDI Inflows in the UK 
Variable manufacturing Services 
Constant 4.92 11.38 
(0.76) (0.59) 
Rea1GNl_1 0.56 0.27 
(2.28)* (0.33) 
AGDP -0.13 0.02 
(-5.55)* (0.49) 
Inflation 0.01 0.11 
(6.85)* (4.12)* 
Openness 4.6 7.38 
(M+X/GDP) (8.32)* (3.99)* 
Interest Rates -0.06 -0.14 
(-4.79)* (-3.53)* 
Exchange Rates -0.12 -0.07 
(-2.21)* (-10.2)* 
Adj. R2 . 60 . 75 
F 4.3 10.5 
DW 1.60 1.80 
`significant at the 5% level, ** significant at 10% level, t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Note: Gross fixed capital formation as a proxy for infrastructure facilities was 
formerly included in the model but was dropped because it is not an appropriate 
measure for infrastructural facilities. 
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The inflation coefficients for manufacturing and services FDI in the UK and 
Malaysia, being positive, have unconventional signs. For the UK they are significant. 
However, as stated earlier, Buch and Lipponer (2004) have argued that the impact of 
inflation on FDI is not clear-cut a priori. They argued that, on the one hand, inflation 
is expected to have a negative impact because of the increased macroeconomic 
instability. On the other, Buch and Lipponer argued that higher inflation might also 
have a positive impact on the nominal dependent variable. 
On the openness, both services and manufacturing FDI of the UK and 
Malaysia responded positively to the openness variable (imports plus exports to 
GDP). Most authors have argued that a country's degree of openness to international 
trade will be a relevant factor in influencing the decision of foreign investment. The 
openness variable in this estimate is with regard to `openness to trade' which refers 
to the ease with which goods are imported or exported. (In this context we may 
argue that both the UK and Malaysia have open policies towards manufacturing as 
well as services FDI). The results for the openness variable, which were significant 
for both countries, support the findings of other works by Govindan (1997), Beer and 
Cory (1996), Li and Guisinger (1992) and Culem (1988) and Chakrabarti (2004), all 
of whom showed that the openness variable is positive and statistically significant 
with regard to FDI inflows. 
With regard to the interest rate variable, the regression coefficients for 
manufacturing and services FDI are negative and significant for the UK and also for 
manufacturing FDI in Malaysia, but not for services FDI in Malaysia. In this context 
Culem (1988) and Beer and Cory (1996) argued that high interest rates will 
encourage investors to bring in funds from outside and we may expect FDI inflows 
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to be high, in contrast to a lower interest rates policy which may encourage investors 
to raise more funds in the host country, causing FDI inflows to be low. 
The regression coefficient for the exchange rate is negative and significant 
for manufacturing as well as services FDI for both the UK and Malaysia. This 
highlights the negative impact of an appreciation of the exchange rate. This finding 
concurs with those of Cushman (1985 and 1998), Caves (1989), Froot and Stein 
(1991) and Swenson (1994), although others (see Ray, 1989, Stevens, 1992 and 
Blonigen, 1997) found no relationship between exchange rate and FDI. However, if 
foreign investors are keen to avoid any exchange risk, they may borrow where their 
assets are located. That is, they may borrow in the host country and this may be one 
reason why economists have argued that the correlation between exchange rate and 
FDI inflows is mixed (see Blonigen, 1977). 
Events that sparked economic turmoil such as the Asian financial crisis 
(1997-1998) have the expected negative sign for manufacturing and services FDI, 
indicating that they affected investors' confidence in Malaysia. The financial crisis 
not only affected new investments but also saw the exit of existing investments. This 
variable was not tested in the case of the UK, since the UK was not affected by the 
crisis. 
At a more general level, bearing in mind that there are country specific 
differences between Malaysia (developing) and the UK (developed) in terms of 
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economic structure and the different stages of economic development, the 
manufacturing-services distinction between the two countries55 is also not analogous. 
For Malaysia (see Table 5.4), it can be seen that the coefficients of the 
growth rate and the interest rate variables between manufacturing and services are 
clearly different because they are opposite in signs. However for the other variables 
the manufacturing-services distinction was examined further with a view to establish 
whether the magnitudes of the coefficients of these variables are in fact different. 
This was done by considering the relative magnitudes of the regression coefficients 
in the two models relative to their standard errors56. In addition to the two variables 
(growth rate and interest rate), the analysis (Table 5.6) confirmed that the 
coefficients of market size, openness, and the dummy variable (financial crisis) are 
different between services and manufacturing FDI, but the exchange rate variable is 
not different. For the UK (see Table 5.5), the growth rate variable (opposite sign) is 
clearly different between services and manufacturing FDI. Using the same technique 
as above, the other variables (see Table 5.7) whose coefficients are different between 
services and manufacturing FDI are inflation, openness and the interest rates, 
whereas the coefficients on the market size variable and the exchange rate variable 
are not different. This form of comparison is only indicative, since it involved a 
comparison between quite distinct estimations, because the models were 
independently estimated. 
ss Regression analysis on the pooling of the UK and Malaysian data was originally reported but it is 
now dropped from the analysis because of obvious economic differences between the two countries. 
56 To analyse this, we looked at the Adjusted Coefficient=Coefficient±standard error. If the two ranges 
of the coefficients do not overlap, then there is a difference between the coefficients of the two models 
at the one standard error difference. The analysis was done for cases where at least one coefficient was 
significant in the initial estimate. 
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Table 5.6 
Comparing Coefficients Relative to their Standard Errors between Manufacturing and 
Manufacturing 
d GDP * -0.004 
Interest Rates* -0.01 
Real GNI_I * 0.97 0.99 1.01 
(0.02) 
Inflation - 
Openness * 0.62 0.68 0.74 
(0.06) 
Exchange Rates -0.31 -0.22 -0.13 
(0.09) 
Dl* -0.20 -0.15 -0.10 
(0.05) 
Figures in parentheses are the standard error (se). 
* indicate a difference - no overlap. 
- not significant in the original estimate 
0.19 
0.14 
1.76 2.78 3.8 
(1.02) 
1.26 1.89 2.52 
(0.63) 
-1.32 -0.69 -0.06 
(0.63 
-1.22 -0.78 -0.34 
(0.44) 
Table 5.7 
Comparing Coefficients Relative to their Standard Errors between Manufacturing and 
Services FDI- UK 
Manufacturing Services 
Services 
-Ise Coefficient +l se -Ise Coefficient +1 se 
-1 se Coefficient +1 se -1 se Coefficient +1 se 
4GDP* -5.55 0.49 
Real GNI_1 0.31 0.56 0.81 -0.55 0.27 1.09 
(0.25) (0.82) 
Inflation * 0.009 0.01 0.011 0.08 0.11 0.14 
(0.001) (0.03) 
Openness* 4.05 4.6 5.15 5.53 7.38 9.23 
(0.55) (1.85) 
Interest Rates* -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.18 -0.14 -0.10 
(0.01) (0.04) 
Exchange Rates -0.17 -0.12 -0.07 -0.077 -0.07 -0.0063 
(0.05) (0.007) 
Figures in parentheses are the standard error (se). 
* indicate a difference - no overlap. 
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5.4 Diagnostic tests 
The models developed above have been checked for multicollinearity, serial 
correlation, stationarity (taking the first difference), and autocorrelation. The 
diagnostic statistics from the OLS exercise were used to test for these, especially for 
the time series model. In addition, the transformation by taking logs is also useful in 
reducing the variation in the variables. The model was also checked for correlations 
between the dependent and independent variables, bearing in mind that Pallant 
(2001) argued that a correlation above 0.3 is preferred. 
As for multicollinearity, Achen (1982) and Gujarati (1995) argued that 
multicollinearity violates no regression assumptions. One way to ascertain the 
degree of multicollinearity is to calculate a correlation matrix between all the 
determinants where those highly correlated pairs will be identified. Tabachnick and 
Fidell (1996) suggest excluding two variables with a bivariate correlation of more 
than 0.70 in the same analysis. In contrast, others (see Pallant, 2001, Bryman and 
Cramer, 1997 and Gujarati, 1995) have suggested that the Pearson's correlation 
between each pair of the independent variables should not exceed 0.80. However 
multicollinearity cannot be avoided and any regression will suffer from it to some 
extent (Schroeder et al. 1986). Regression will be best when each independent 
variable is strongly correlated with the dependent variable but uncorrelated with 
other independent variables. From the correlation coefficient matrix (Appendix 5.4) 
we can draw the conclusion that multicollinearity is not a major problem, because 
none of the coefficients for the pairs of independent variables exceed 0.8. 
131 
The next test is to check against serial correlation or autocorrelation, which 
occurs most frequently in time series data sets. The Durbin-Watson57 test is a useful 
indicator to check the presence of serial correlation. But this problem is again 
common in time series models, possibly due to omitted variables or misspecification 
of the models, and therefore some modifications of the models are needed. To correct 
for misspecification which leads to autocorrelation or serial correlation, the model 
relied upon the Cochrane-Orcutt method, which eliminates the presence of serial 
correlation. 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed FDI models representing the manufacturing 
sector, a model for the services sector as well as FDI models for aggregate FDI 
inflows involving cross country and also country specific studies of the developed 
and developing countries. 
All the empirical models reviewed in this chapter have shown the 
importance of market size in relation to the entry of FDI. With regard to other 
variables, the models in Table 5.1 included variables suited to the sectors and 
countries under study and also of interest to the authors to establish a statistically 
significant relationship. For that reason, direct comparisons between the models are 
difficult. The availability of data is also another limitation, especially for developing 
countries such as Malaysia. 
57 Values of DW statistic fall between 0 and 4 and according to Stewart (1991 p. 52), "..... in general 
the closer the value is to 2, the more acceptable is the estimated relationship will be. " 
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With the context of establishing the manufacturing-services distinction, the 
model developed in this chapter has examined several variables, including market 
size, growth rate, openness, inflation, interest rates, exchange rates and a dummy on 
economic turmoil. In the analysis it was found that, for Malaysia, the variables that 
are different between services and manufacturing are market size, growth rate, 
interest rate, openness and financial crisis. For the UK, the variables on growth rate, 
inflation, openness and interest rate are different between services and manufacturing 
FDI. The openness variable measured by imports plus exports to GDP, which is 
different between manufacturing and services FDI for Malaysia and also the UK, is 
also a core variable in the context of regulation that will be investigated in Chapter 
Seven. 
Finally aggregate FDI models of the type developed in this chapter do not 
incorporate the fact that firms in the services and firms in the manufacturing sector 
may be systematically linked, for example by means of linkages in the form of 
vertical coordination and vertical integration in the case of supermarket firms. This is 
a major limitation of the FDI models which this dissertation addresses in a quite 
different way in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION: WITH APPLICATIONS TO 
SUPERMARKET FIRMS 
6.0 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, this dissertation has looked at the FDI theory 
and related empirical works with an emphasis on the manufacturing-services 
distinction. Chapter Four has surveyed the literature on FDI and found that the theory 
is aggregative and macro in approach and the arguments of the theory are centred on 
firms in production, although some authors argued that the theory is also applicable 
to services FDI. Empirical works following from that literature were also seen to 
concentrate substantially on manufacturing firms, with less emphasis on services 
firms. Using the same methodology as several previous authors (e. g. by Beer and 
Cory, 1996 and Culem, 1988) Chapter Five was motivated to show that the entry of 
FDI in services and manufacturing into the host economy such as Malaysia may be 
associated with some macro economic variables such as market size, economic 
growth, inflation, interest rate, openness and exchange rate. The prima facie case for 
this motivation may have some policy implications for the host country with regard 
to the entry of services FDI and manufacturing FDI. In that chapter, econometric 
work was undertaken and the result showed that there is evidence that the 
coefficients of the variables that attract FDI in services are different from those for 
manufacturing FDI, both for Malaysia and also for the UK. However, in common 
with other econometric works in this area, each of these approaches is essentially 
aggregative and sectoral. 
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For firm specific entry, aggregated analysis of the kind developed in Chapter 
Five may be less suitable. A micro methodology is more appropriate to the analysis 
of MNFs, since the manufacturing-services distinction suggests a case for further 
disaggregation and for more detached modelling with a firm specific context. With 
these perspectives, this chapter and Chapter Seven will focus on microeconomic 
approaches to the analysis of MNFs. In this chapter, a further motivation to consider 
a disaggregated case is the argument for vertical integration, given the significance of 
such features for MNFs. The significance of the openness variable in the context of 
the econometric work in Chapter Five also suggests a potential link to disaggregation 
with issues on regulation (as taken up in Chapter Seven) and also with reference to 
discretionary transfer price in the context of vertical integration. Before turning to 
these points and applications, including potential applications to supermarkets, this 
chapter paves the way with the formal development of a multistage model and 
associated results pertaining to the potential optimality of vertical integration vis-ä- 
vis vertical separation. 
For this purpose it will draw upon a formal proof of the well-known results of 
vertical integration, together with the extended models of vertical integration/vertical 
coordination contained in Hasan and Ryan (2003). To begin with, Section 6.1 will 
discuss the vertical integration/coordination literature where the emphasis will be on 
the food supply chain and supermarkets. Section 6.2 will briefly revisit the work of 
Hasan and Ryan. Although the work of Hasan and Ryan concerned successive 
monopoly cases, the proof relating to the model can readily be extended to more 
general cases, including to non successive monopoly conditions and oligopolistic 
cases. Having done this, in Section 6.3, the associated model is illustrated with 
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multinational interpretations with examples interpreted with reference among other 
things to a supermarket related case in which the reader might interpret the final 
stage as referring to a differentiated oligopoly with vertically integrated suppliers 
which it wholly owns or controls. The distributional implications stemming from 
vertical integration relating to the increase in profits, relationship with suppliers, 
workers and consumers will be discussed in Section 6.4, emphasising that in a 
multinational setting, benefits may accrue to different nations. Section 6.5 will focus 
on the issue of technology transfer via vertical integration as an instrument for the 
transmission of technology between MNFs and domestic firms. Finally, Section 6.6 
summarises the discussions and formulates the final conclusion that a firm specific 
methodological approach is more appropriate to the analysis of MNFs, especially in 
the context where MNFs are vertically integrated or coordinated organisations 
spanning both services and production activities. There are efficiency gains when 
departing from the double marginalisation case, where vertical integration may be 
welfare enhancing iff (if and only if) benefits are passed down to producers and 
consumers of the host country. The results stemming from the distributional 
implications will have some policy implications particularly useful for the host 
government. 
6.1 Vertical Integration and Coordination in the Food Industry 
Vertical integration is said to take place when two or more stages of 
production are merged together under the control and ownership of one company 
either by forward or backward vertical integration (Waterson 1984; Perry 1989; 
Carlton and Perloff, 1994 and Kühn and Vives, 1999). In both forms, one or more 
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intermediary channels that link the stages of production are eliminated. Accordingly 
here vertical integration will refer to control of supplies of intermediate commodities 
through ownership of suppliers, whereas the closely related concept of vertical 
coordination will refer to control of supplies from suppliers but not ownership of 
suppliers. 
The vertical integration/coordination argument was advanced by Williamson 
(1971,1979,1986) based on the pioneering work of Coase (1937) with the emphasis 
on the comparative merits of markets and firms as institutions for coordinating 
production decisions. Coase argued that transactions will be organised within the 
firm if the cost of doing this is lower than the costs associated with those transactions 
via the markets. This distinction recognizes that transaction costs may be greatly 
reduced by internalizing the production process and possessing specific assets, 
whereas in the neoclassical argument, these advantages together with information 
costs, bargaining and decision costs and policing and enforcement costs are non- 
existent. Besides the Coasian factors, other arguments for vertical integration have 
been the asset specificity argument (Williamson, 1986); the drive for market power 
(Comanor, 1967; Etgar, 1978; Perry, 1989 and Martin, 1994), uncertainty in the 
supply of the upstream good (Arrow, 1975; Carlton 1979; and Scherer 1980) and the 
efficiency argument because double marginalisation is eliminated (Splenger, 1950; 
Hamilton and Mqasqas, 1996 and Kühn and Vives, 1999) as well as arguments 
stemming from technological advantages (Clarke, 1985 and Davies, 1987). These 
factors can be summed-up as decisions by firms to balance potentials and capacities 
while at the same time maintaining flexibility (Vallespir and Kleinhans 2001). 
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Where supermarket firms are concerned, purchasing their products on the free 
market is only one of the possible options. In addition to open market transactions, 
Martinez (2002) states that the supplier and the retailer may undertake trading 
relationships through contract purchasing, i. e. coordination, or could also undertake 
complete vertical integration. However in the food sector, open market relationships 
will be unable to coordinate transactions, given continually changing consumer 
preferences (Chambers and King, 2002). 
There are several reasons why retailers such as supermarket firms may have 
to get involved in the supply chain rather than purchasing products on the free 
market. A strong reason for a supermarket firm to integrate or coordinate its 
activities is to ensure that supplies are provided at the right time, in the right quantity, 
of appropriate quality and at competitive prices (Competition Commission, 2000 and 
Dobson and Waterson, 1996). In this context, buying on the spot market is said to be 
inefficient to handle such a complex transaction involving numerous suppliers along 
the food supply chain. 
Another argument for vertical integration in the food sector is the 
sophistication and continuous change in consumer preferences and awareness of food 
quality and safety. This is especially so when quality uncertainty is an increasingly 
important issue in the food chain. Economides (1999) argues that overall gains in 
quality may stem from integration of successive stages of production. The case in the 
poultry, egg and pork industries is a good example; during the last decade these 
industries have experienced increase in vertical integration and coordination to 
maintain quality (Aust, 1997). The empirical study of Frank and Henderson (1992) 
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suggests that transactional inefficiencies encountered in the food industry promote 
increased utilisation of non market vertical arrangements. The usual Coasian 
transaction cost factors identified by them are uncertainty, input supplier 
concentration, asset specificity and internalisation cost. However Osegowitsch and 
Madhok (2003) contend that many of the earlier reasons for vertical integration 
motives have become outdated and diminished in importance. This is especially so 
in the food supply chain where, they argue, a transaction cost argument is not the 
only motive for firms in this sector to consider integration but there are other 
compelling reasons, which are more peculiar to the food industry (see Hennessy, 
1996). One reason is that information asymmetry with regard to quality is a major 
motive for firms in the food supply chain to coordinate their activities. This is also 
consistent with the argument of Chambers and King (2002), which state that the cost 
of measuring product quality will affect the structure of market relationship in the 
food supply chain. In general Davies (1987) had earlier mentioned that information 
asymmetry with regard to quality of the intermediate product might motivate the user 
to integrate its upstream supplier. 
A further motivation for retailers to effectively become backward integrated 
into the supply chain to a much greater extent than supplying firms have been able to 
integrate forward is because of the growing concentration in the retail sector vis-a- 
vis other sectors. Here it means that retailers have used extensive mechanism 
including coordination and contracting to formalise the relationship with suppliers 
with the aim of controlling the nature and the flow of the products involved. 
Where supermarket firms are concerned, they have effectively used their size, 
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concentration and market power to coordinate their trading relationship with their 
suppliers to their advantage (Competition Commission, 2000). Two main issues with 
reference to vertical integration between the supermarkets and their suppliers which 
were the subject of that report on supermarkets by the Competition Commission of 
the UK were the ability of the supermarkets to drive down suppliers' price to 
uneconomic levels and other alleged practices of which the most common was 
requiring suppliers to pay for shelf space or slotting fees for their products. With 
reference to size and market power, these were earlier recognised by Hirsh and 
Votaw (1952) who argued that power will naturally come with economic size of the 
firm where a big supermarket has a cost advantage over a small grocery shop. This 
is supported by Dobson and Waterson's (1996) assertion that state economies of size 
and scope have a cost advantage over smaller rivals. 
In the multinational context, food retailers, and especially supermarket firms 
in the UK and the United States, are highly advanced in terms of logistics, marketing, 
pricing as well as sourcing of supplies. They have come to a stage of a `one-stop 
shopping' concept with several large multiple retail chains dominating the market. 
The advancement of these firms may relate to their having technical innovation and 
human expertise which are central to their undertaking vertical integration or 
coordination with their product suppliers. They have also used their size effectively 
to bargain for lower prices with their suppliers. As these firms internationalise they 
will bring along their technologies and expertise and may start to change the food 
retailing sector of the host country, especially in developing markets. These firms 
will introduce their operating systems to the host market and in doing so will 
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modernise the sector, a transformation which may benefit local firms such as 
suppliers through the transfer of technology by the MNFs. 
Having surveyed the literature on the importance of coordination and 
integration in the food supply chain, the next section will revisit the work of Hasan 
and Ryan (2003) in which various phenomena pertaining to the vertical integration or 
vertical coordination decisions were explicitly modelled for general cases, before 
going on to Section 6.3 to consider specifically multinational extensions and 
interpretations of that model, with an idea of linking it to supermarket firms. 
6.2 Vertical Integration Model in the Context of Applications to Supermarket 
Firms 
Prior to developing the vertical integration arguments with reference and 
explicit applications to multinational supermarket firms, this section will first 
summarize the vertical integration model as set out in Hasan and Ryan, which forms 
the basis of the multinational discussion in the next section. 
The basic model consists of two successive monopoly firms at stages of 
production, s and s-1. The production function of firm s is specified by 
xs fs(L,, K,, ys), where xs is output and LS, Ks, ys are respectively quantities of labour, 
capital and intermediate inputs utilised in the production. The inverse demand at 
level s is p(xs) and the unit costs of labour, capital and intermediate inputs are given 
by w, r and p(ys) respectively, then the profit optimizing level, nl *, of firm s is given 
by the relationship as follows: 
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Max iti *=p(xs)xs-wLs-rKs-p(ys)ys (6.1) 
s. t. xs fs(L,, K,, Ys) 
xs, Ls, Ks, Y, >O 
In a context of successive monopoly, p(ys) corresponds to the way in which 
input ys is acquired by firm s. The intermediate inputs ys may be acquired either 
from an independently profit maximising firm, i. e. based on the spot market price or 
p(ys) may be an optimally determined intra-firm transfer price determined via 
vertical integration or from coordination between firm s and its intermediate input 
supplier. These possibilities will be considered below, following the development of 
a model of the enterprise producing the intermediate output ys. 
Intermediate inputs are produced by a firm s-1, whose production function is 
ys_1=fs_ý(Ls_1, KS_l, zs_1), where ys_1 is output and LS_1 is the number of labour, KS_1 is the 
amount of capital and zs_1 are quantities of intermediate inputs to firm s-1 and 
correspondingly it pays unit cost of wage, w, interest rate, r and cost cZ respectively. 
With the given output and production factors, the profit maximising function, it2*, for 
a firm s-1 is given by: 
Max it2*=P(Ys-i)Ys-i-wLs-t-rKs-i-c7Zs-i (6.2) 
s. t. ys-1=fs(Ls-i, Ks-i, Zs-1) 
YS-i , LS-i , Ks-i , zs-i? 
0 
In the absence of either vertical integration or of vertical coordination, if firm 
s is the only purchaser of output ys_1, such that y, ys_1 and p(ys)=p(ys_i), then an 
optimal solution to (6.2) is in turn consistent with the optimization plan by a firm via 
(6.1) and a supplier via (6.2). This situation is synonymous with the market clearing 
conjecture or the spot market situation. 
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The next possibility is to consider a situation where firm s and its 
intermediate input supplier s-1, are vertically integrated, such that ys=ys_i. This 
strategy may be optimal because then firm s can determine its own input price, p(ys_I) 
from its own supplier s-1 and can arrange optimal production of xs as well as ys_1 so 
that overall profits are optimised. The profit maximisation strategy, ic3*, of the 
integrated firm for this case is as follows: 
Max TC3 =TC3*=p(xs)xs-wLs-rKs-wLs_l-rKs_i-czzs_1 
s. t. xs = fs(Ls, KS, Ys) 
YS=fsi(LSiýKsi, zsi) (6.3) 
xs, L1, K1, Ys, L51, Ks-I, Zs-j? 0 
The results and ideas stemming from (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) [see Appendix 6.1 
for the details] were formalised in Hasan and Ryan (2003) via Theorems I and II 
below: 
Theorem I 
If ys_1=ys the overall profits generated by maximising via (6.3) and 
establishing an optimally determined endogenous transfer price 
ß, s_1 is no less than profit generated via separate maximisations via (6.1) and (6.2) with an exogenous transfer price p(ys), i. e: 
R3 ý! it12 
Proof 
If y, -, =y, so that p(ys_I)=p(ys) then optimal solutions 711,7E2 to (6.1) 
and (6.2) together constitute a feasible but not necessarily an 
optimal solution it3* to (6.3) 
Theorem II 
With assumptions as in (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3), unless ß, s_1=p(ys_1*), 
where ý, _, 
is optimal in (6.3) and y, -, 
* is optimal in (6.2), the 
optimal solution to (6.3) is such that ßs_1<p(ys_I*) and ys_I>ys_1*, 
whereby p(ys_1)* and ys_1* are optimal in (6.2). 
Proof 
The proof of this result is in Appendix 6.2 
While the models set out in (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) were of the successive 
monopoly types, Hasan and Ryan argued that the conditions and proofs relating to 
Theorems I and II can be extended to oligopolistic cases too, involving more than 
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one firms at stage s (sl, s2.... sN) and s-1 (s-2, s-3..... s-N). In the paper extensions 
were also made to include quality variables, q, efficiency and productivity enhancing 
resources, g and the associated interpretations with reference to `make or buy' 
decisions by means of the relations Ys yl+y2, where yS are acquisitions of 
intermediate inputs, yl is `make' and y2 is buy at a unit cost c2. The expanded model 
is as follows: 
Max it4 =1c4*= ps(xs, q)xs-wLs-rKs-wLs-i-rKs-i-cZzs-i-c2Y2-G1(gi)-G2(g2)-Q(q) 
s. t. YS Y1+Y2 
XS fs(Ls, Ks, Ys, gi) (6.4) 
yl=fs-1(Ls-i, Ks-1, zs-i, g2) 
Xs, Ls, Ks, Ys, L, -1, 
K, 
-1, z, -1>O 
Theorem III 
With assumptions as in Appendix (6.3) and if c2*<_ c2 and/or G, *(g, )<_G, (g, ) 
and/or G2*(g2)SG2(g2) then: 
Max i4=it4*= ps(xs, q) xs - wLs- rKs - wLs-i-rKs-i -cZzs-, - c2y2- G1(gl) - G2(g2)- 
Q(q)-O(Ys-yi-YZ)-k, [xs-fs(LS, Ks, Ys, gi)]-XS-l[Yl - fs-i(Ls-], KS-1, zs-i, g2)] (6.4)* 
Max m4=m4*=ps(xs, q) xs - wLs- rKs - wLs-1-rKs-I -czzs-, - c2*y2- G1* (gi) - G2* 
(g2)-Q(q)-e(YS-1-Y2)-2"s[xs-fs(LS, Ks, Ys, gi)]-ks-1 [Yi-fs-, (Ls-1, Ks-, 'zs-ß, g2)] (6.4)** 
Proof 
Any solution to (6.4)* is a feasible but not necessarily an optimal solution to 
(6.4)**. 
The quality variable q in (6.4) together with quality related cost relation Q(q) 
will be discussed in the context of perceived quality which is associated with 
branding. The efficiency enhancing resources gl, g2 and associated costs Gi(gl), 
G2(g2) may refer to technical innovations and human capital or expertise associated 
with the MNFs, where G1(gl) is the cost of the productivity enhancing resources at 
the final stage s while G2(g2) is the cost of these resources at the intermediate input 
stage, s-l. Firm s-1 intermediate input is zs_l and its associated cost is cZ_t. In the 
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multinational context there may be several options of sourcing: firm s may obtain its 
intermediate inputs either from its integrated subsidiary firm, s-1 via quantities yl>O, 
from an independent external source, c2 via quantities y2>0 or from the optimal mix 
of both of these two sources, yl, y2>0. 
In the subsequent section, this chapter will consider variants of these results 
with multinational interpretations and applications, particularly the potential 
advantages over alternative producers (or sources). 
6.3 Vertical Integration - An Extension to Multinational Interpretations and 
Applications 
In Chapter Three it was shown that in less than a decade since the 
multinational presence in the Malaysian supermarket activity, sales from 
multinational supermarket firms have far exceeded sales generated from local 
supermarket firms. This phenomenon is not unexpected because the entry of these 
firms into the host market has brought along intangible assets or efficiency 
enhancing resources that are superior to the expertise of local firms. This is further 
compounded because local firms may lack product quality, q in the line of business 
activity they are in. These intangible assets of the MNFs may relate to gl, g2 and 
associated costs G1(gl), G2(g2) and q with related cost relation Q(q) as in equation 
(6.4). 
Dunning (1996) states that FDI constitutes a package of resources. But he did 
not specifically identify the specific resources. In this context, one kind of specific 
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resources are those associated with variables gi, g2 and q as in equation (6.4). These 
efficiency enhancing resources gl, g2 and q are one of the main reasons why host 
governments are preoccupied with the policy of attracting FDI and MNFs into their 
economies. There will be welfare gains from gl, g2 which accompany the entry of 
these firms through increased competition, which will drive down cost and prices, 
while q will benefit consumers in terms of superior quality. 
For host governments, at least in Malaysia, entry of the multinational 
supermarket firms is expected to reform the supermarket sector by bringing in retail 
innovation and change, especially where the supermarket activity is characterised 
with small, non-innovative local firms, as was discussed in Chapter Three. Therefore 
potential application of that kind provides motivation to examine the vertical 
integration framework in Section 6.2 but with multinational interpretations and 
potential applications to supermarkets which will be drawn from the context of the 
stylised models and Theorems. It will be argued that the restructuring of the retailing 
sector which will benefit the host country in general and the supermarket activity in 
particular will come from the quality variable q and the productivity enhancing 
resources gi, g2. 
A third feature that has been incorporated into model (6.4) is the `make or 
buy' decisions, ys yl+y2. In the multinational context the decision to `make or buy', 
may have a major impact on the supply of intermediate inputs from the local 
suppliers. The MNFs may `make' yl via vertical integration or `buy', y2 via imports 
or it may also buy from local suppliers provided the transfer price is lower than 
imports. In this way model (6.4) can be understood as a stylised presentation of the 
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supply chain decisions in organising the supply of its intermediate inputs from the 
supplier to the retail chains. 
Firstly, this section will look at the quality variable, q in model (6.4), which is 
presented in the context of perceived quality where firms signal quality through 
branding. The quality variable q is analogous to Bain's (1956) brand allegiance or 
product differentiation advantages that may be used by firms to block entry but in 
model (6.4), the quality or brand is used to penetrate new markets and elevate the 
host market. The quality variable in (6.4) is similar to the advertising variable in 
Baumol's seminal sales revenue maximisation model with advertising (Baumol 
1959). Consumers may perceive the brand as a `sign of quality' in its production and 
nowadays the brand has become one of the basic motives for the consumers' choice 
of a particular product. It is also likely to be seen as a symbol of status, especially 
when acquaintance is made with foreign brands. 
In this context, MNFs entering a new market may have an advantage over 
local firms because the MNFs have their own label brands and foreign brands are 
associated with the quality connotation. The entry of these firms may therefore lead 
to more competition and possibly more promotional activities and greater product 
differentiation. In terms of supermarket activity, the brand has strategic importance 
primarily of its impact on demand. Therefore the quality variable, q which is 
presented in the demand side in model (6.4) may shift the demand curve to the right 
as demand increases. In this context firms would optimally put in more resources or 
their managerial skills to quality enhancement, q up to a certain point according to 
the optimizing condition: 
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87E4/6q=x, 6ps(xs, q)/6q-6Q(q)/Sq: 50 (6.5) 
For firms, brands assume a certain value to be invested in where the returns 
from such investments justify their costs. In this respect we may argue that firms 
with higher product quality are more efficient producers than firms with lower 
product quality. When MNFs bring in high quality products, this would optimally 
increase the welfare of consumers and would also reduce the cost to consumer of 
searching for the right products. 
In the context of the Malaysian supermarket activity, "own label" brands, 
were introduced by the multinational supermarket firms such as Tesco and Carrefour. 
The entry of these firms into the supermarket activity has brought along established 
brand names or "own label" goods which differentiate them from the products of the 
local supermarkets. The multinational supermarkets started prominently displaying 
their private brands, which may create loyalty to a particular supermarket chain and 
have the power to differentiate products and separate them from other competitive 
products. 
Secondly, assume also for the purpose of argument that MNFs entering a new 
market not only bring in quality/brands but also technology, gi where model (6.4) is 
a stylised presentation of this. If entry is without a relatively advantageous gl then 
the host government may not allow the MNFs to come in, especially if the 
expectation of the host government is that gl may bring associated increase in 
innovation, competition and change in the host economy. 
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If the MNFs have a superior gl these firms may internationalise in order to 
take advantage stemming from their superiority in technical innovation and human 
expertise. As was mentioned with reference to the FDI literature (in Chapter Four) 
MNFs have a large pool of managerial expertise, financial assets and technical 
resources and in part this may explain the MNFs' ability to penetrate new markets in 
contrasts to firms with lower gs. 
Since incoming firms or the MNFs are associated with higher efficiency and 
productivity and are more efficient than local firms such that g>>g (assume that g is 
the productivity and efficiency of local firms), and that the cost of achieving 
efficiency and productivity is G1(gl)<G(g) (where G(g) is the associated cost of local 
firms) then the MNFs will optimally exploit its management expertise, gi up to the 
point where its marginal value in enhancing production equates to its marginal cost 
of securing that enhancement through the relationship: 
6n4/6g1=-8G(gi)/6gl+? 6fs/6gl<O (6.6) 
In a market that consists of two efficiencies and productivity differentials, 
some distinct market developments may be anticipated. Firstly, firms with higher gi 
and therefore lower cost G1(gl) may organise production internally or integrate to 
take advantage of the technological economies, in contrast to firms with lesser 
productivity enhancing properties g and higher cost, G(g). Secondly, a firm with a 
higher efficiency and productivity level, gi may have a bigger market share than 
firms with lower g. Following this argument we may expect that with relatively 
superior gl the MNFs will have a bigger market share than domestic firms, as was 
evident in the supermarket activity in Malaysia. 
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One reason for the efficiency and productivity of MNFs being higher than 
those of a host nation is because they employ more knowledgeable and experienced 
managerial staff as compared to local firms. However the associated cost GI(gl) may 
also be higher but this is a trade-off to the higher productivity and efficiency of the 
staff. 
The third impact on the technology differentials will be the process of 
learning and catching up. This may not be difficult, especially in the context of 
supermarket activities which involve management expertise, which is relatively 
easily transferable through on the job training of domestic employees who move 
from foreign to domestic firms where expertise may be passed on in the process. 
The process of technology transfer through the learning effect may be passed on 
either horizontally to domestic supermarket firms or vertically to local producers in 
terms of 92, which will be discussed in Section 6.5. Eventually the technological gap 
will converge and this may lead to a situation where multinational and local firms 
may compete on equal grounds. This situation is more interesting because it has 
policy implication pertaining to the competitiveness of local firms vis a vis the entry 
of new MNFs and in this context the host government may want to evaluate the 
presence of the MNFs, especially with regard to market penetration and market 
shares between the two firms. 
Condition (6.6) provides one kind of explanation for the possibility that 
even in unfamiliar market conditions, MNFs which have firm specific advantages in 
terms of superior gi, by means of superior human capital, may still be able to obtain 
superior returns from their operations in these markets which we have looked at in 
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Chapter Three in the context of the MNFs' share in the supermarket activity in 
Malaysia. 
The preceding paragraphs have so far argued the relative advantages of the 
MNFs in terms of their q and gl and related costs Q(q) and G1(gl) vis-ä-vis local 
firms. The following paragraphs will discuss the `make or buy' decisions, ys=yl+y2, 
introduced in model (6.4). In this respect the `buy' options served as an alternative 
where outside sourcing may provide another form of potentially cost reducing and 
profit optimization strategy via quantities y2 and price c2 in contrast to the `make' 
options or vertical integration via yl_ This decision has an impact on local suppliers 
because they may benefit or may be bypassed. The options whether to `make or buy' 
relate to the conditions: 
st4iby, =e-aS-, <o (6.7) 
s7E4isy2=e-C2<o (6.8) 
Given conditions (6.7) and (6.8), a firm will `make' if the cost of acquiring 
inputs from its integrated subsidiary via quantities yl>O and transfer price _1 
is 
cheaper than outsourcing via quantities y2>0 and price c2 or vice versa or the 
intermediate inputs may be acquired from an optimal mix of both. The proofs of 
these arguments relate to Theorem II. Together with condition 67r4/6y, =-O- 
? 8fs/6ys<O, for an overall optimum to obtain (see Appendix 6.3), the following 
condition must hold: 
), S6fs/6ys<A<minI -1, c2} 
(6.9) 
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In the context of the MNFs, outsourcing rather than producing internally may 
also provide them with another cheaper source for their intermediate inputs. There 
are two main reasons why this may happen. Firstly, MNFs with subsidiaries in more 
than one country may trade with each other. This is a well known phenomenon, and 
the intra-firm trade is a significant proportion of trade by the MNFs. For example, 
Tesco Malaysia may obtain supplies from Tesco Thailand or from any of its 
subsidiaries, provided the transfer price, c2 is lower than the transfer price, ß, s_1 if the 
intermediate goods are to be produced internally or if the intermediate goods are 
obtained from local firms. Secondly, the MNF via its internationalisation links may 
have easier access to cheaper foreign imports and may substitute the local products 
as well as the local producers. In this case local producers may be left out in the 
context of the `buy' decisions of the MNFs. Securing supplies outside the host 
markets may benefit the firms and workers of other countries instead of the host 
country where the MNFs are operating. In this situation the host government may 
intervene through regulation via the imposition of higher tariffs on imports which 
this dissertation will look at in Chapter Seven. 
This is especially the case if local suppliers are high cost producers c2, 
(particularly when efficiency and productivity are lower) than international suppliers 
or imports and vertical integration, such that the cost of acquiring inputs from local 
suppliers may reduce the profits of the MNFs. Furthermore, local suppliers are also 
hampered by the limit on their productivity enhancing resources, g and associated 
costs G(g) vis-ä-vis to the integrated subsidiary, s-1, with g2 and associated costs 
G2(g2) whose marginal cost of securing that enhancement is governed by the 
condition: 
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S714/6g2=-6G2(92)/692+kSf)692"0 (6.10) 
The import or `make' decisions of the MNFs may only be transitory in the 
condition where local suppliers may be high cost producers due to low efficiency 
enhancing resources or lower quality products, but through the process of catching 
up and technology transfer, local suppliers may eventually replace imports. This may 
also propel the integration/coordination between the MNFs and domestic suppliers. 
Notice that in the multinational context, different nations may benefit from 
the activities of the MNFs. While business is done in the host countries where 
profits are extracted and then repatriated, supplies may be imported from the 
cheapest cost source and not from the host country, benefiting the suppliers and 
workers of other nations instead of suppliers of the host country. Outsourcing by 
MNFs from suppliers outside the host country will not help in the development of 
indigenous local firms. For example, the Bumiputera suppliers which the Malaysian 
government are trying to promote may not benefit if multinational supermarket firms 
such as Tesco are sourcing their goods from outside instead of from these suppliers. 
The preceding paragraphs have discussed the interpretations of q, gi, g2 and 
the `make or buy' decisions, ys yl+y2, in the model under (6.4) in the multinational 
context, with an idea of linking it to supermarket firms. Issues with regard to profits 
repatriation and redistribution are also likely to be important, especially so if all 
parties, including the owners of the MNFs, suppliers, consumers and the host country 
(regulator) are all to benefit from entry of these firms. Accordingly the next section 
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will explore the distributional implications of vertical integration in the multinational 
context. 
6.4 Distributional Implications 
In the multinational context, the distributional effect arising from vertical 
integration may have implications for four groups, namely shareholders, suppliers, 
consumers and workers, especially if these groups reside in at least two distinct 
nations. This is unlike the situation where these groups are all in the same nation. 
In order to develop this point further it will be useful to illustrate the 
distributional implications relating to the theorems of the vertical integration model 
developed in the last section with a graphical presentation similar to the standard 
textbook illustration. For this purpose, certain key assumptions are necessary. Firstly, 
we may assume that firms s and s-1 are successive monopolies and secondly the 
various inputs must be combined in fixed proportions in the final product. 
Let consider a situation involving a single potential user, s and a single 
potential supplier, s-1 at each stage. Assume that firm s-1 sells all its output to firm s 
and charges a wholesale price, p, t_1, per unit. Firm s treats this wholesale price as 
its 
marginal costs. Under vertical separation, we see that firm s-1 charges px_1, which is 
above its marginal cost of me and firm s charges pi which is above its marginal costs, 
px_1 (assuming other costs constant). Figure 6.1 shows the resulting double mark up, 
pl>p,, _1. 
Since each firm adds a monopoly mark-up, consumers face two mark-ups 
instead of one. 
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Now let us consider a situation where firms s and s-1 decide to integrate. The 
strategy to integrate may be optimal because firm s can now determine an overall 
profit maximising choice of its internal transfer price, ý, _j 
(Theorem II) rather than its 
being taken as given, as in the case of vertical separation. In the context of Theorems 
I and II, together it was argued that, stemming from a lower transfer price, ß, s_1, the 
profits of the integrated monopolists are at least as great as the sum of the profits of 
the two independent monopolists prior to integration (otherwise vertical integration 
is not optimal). This is illustrated in Figure 6.1 where the shaded area, p*2,. 5_lEF of 
the integrated firms is greater than the combined shaded areas of firms s and s-1 
(vertical separation), p, t_1mcAB+plp, c_1CD such that p*_IEF>p, c_1mcAB+plp, '_1CD. 
In 
the successive monopoly case, consumers facing the double mark-up buy less output, 
Q2, than in the integrated case, Q3. As a result, they are worse off. Thus, both 
consumers and firms are worse off with successive monopolies than when these 
firms are integrated. These losses provide a strong incentive to integrate. 
The model in (6.4) also incorporates more subtle cases in which the firm, 
apart from obtaining its input supply from local suppliers (buy) via y2 and the `make' 
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V 
Q3 
decision or vertical integration (produce internally by its subsidiary company), via yi, 
may also have other options for acquiring its inputs supply from other sources, via 
imports (the `buy' versus `make' options). If the `buy' cost (imports) is lower than 
the cost of the other two sources then this will push down firm, s, marginal cost to 
mc* (which is lower than under vertical separation, p,, _I, and also under vertical 
integration, Xs_1) and this in return may yield a bigger profit margin (p**mc*GH). 
The welfare implications of vertical integration which may accrue for the four 
parties above are easily predicted if these groups belong to a single nation. Firstly, 
the increase in the collective profits of the integrated firm will accrue to its 
shareholders where profits will not be repatriated but may be reinvested in the host 
country. Secondly, local suppliers will also benefit by supplying the required inputs. 
The third impact is with regard to the workers, who are better off because more jobs 
are created (area XS_1OFQ3). The fourth implication is the gain to consumers and 
clearly here this group will benefit (Pp*E>Pp1C) in terms of lower prices because 
double marginalisation has been eliminated. These results conform to the standard 
double marginalisation arguments that all parties are better off if firms are integrated 
rather than being separated. 
In the multinational context, however, the distributional impact of vertical 
integration may have different interpretations because, as already noted, the groups 
may belong to more than one nation. In the context of super profits (see Theorem I), 
since the owners of the MNFs are foreign, then profits may be repatriated. From the 
point of view of the host country, the MNFs must trade-off gains to consumers and 
potentially also suppliers against the possibility that super profits will be channelled 
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abroad rather than, for example, retained by those domestic firms which would have 
supplied the commodity in the absence of MNFs entry. 
For an illustration of the distributional gains where the groups reside in at 
least two nations, we may assume that the MNFs are foreign owned, the sales 
(supermarkets) are in Malaysia, supplies are obtained from local as well as imports 
and the consumers are Malaysians. In a case where the intermediate goods are being 
sourced from imports (cheaper than if acquired locally), then suppliers and workers 
of the host country may not benefit. In this context the efforts to promote local 
products and suppliers may not materialise as was initially envisaged in the entry of 
the MNFs. Perhaps the only welfare gain is to the consumers of the host country in 
terms of low prices, as in the standard double marginalisation argument. Within these 
interpretations it is therefore not evident whether the net welfare gain to the host 
country is obvious as tabulated in Table 6.1. This interpretation is useful especially 
for Malaysia which is home to six different multinational supermarket firms and in 
this case Malaysia may have reasons to regulate multinational entry, a point which 
will be taken up in the next chapter. 
Table 6.1 
Static Analysis on the Distributional Gains on the Entry of Vertically Integrated MNFs 
Vertical Buy Vertical 
Integration (local and Integration 
(Make)* imports) And Buy 
Profits F F, H F, F, H 
Consumers HHH 
Suppliers F F, H F, F, H 
Workers F F, H F, F, H 
F=Foreign, H=Host country 
* The assumption is that the `make' decision is also between foreign firms because 
local firms are high cost producers. 
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From Table 6.1, the distributional implication of the vertically integrated 
MNFs for the four distinct groups is easier to draw in the disaggregated analysis vis- 
ä-vis the aggregated approach. Each of these results may be linked to regulation, 
which will be taken up in Chapter Seven. 
6.5 Vertical Integration as a Channel for Technology Transfer 
In the previous sections, this chapter has discussed the variants of vertical 
integration from the multinational context and except for efficiency and productivity 
reasons or in other words technology and expertise, gl, g2 which may be passed down 
to local firms, the net distributional effect to the host country is ambiguous or mixed. 
This section will proceed to discuss why countries are interested in attracting MNFs 
and FDI, with an emphasis on the issue of technology transfer, gl, g2 in (6.4) from the 
MNFs to domestic firms. 
MNFs may transfer their technologies to foreign countries in a variety of 
ways - by emigration of skilled workers, by export of goods and services, by 
licensing and by having subsidiaries in the host country through FDI. In most sectors 
and in the context of supermarkets direct investment may be the most appropriate 
form for the multinational presence. On the other hand the host government, too, 
may prefer FDI to other modes because FDI is associated with a wide variety of 
benefits, including not only the inflows of financial capital but more importantly in 
such cases, the host government is in direct contact with the provider of technology, 
which may lead to the transfer of technologies and human expertise to the host 
country. The diffusion of technology to local firms is also argued to be faster when 
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these MNFs set up subsidiaries in the host market than through other modes such as 
licensing or export. 
Pack and Saggi (1991) have found that suppliers in developing countries may 
benefit from technology diffusion from buyers in developed markets. In this context 
model 6.4 is one mechanism by which the MNF at level s may transfer its expertise 
to local firms, where the transmission may be more effective if these firms undertake 
vertical integration. In this way vertical integration may accelerate the diffusion of 
new technology to domestic firms and also provide a faster way for its adoption, thus 
reducing the cost of transmission. However the success of the transmission depends 
on the absorptive capacity of the local firms, bearing in mind that these firms have 
low level of skills and expertise. In any case, the long run effect is to raise the 
technological capabilities of domestic firms, thereby closing the technological gap. 
This explains the preoccupation of policymakers with technology transfers, 
stemming from the argument that external knowledge is an important input for the 
innovation process of domestic firms. 
According to Ali (1992), the technology factor is one of the main assets that 
the host government might consider in deciding the entry of MNFs to operate in its 
economy. It is also an important objective in encouraging FDI, since the expectation 
is that FDI will facilitate technology transfer from the more advanced countries and 
the acquisition of such technology is perceived as a crucial component of rapid 
economic growth. In the context of supermarkets, this dissertation has argued earlier 
that the human capital in the form of managerial skills is more obvious than the 
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physical capital flows, which may not be realised in the context of FDI, as discussed 
in Chapter Four. 
Technology may be passed on to local firms in a number of ways. While the 
direct effect of the technology transfer is the enhancement of the gs of the local 
suppliers via vertical integration (if the MNFs undertake vertical integration with 
local firms) the other mechanism is the indirect effect, that is, in terms of 
technological spill-over to local competitors (local supermarkets). Firstly, technology 
embodied in capital goods may be transferred to domestic suppliers who learn new 
techniques from the MNFs. The second mechanism is through learning by doing 
combined with on the job training of domestic employees who move from foreign to 
domestic firms, where management expertise may be passed on in the process or 
indirectly by the physical movement of workers who have been exposed to the 
technology. Thirdly, technology transfer may be affected through copying the 
format of the MNFs which may be applied by local supermarket firms. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The analysis of this chapter stems from the vertical integration work of Hasan 
and Ryan (2003). It has provided formal proofs of the double dividend arguments 
together with extensions of this framework to incorporate conditions of quality, 
efficiency and `make or buy' decisions. This chapter has emphasised that 
manufacturing related and services related FDI are likely to be interrelated for 
reasons stemming from vertical integration of elements of firms' activities. 
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In the context of model (6.4) and related multinational interpretations, ways 
in which quality, productivity and efficiency as well as the `make or buy' decisions 
may affect local firms have been considered. In the multinational context the quality 
variable is signalled via product branding, where foreign brands are perceived to be 
of high quality than local products. This chapter has also shown how efficiency 
enhancing resources may have an impact on the transfer price, leading to integration 
or disintegration. The transfer price in turn will influence the `make or buy' decisions, 
requiring the intermediate inputs to be sourced from the lowest cost suppliers, 
whether from imports, local firms or from a firm's own subsidiary via vertical 
integration. There are also tradeoffs in innovation and efficiency. In this context we 
may see that the host government may encourage the entry of innovative MNFs, and 
that this may lead to the displacement of local firms. This chapter has also 
emphasised how, with multinational interpretations, the benefits stemming from 
vertical integration may have implications for different nations, both via suppliers 
and via profits and the net welfare gain to the host country may only be in terms of 
lower prices to consumers. 
The firm specific approach undertaken in this chapter has deepened our 
analysis of the vertically integrated structures of the MNFs, which will complement 
the aggregated work in Chapter Five. This approach will also be useful in the next 
chapter, which will look at regulation in the context of the openness variable that was 
found to be significant in the aggregated work in the last chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ENTRY AND REGULATION OF MULTINATIONAL FIRMS 
7.0 Introduction 
The main motivation of the previous chapter was vertical integration, given 
the significance of that feature for MNFs. In that chapter vertical integration was 
looked at from a firm specific and disaggregated approach. That approach included 
interpretations pertaining to the quality variable q, the efficiency enhancing variables 
g1, g2 and associated costs G1(gl), G2(g2) and the `make or buy' decisions yi, y2 and 
consideration of potential applications, including supermarket firms. That chapter 
also looked at the distributional implications of vertical integration relating to profits, 
consumers, suppliers and workers, which in the context of multinational 
interpretations may have policy implications for the entry of MNFs, including 
potential applications to supermarket firms. 
In this chapter the firm specific approach to the analysis of the MNFs will be 
developed further with the emphasis now being on regulatory applications. The 
motivation for discussing regulation may be seen in the context where issues of 
regulation have been a policy concern to the host government, especially where local 
firms are not competitive. However there are trade-offs to regulation, particularly 
between efficiency of the MNFs and the less efficient local firms. Inhibiting foreign 
entry is equivalent to blocking foreign capital and innovation, but that is often 
inconsistent with the development objectives of developing countries. On the other 
hand, too much entry will also hurt local firms. An example of a regulatory 
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mechanism on foreign entry is the equity regulation that was discussed in Chapter 
Two in the context of the supermarket firms in Malaysia. 
This chapter will, however, look at a different kind of regulation which is 
distinct from the regulatory context that was discussed in Chapter Two but 
potentially applicable to supermarket firms in Malaysia. It will look at ways in 
which the variables associated in model (6.4) pertaining to 91.92 and related costs 
G1(gl), G2(g2) and the `make or buy' decisions, yl, y2 potentially associated with the 
MNFs including supermarket firms may be regulated. These variables are potentially 
open to regulation via contingent taxes, tariffs or subsidies that have links to 
efficiency and competition, in contrast to the equity regulation discussed in Chapter 
Two, which has no such links. 
Further motivation for discussing regulation issues stems from the openness 
variable that was found to be significant in the econometric works in Chapter Five. In 
that chapter it was shown that the openness variable is aggregative and needs to be 
looked at using a micro methodology that may suggest a potential link to regulation 
and to a disaggregation approach. In the disaggregated approach, the openness 
variable may have wider applications with respect to the variables in model (6.4) in 
contrast to the macro result in the aggregated work. In this way regulation related 
applications and interpretations pertaining to MNFs are clearly identified and the 
results are much sharper. 
With this perspective, this chapter will use extensions of the Hasan and Ryan 
(2003) model to suggest ways in which microeconomic explanations with the focus 
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on MNFs' regulation may at least in part provide theoretical and policy related 
predictions to the host country with potential applications to supermarket firms, 
especially in the context of Malaysia. One conclusion will be that this approach may 
present a host government such as Malaysia with a complementary set of regulatory 
policy measures which may be superior to and in contrast to the restrictive regulatory 
policies such as those discussed in Chapter Two. 
It will also be argued that issues of regulation and entry could also be linked 
to the implicit regulatory mechanism of the contestability theory and in particular to 
regulated contestability, which is a refinement of the contestability idea. In the 
regulated contestability extension, links to regulation and especially to the entry of 
MNFs will be with regard to two useful distinctions, between physical and financial 
contestability and between market and industrial contestability. 
In the context of the above preliminaries this Chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 7.1 will revisit model (6.4) from the preceding chapter but here the scope and 
emphasis is on regulation and also with multinational extensions and applications. 
This section will extend the model to include regulatory parameters (t, a, W) with 
respect to the variables that may be open to host country regulation, such as the 
efficiency enhancing variables gl, g2 and associated costs G1(gl), G2(g2) and the make 
or buy variables yl, y2. Then Section 7.2 will look at regulation in a wider 
perspective of the contestability ideas and in particular ideas on regulated 
contestability. In Section 7.3, the preceding discussions are extended to 
look at three 
related key issues - MNFs, FDI and competition policy 
(of the European Union and 
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the UK). The conclusion in Section 7.4 will note the links now obtained between the 
various chapters that will lead into the concluding chapter. 
7.1 Regulating Multinational Firms 
For the purpose of further discussions with the emphasis on regulation, this 
Chapter will introduce further interpretations with reference to the stylised model of 
(6.4) in Chapter Six which is reproduced here for ease of reference as follows: 
Max 7i=7E*=ps(Xs, 9)xs-wLs-rKs-wLs-i-rKs-i-CZzs-i-czy2-GI(gi)-G2(g2)-Q(q) (7.1) 
s. t Ys YI+Y2 
xs=fs(L,, Ks, Ys, gi ) 
Yi =fs-t (Ls-1 'Ks-i'zs-i, g2) 
XS, L,, K,, Ys, L, -l, 
Ks-i3zs_1>0 
The model above may be interpreted in such a way that a foreign owned 
MNF operating at level, s, in a host country, may `make' its intermediate inputs yl 
from its subsidiary operating at level s-1 via vertical integration and it may acquire 
its intermediate inputs via vertical coordination from foreign suppliers through 
imports. (Here the `make' decision yl, will refer to internal production as well as 
imports). In this context too, for the purpose of interpretation and argument, firm s 
may also `buy' its intermediate inputs y2 from local producers with associated costs 
c2y2. The ways in which the MNFs acquire their intermediate inputs depend on the 
decision whether or not to `make or buy' inputs ys and in that context will depend on 
the transfer price, _I 
(see Chapter Six) which in turn, depends on the productivity 
between producing internally or coordinating, yl or outside sourcing, y2, via the 
relationship ys yl+y2. In the multinational interpretation, it has already been argued 
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in the preceding chapter that profits, it, in model (7.1) may be shipped abroad to the 
home country of the MNFs. By adopting this approach, further analysis and 
arguments regarding the stylised model and its extension to regulation and 
multinational interpretations will be much clearer. 
7.1.1 The Basic Regulatory Approach 
In relation to the stylised model (7.1) there are several regulatory mechanisms 
which a host government may comprehend to regulate the presence of the MNFs in 
its economy. One of the most important and simplest instruments is the use of tax 
rates on profits such as the imposition of a corporate tax. If we let t>0 be the share of 
profits earned in a host country which eventually go to taxes, the after tax earning, 71 
of the MNFs will be: 
Max ii=m*=(1-t)LPs(x,, q)XS wLs-rKs-wLs-i-rKs-i-c, zs-i 
-c2Y2-Gi(gi)-G2(g2)-Q(q)] (7.2) 
s. t Ys=Yi+Y2 
x f8(Ls, Ks, Ys, gl) 
yl=fS-I(LS-I, KS-15Zs-19g2) 
xs, L,, K,, y,, L, -i'Ks-i'zs-i? 
0 
Therefore in addition to the cost of production, the firm is also burdened by 
taxes on its super profits, (1-t) which may be an international competitive tax rate. 
The effect of raising or decreasing a tax rate, t>0, and holding other variables 
constant may have an impact on the behaviour of the MNFs, either encouraging or 
discouraging the firm to shift its production into other countries. In order to 
encourage multinational entry, the host government may set a lower tax rate, t viz a 
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viz t of other countries. In this context it may be argued that the tax rate, t, 
corresponds to the openness of the host country in attracting MNFs entry. But there 
is contrasting evidence as to the effectiveness of taxes as a major instrument in 
influencing the location of multinational investment. A profit tax based approach to 
regulation and to the entry of the MNFs has been implemented by many developing 
countries but with minimal impact of attracting MNFs, because any reduction in tax 
rates by one country may be offset with a corresponding reduction by other countries 
(see Yeung, 1996). An earlier finding by Horst (1971) was that minor changes in 
any tax rate are likely to have no effect on the MNFs's behaviour. Another reason is 
that because multinationals are global firms with subsidiaries in more than one 
country, a slight reduction in the tax rate in one country may benefit the existing 
subsidiary in that country and will not result in a relocation of other subsidiaries from 
other countries. 
But this does not mean that tax incentives have little impact on attracting 
MNFs. UNCTAD (1995) argued that tax holidays or temporary rebates for certain 
investments have been implemented in as many as 67 countries that may have 
benefited primarily short-term investments. In the OECD countries where the general 
investment climates are similar, any differential in the tax rate of these countries may 
influence the investment decisions of the MNFs (for a discussion on the tax policy 
issue see Morisset and Pirnia, 2000). 
At the same time, corporate taxation plays an important withholding function, 
raising revenues on domestic-source income that might otherwise escape the tax net. 
In this regard we have looked at this issue in Chapter Six, showing that in the 
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multinational context there is a far greater possibility of the after tax earnings that 
might go overseas or be repatriated, rather than being reinvested in the host country. 
The desire to tax this income while not discouraging foreign investors raises some 
concern regarding the sensitivity of MNFs to taxation and how much additional 
investment can be expected from tax relief and at what cost. Therefore in the context 
of model (7.2) and its multinational interpretations, a regulation based on taxes must 
be internationally competitive. This means that in the first instance it must ensure 
that the burden imposed is not excessive and it does not deter multinationals' entry. 
But if the objective of raising the tax rate is to deter entry and protect local firms, 
based on the infant industry argument then the host government, especially 
developing countries, may lose particularly on two important aspects which are much 
needed in their development. These countries may not only lose on much needed 
investment, but also on the efficiency and productivity enhancing resources, gl, g2 
(with the possibility of transferring technology to local firms) associated with these 
firms, that were discussed in the last chapter. 
Besides regulation based on overall profits, the next section will show how 
other variables in model (7.2) are also open for regulation and provide further 
mechanism for the host government to induce firms in the direction that best suits the 
policy and the development objectives of the host country. 
7.1.2 Regulation with Respect to Technology 
The importance of the efficiency and productivity enhancing variables has 
been discussed in detail in Chapter Six, where it was argued that MNFs are 
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associated with gl, g2 which is superior to the gs of local firms. Thus, one way at 
looking at rivalry is to look at the differentials between gl, g2 and gs and the 
associated costs G1(gl), G2(g2) and GS(gs) respectively. Under the assumption of the 
model, a MNF will make and supply its intermediate inputs if it has superior gi, g2 
and lower associated costs, G1(gl), G2(g2) leading to the lowering of the transfer price 
k, 
-, and will 
buy from outside if the costs of outside producers, whether local or 
imports, are lower than the cost (transfer price) of producing internally. In these ways 
the decision between `make or buy' will depend directly on the relative efficiency 
gl, g2 for the MNFs and gs for the local suppliers. 
Potentially, here, the role of the government is to facilitate the process of 
change and innovation and introduce a more efficient way of production. This is 
consistent with the argument of Romer (1993) who says that since MNFs are the 
flagship of innovations and ideas, these firms may provide a channel for the diffusion 
of knowledge-based and firm specific assets. To attract these firms, developing 
countries may ease restrictions on incoming MNFs by offering special incentives 
including lower tax and tax holidays (as was discussed above), subsidies for 
infrastructures and may provide incentives for the recruitment of expertise. The 
rationale for this special treatment often stems from the understanding that MNFs 
generate externalities in the form of technology transfer (see Pavitt, 1971, Teece, 
1977 and Aitken and Harrison, 1999). In this context the government may impose a 
policy that only firms with superior gl and lower cost Gi(gl) vis-ä-vis alternative 
sources may be allowed to enter the host market. This has been the key policy of 
most developing countries in attracting FDI and MNFs, as was argued in Chapter Six. 
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In order for innovation to take place and for this policy to be effective, the 
government may introduce a regulatory mechanism to attract firms with technology 
and human expertise, as well as to encourage these firms to transfer their expertise to 
local firms. By holding other variables constant, this policy may be implemented via 
contingent subsidies (1-a), which may be imputed into the associated cost variables, 
G1(gl) of the MNFs and G2(g2) of its subsidiary as follows: 
Max 7c*=ps(xs, q)xs wLs-rKs-wLs_l-rKs_1-cZzs_1-c2y2-(1-a)1G1(g1)-(1-a)2G2(g2)-Q(q) (7.3) 
s. t the same conditions as (7.2). 
Associating Lagrange multipliers with the constraints as shown in Appendix 6.3, the 
corresponding Lagrangean is: 
Maxlr=7r*=ps(xs, 9)xs-wLs-rKs-wLs-i-rKs-i-cZzs-i-c2y2-(1-a)IG1(gi)-(1-a)2G2(g2)-Q(q) 
-A(Ys-Yi-Ya)-XS[x, -fs(Ls, KS, Ys, gi)]-A. 5-I [Yi-fs-1 (Ls-i, Ks-1, zs-i'g2)] (7.3)* 
The necessary conditions for a maximum to (7.3)*, where conditions (7.3.1)- 
(7.3.10) are analogous to those of (6.4.1) to (6.4.10) [Appendix 6.3] except for the 
two conditions associated with G1(gl) and G2(g2) which are given as follows: 
67E/6gl =- (1-a), 8G1(gl)/bgl +k 6fs/Sgl<O (7.3.11) 
67E/892 =- (1-a)26G2(g2)/Sg2 + X-18fs/bg2<_0 (7.3.12) 
In contrast to the corporate income tax, t, which taxed the overall profits of 
the company, model (7.3) provides an extension with respect to the technology 
enhancing variables and associated costs that are open for regulation. For the 
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purpose of argument, if the objective of the country in attracting MNFs is because of 
their superiority in gi, the government may encourage the rate of inflow of gi by 
regulating the associated cost G1(gl), via (1-a)1 by subsidizing incoming technology 
because of its higher efficiency, which distinguishes it from the local industries. The 
subsidy may take the form of a tax incentive allowance. In this case, a is similar to 
the investment incentives that Yeung (1996), identified as an important variable that 
may have attracted the entry of MNFs with research and development facilities to set 
up operations in countries offering the incentives. In this context the provision of 
incentives via a which may further reduce costs GI(gl) may encourage MNFs to 
employ more efficient and productivity enhancing resources, gl. The same incentive 
may also be provided to its integrated subsidiary, s-1 with efficiency g2 and 
associated cost G2(g2). 
Likewise, if we assume that the local producers have efficiency and 
productivity enhancing variables, gs and costs GS(gs) which are less superior and of 
higher costs than 91,92 and costs G1(gl), G2(g2) of the MNFs and its subsidiary, then 
the impact of gs may also be enhanced via a regulatory mechanism as, such as by 
subsidizing the associated costs GS(gs). Therefore via contingent subsidies as, local 
firms may employ more resources to enhance capabilities viz-a-viz MNFs. However 
because of the differentials in the efficiency, subsidizing GS(gs) of local firms in 
general will not have the same effect as subsidizing Gl(gl), G2(g2) of the MNFs 
because these firms are in different stages of development with local firms still in a 
learning process. 
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Given a, conditions (7.3.11) and (7.3.12) require that the efficiency 
enhancing resources are to be employed to the point where the marginal 
enhancement in value of production equates to the marginal cost of securing that 
enhancement. The efficiency and productivity enhancing variables, gl, g2 may also 
refer to labour enhancing as well as to capital enhancing productivity and in the 
context of model (7.3) the government may employ contingent taxes or subsidies to 
affect the usage of these variables. For example the government may lower the rate 
of interest on capital or may remove barriers to capital, so that now firms will have 
easy access to cheaper capital, which will have an effect on cost and influence 
production decisions. If capital is cheap, more labour saving technology may be 
employed or it may also result in an expansion of existing facilities. In countries 
where labour is abundant, the government may provide incentives to encourage firms 
that employ local labour and local expatriates and may tax firms that employ foreign 
expertise or foreign labour. Contingent taxes and subsidies on labour and capital 
may promote labour or capital intensive technology and this depends on the 
development objectives of the countries. In this context, Freeman (1971) argued that 
if MNFs used capital intensive technology, then it may run counter to the labour 
intensive strategy where labour is abundant in developing countries. 
For reasons of increased productivity, innovation and competition, more 
subtly in the Malaysian case since the objective of the government is to innovate and 
increase the efficiency of the supermarket sector, then a direct policy approach is to 
import more efficient organisation structures associated with superior efficiency and 
productivity enhancing resources, 91,92 and lower costs G1(gl), G2(g2). 
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However such policy on taxes and subsidies on the efficiency enhancing 
resources may only be applied at the industry level but the point here is to show that 
each of the variables as depicted in model (7.3) is also potentially regulated. Apart 
from technology, the other variables in the model such as the intermediate inputs are 
also open for regulation, which will have an impact on local production and local 
producers. This will be discussed below. 
7.1.3 Regulation with Respect to Intermediate Inputs 
A further extension of model (7.1) in which a potential mechanism whereby 
market shares of intermediate inputs may be regulated is to introduce regulatory 
parameters 'V3,1415 and W4 with respect to the costs associated with the intermediate 
inputs of the `make' decisions, yl via c, of firm s-1 as well as imports and the `buy' 
decisions, c2 respectively. The issue of regulation of market shares of intermediate 
inputs stems from our earlier discussion on the distributional impact (see Chapter Six) 
that might accrue to local suppliers vis-a-vis foreign suppliers. In the multinational 
context we have interpreted that different nations may benefit from the `make or buy' 
decisions and that local suppliers may be left out. This section will show how 
regulation parameters (yV3. N'4 and W5) may play crucial roles in discriminating outside 
suppliers or imports that may benefit local firms. Therefore in this regard the ground 
for economic regulation is premised on the basis of income and wealth distribution 
effect rather than on market failure and the case for public regulation in this context 
is stronger in developing countries (Stiglitz 1998). 
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Holding other variables constant, in this case the regulatory parameter N'3, W4, 
W5 may take the form of contingent tariffs or subsidies depending on the objective of 
the government. The incorporation of this variable will extend the model as follows: 
Max n=7c*=p(xs, q)xs-wLs-rKs-wLS-i-rKs-i-(cz+W3)ZS-1-(c2+W4)Yz-YIy15 
-Gi (gi)-G2(g2)-Q(q) (7.4) 
s. t Ys Yi+Y2 
Xs fs(Ls)K,, y,, gi) 
Yi=fs-i (LS-i'KS-1'zs-11 2) 
XS, L,, K,, y,, L, -1'Ks-1, z, -i_>O 
Associating Lagrange multipliers 0, X, 2.1 with the constraints in (7.4), the 
corresponding Lagrangean is: 
Max 7r=7r*=p(xs, q)xs-wLs rKs-wLs-i-rKs-i-(Cz+W3)Zs-i-(c2+kV4)Y2-Y1w 5-G1(gi)-G2(g2)- 
Q(q)-9(ys-yl-y2)- [XS fs(L,, Ks, ys, gi)]- 2s-i[yi-fs-i(Ls-i'Ks-i'zs-i'gz)] (7.4)* 
Necessary conditions to an optimum to (7.4)* are: - 
S7r/Sx, =p(xs)-x, 6p/6xs <0 (7.4.1) 
8n/6LS = -w + XS 8fs/8L, <0 (7.4.2) 
87r/8KS = -r + ?,, 5 bfs/SKS 50 (7.4.3) 
87t/8ys =-8+k Sfs/öys <0 (7.4.4) 
Sr/8LS-I = -w + 41 ifs 1/6LS 1 50 (7.4.5) 
bar/SK, -1 = -r + _18fs_1/SKs_1 
50 (7.4.6) 
8'9/8zs-1 = -(Cz+W3) + ? -i 
Sfs-i/8z <0 (7.4.7) 
8n/8q = xspäp, (xs, q)/8q - 8Q(q)/Sq 50 (7.4.8) 
8W8y1 = A-(CVs + -i) <O 
(7.4.9) 
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8916y2 = 0-(c2+W4) <0 (7.4.10) 
87r/6gl =- 6G1(gl)/6g1 + ý, 5 Sfs/bgl<0 (7.4.11) 
671/Sg2 =-6G2(g2)/8g2 + XS-1 6fS/6g2<0 (7.4.12) 
In a manner similar to conditions (6.4.1)-(6.4.6), (6.4.8)-(6.4.9) and (6.4.11)- 
(6.4.12) [as in Appendix 6.3], conditions (7.4.1)-(7.4.6), (7.4.8) and (7.4.11)-(7.4.12) 
take on familiar interpretations according to which at a profit maximising optimum 
to (7.4), marginal revenue product equates to marginal factor cost for each factor 
employed. However a key difference is with respect to conditions (7.4.7), (7.4.9) 
and (7.4.10) which are associated with regulation parameters, W3, W5 and W4 
respectively which may be in the form of contingent subsidies or tariffs on the costs 
of the intermediate inputs, c, imports and c2 which may be imposed on the MNFs. 
This chapter has already assumed (see page 165) that the `make' decision, yl 
may refer to the acquisition of inputs either from internal productions from vertically 
integrated subsidiary, s-1 or the acquisition of inputs from foreign suppliers through 
imports and y2 will refer to the `buy' decision of intermediate inputs from the 
production of local producers. The central focus of our discussion here is with regard 
to regulation pertaining to the acquisition of intermediate inputs, between the 
'make '58 decisions via imports and the `buy' decisions involving local suppliers, c2 
via yl, y2 in (7.4). 
58 Regulation via \f (taxes or subsidies) on the `make' decision on the intermediate inputs, ci,, by an 
integrated firm is not possible because in practice it may be difficult to differentiate between 
production by an integrated firm and by independent suppliers. 
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In the context of model (7.4), W5 and \J4 are regulatory parameters to regulate 
market shares with respect to the `make or buy' decisions, yl, y2 of the MNFs on their 
acquisition of intermediate inputs. An effective mechanism by which market shares 
of the intermediate inputs may be regulated is to impose either contingent tariff or 
subsidy on the cost of the intermediate inputs. The host country may impose tariff, 
W5>O or subsidy W5<O, on the `make' decision, yl of the intermediate inputs via 
imports and likewise may also impose the same conditions (0>W4>0) on the `buy' 
decision, y2 from local suppliers. 
First, consider regulation in the context of pushing up the transfer price ß, s_1 
from imports (the `make' decision) and c2 from the `buy' decision where tariffs are 
involved, yes>0 and W4>0 respectively. The imposition of tariffs W5>O on the cost of 
acquiring intermediate inputs from imports in the `make' decision yl will raise its 
price to (yes+ _I) and similarly 
if tariffs, W4>O are imposed on the intermediate inputs 
of the `buy' decision from local producers, the cost of local production will rise to 
(c2+W4) and local production will be expensive too. Therefore the higher the per-unit 
tariffs on the intermediate inputs, the more will be the disturbances to total output 
and sales and to their allocation, to prices, factor flows and profits. If the `buy' 
decision from local production is to be the main source of supply of the intermediate 
inputs for the MNFs, and if imports are cheaper than local production, the 
government may set higher tariffs on imports, so that yr4<yr5. This will push up the 
price of the intermediate inputs from imports such that (Ws+41)>(c2+yV4), and 
necessary condition for a maximum to (7.4) with regard to the `buy' decision, y2 is: 
871i8y2 =0- (c2+W4) <0 (7.4.10)* 
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Likewise if the `make' decision via imports is to be the main source of supply, 
the government may fix yr5<Y4, such that (W5+ß,, s_1)<(c2+W4), and necessary condition 
for a maximum to (7.4) with regard to the `make' decision, yl is : 
8t/8y1 = 605 + ks-i) : 5o (7.4.9)* 
Therefore the direction of trade will reflect the cost advantage between 
`make' and `buy'. In these ways conditions (7.4.10)* and (7.4.9)* which relate to the 
`make or buy' decisions require that intermediate inputs be acquired from the lowest 
cost source, either from imports via quantities yl>O or from local producers via 
quantities y2>0, or from an optimal mix from these two sources. Together with 
conditions (7.4.4) they require that for an optimum to obtain, the following condition 
must hold: 
6fs/8ys<6<min{yf5+k_l, c2+W4} (7.4.13) 
From (7.4.13), 9=min{W5+a, s_1, c2+W4}, where (W5+ý, s_1) is the transfer price 
under the `make' decision via imports and (c2+yr4) is the price via acquisition of 
intermediate inputs from local suppliers. Because the `make or buy' decisions 
depend on the transfer price (inclusive of contingent tariffs added on to it) where the 
optimal strategy is to use yl if cheaper than y2, or vice versa, a higher tariff, by 
raising the MNFs import costs, is certain to discourage imports, encourage local 
production and raise prices in the importing country. In this situation, local 
producers may benefit from the tariffs regime and this may increase their welfare. 
Therefore a differential tariffs policy is one way to regulate market shares between 
imports and local productions of intermediate goods and also a mechanism to protect 
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local producers against imports. Such a regulatory policy may be effective in 
protecting Bumiputera producers at least in the case of the Malaysian supermarket 
sector. 
On the other hand it is unlikely that the government will subsidize the `make' 
decision yl, via W5<O, which will push down the cost of the `make' decisions via 
imports, (yi5+a, S_i) which in any case will be detrimental to local producers. There are 
also various other combinations of tariffs and subsidies which the government may 
use to regulate between the `make' and `buy' decisions. It is often the case that the 
government, especially in developing countries, may subsidise local production so as 
to bring down the price of local inputs such that (c2)<(W5+Xs-1). In this case the `buy' 
decision from local production is cheaper than the `make' option, which tends to 
benefit local producers. Therefore the tariff or tax mechanism used by the 
government in this case is a fundamental strategy to switch internal production to the 
`buy' decision, which may bring benefits to local producers. This mechanism is 
similar to that in Ryan (2000), who argued that taxes and subsidies may be used to 
regulate demands and outputs as well as capacities and these may have implications 
for industrial and market structures. 
The regulatory mechanisms that have been discussed above are different from 
the regulatory approaches in Chapter Two. One of the main advantages of the 
mechanisms argued in this chapter is that these mechanisms have direct links to 
efficiency and productivity of the industry structure, whereas in Chapter Two, the 
regulatory emphasis was on the basis of income distribution. In addition, regulatory 
applications of the kind developed in this chapter with reference to potential entry of 
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foreign firms may be tailored to suit the objectives of the host government more 
effectively, such as to safeguard local firms. This is in contrast to the policy of 
restricting foreign entry as in the case discussed in Chapter Two. A restrictive policy 
will not only discourage entry of MNFs but more importantly discourage the entry of 
innovation and efficiency which are catalytic for growth and competition. 
The imposition of tariffs (yes>O) on the imports of intermediate goods under 
certain specific conditions may be allowed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
For example, tariffs may be permitted during the transition period or the process of 
catching up in order to safeguard domestic producers (WTO, 2003). However 
according to the WTO, the safeguard measure should be short term and they should 
not last more than four years, although they may be extended up to eight years, but 
only on certain conditions, for example the measure is needed and there is evidence 
that the industry is adjusting. 
Consistent with WTO rules and in the context of model (7.4) a balanced 
regulatory policy between tariffs and subsidies is justified for a transitional period in 
order to accommodate the adjustment process needed to enable domestic firms to 
catch up with the superior g1, g2 of the MNFs and their integrated subsidiaries. 
However to be effective a protectionist policy of this kind must operate within a 
specific time frame as suggested by WTO. Otherwise, the adjustment process will be 
too slow and local firms may be too complacent to adjust. 
Even though there is a consensus that most countries are becoming more 
concerned about the spread, scale and reach of the MNFs, nevertheless these 
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countries have also been actively and consciously attracting FDI and MNFs, because 
the entry of these firms is desirable from the perspectives of innovation, technology 
transfer and efficiency gains, which have been discussed in Chapters Six. The 
specific concern is only with regard to the capacity of individual countries to control 
the activities of the MNFs, given that these firms have substantial bargaining power. 
At the same time, the advocates of a free market, as well as the MNFs, seek to 
guarantee freedom to operate with as few constraints as possible. Pressures for 
regulation and control of MNFs arise from domestic economic problems, especially 
because local firms are being displaced through foreign entry and production and 
also because domestic policy goals are being undermined. However Calzolari and 
Gremaq (2001) state that the existing theoretical literature on regulation of MNFs is 
very limited, even though regulation is important to ensure efficiency and 
competition, as well as to safeguard national interests. 
In the preceding sections we have looked at ways in which the entry of the 
MNFs may be regulated and how these may impact on entry decisions, market 
structures and innovation. Regulation mechanisms include taxes, tariffs and subsidies 
which may relate to the openness variable that was discussed in Chapter Five. These 
have been considered in detail in a microeconomic context in contrast to the 
aggregate econometric approach developed earlier. The micro and firm specific 
approach in model (7.4) shows how the host country may vary the 
degree of the 
`openness' directed at firm s and s-1 (and also in more general case at level s-2... s-N) 
and since these firms are integrated therefore the impact of regulation at 
level s may 
have implications to level s-1 and vice-versa. 
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This chapter has discussed entry, regulation and the openness variable, 
elements which could be used to make contact with literature on the contestable 
market theory advanced by Baumol et al. (1982). For example the openness variable 
and the regulatory mechanism are analogous with the free entry and exit variable of 
Baumol et al. and more specifically with the ideas on regulated contestability of 
Ryan (2000) which will be discussed below. 
7.2 Regulation, Contestability and Regulated Contestability 
The regulation mechanism associated with the entry of MNFs and related 
regulatory interpretations developed in the last section may suggest links to the 
contestable market theory advocated by Baumol et at. (1982) and more specifically 
to the contestability extension of Ryan (2000). Baumol et at. (1982) and Baumol and 
Willig (1986) put forth a new view of markets that in the absence of sunk cost when 
firms can enter an industry freely and where exit is costless and fast, the behaviour of 
the incumbent firms is always constrained because the incumbent firms may fear `hit 
and run' entry. Since then, the development of the contestability theory has attracted 
other writers including Shepherd (1984), Cairns (1986) and most notably Ryan 
(2000). Shepherd developed a critique of the contestability theory with the 
conclusion that the implicit threat derived from contestability should not shift 
attention from real competition in the market, while Cairns examined the 
contestability theory in the context of uncertainty. The variants of the contestability 
theory by Ryan which may be usefully link to the regulatory context of this chapter 
will be discussed more deeply later. However, inherent in the contestability theory of 
free entry and exit is the implication for regulatory considerations and its potential 
in 
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disciplining incumbent firms in the market. Given such a potential threat, it was 
argued that the key idea is that even a single firm industry might behave as if 
competitive, disciplined by the threat of hit and run tactics by potential new entrants. 
In this context Baumol and Willig (1986 p. 22) explained that the theory of 
contestable market can be helpful in the design of public policy in two ways. First it 
undertakes to provide the criteria to distinguish the cases in which government 
intervention is desirable from those in which it is not and secondly, it seeks to offer 
tools that will increase the public welfare benefits of the intervention. 
A useful extension which is in fact a refinement of the contestability theory is 
provided by Ryan (2000). He considers three key areas that distinguish his 
contestability variants from the contestability ideas of Baumol et al. (1982) and 
Baucool and Willig (1986). These are between physical and financial contestability, 
between market and industrial contestability and a regulation related role which 
refers to the possibility of systematic intervention by regulators by means of taxes or 
subsidies with the purpose of regulating the conditions of the market and could be 
termed as regulated contestability. 
The distinction between physical and financial contestability could among 
other things refer to how investment may be undertaken and to the control of profits 
across a border. In this context we may find that a diversifying MNF may enter a 
market by acquiring existing producers without adding new physical capital or may 
also enter via imports or may also make new physical investment. This 
is physical 
contestability, which refers to the locating of plants in the host country and the 
control of this physical investment, in contrast to financial contestability which 
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relates to the financing of assets or liability in the host country. This is in sharp 
distinction to Baumol et al. (1982) contestable market condition, which refers only to 
new capacity being created in the market and not changes of ownership of existing 
producers or via imports and of financial investments. 
Another distinction is with regard to industrial contestability and market 
contestability, ".......... referring respectively to conditions of entry and exit for the 
marginal potential producer and for the marginal potential supplier in a region" 
(Ryan 2000, pp. 714-715). Clearly models (7.2) and (7.4) have features similar to 
Ryan's market contestability and industrial contestability conditions respectively. 
The government via contingent taxes or subsidies t (t>0) in model (7.2) may vary the 
market contestability conditions - with reference to existing firms and to potential 
firms, for example between multinational supermarket firms and domestic 
supermarket firms competing in the same market. Likewise via conditions, (CZ+W3)59, 
(Ws+ß, s_1) and (c2+W4) in model (7.4) the government may select values of contingent 
tariffs or subsidies to vary the conditions relating to industrial contestability of 
producers where a key distinction relates to the `make or buy', decisions, yl, yz which 
affect contingent cost of potential suppliers - between imports (outside suppliers) and 
local suppliers 
Therefore in order for effective competition to take place between 
multinational and local firms in a context of a regulated market, the regulator may 
consider introducing several contestability-based strategies. Regulators, 
for example 
may consider contestability based legislation to remove barriers that may impede the 
s9 In practice, as was noted earlier, it may be difficult to differentiate between yr3 (internal production) 
and production by outside suppliers (yrs and yr4). 
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international contestability of such markets. Regulators may also consider 
contestability based regulation in the context that was discussed above, where a 
regulator can affect a firm's behaviour by the threat of regulation as well as by 
regulation itself. This may also mean that the regulator may take on the role of a 
potential hit and run entrant in an attempt to influence firms' pricing and output 
decisions and potentially influence their investment decisions too. 
In the above context, the government may use the approach implicit in 
models (7.2), (7.3) and (7.4) to synthesize conditions of potential entry in general and 
for market as well as industrial contestability in particular. This underlines the fact 
that models (7.2), (7.3) and (7.4) may potentially consist of a variety of behaviour 
and entry conditions that may be varied in accordance to the regulated contestability 
ideas. For example, by regulating G1(gl), G2(g2) in model (7.3) the government may 
affect the productivity and efficiency of the MNFs and its subsidiary. Also in the 
context of a regulated contestable market we may look at multinationals operating 
alongside local firms which may eventually be displaced. A way to avoid local 
producers being displaced is to regulate the market conditions, for example 
by 
imposing tariffs on imports, ii in model (7.4) as a mechanism to regulate the process 
of competition. 
In a regulated market we have seen that the regulatory mechanism in 
principle discriminates between national and foreign firms. The government may 
fix 
the entry and exit conditions of certain firms to vary the contestability of the markets. 
This may limit the international contestability of such markets, but a limit to 
contestability may be needed to promote development of local firms and under 
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special conditions (UNCTAD, 1997). In this context, contestability is a matter of a 
degree of the openness to either physical or non-physical capital and in a way is 
related to the entry of FDI and the MNFs. 
7.3 Multinational Firms, FDI and Competition Policy 
In general, Chapter Six has argued that MNFs have firm specific advantages 
which are related to the production method they use, the way in which activities are 
organised and also the way they marketed their products which all these make them 
superior than local firms. Innovation specific advantages of these kinds have been 
seen in the multinational supermarket activity in Malaysia and the specific policy the 
Malaysian government has on this was discussed in Chapter Two. However the 
superiority of the MNFs can become a threat to local firms and this chapter has 
looked at ways in which the superiority may be regulated so that local firms may 
benefit and at the same time entry of the MNFs with innovations is encouraged. 
In reality it is difficult to identify a country that does not regulate inward FDI 
and MNFs in some ways or other, either through official restrictions or official 
approval processes in which the government intervenes directly to affect the level, 
composition or form of foreign investment and multinational activities and also a 
selective level of competition. Admittedly these concerns are voiced principally by 
developing countries but they are not only confined to them, and even in the 
developed countries such as the EU the entry of the MNFs from outside the region 
may be treated differently, as is implicitly seen in the competition policy of the EU. 
185 
In Chapter Six we have looked at how innovation and efficiency stemming 
from vertical integration may lead to efficiency gains such as the elimination of 
double marginalisation and the increase in collective profits. These benefits are 
recognised by the competition authorities as being not against the public interest and 
therefore will not trigger any intervention or investigation by the competition 
authorities. This is consistent with the exemption given under the UK and the EU 
Competition Policy, where vertical integration in the context discussed in Chapter 
Six involving firms operating at a different level of the production or distribution 
chain may be excluded from investigation. The exclusion of vertically integrated 
firms may involve relationships between manufacturers and wholesalers or retailers, 
wholesalers and retailers or even between two wholesalers, provided they are 
operating at different levels of the supply chain. 
Exemptions may also be granted especially in the context of MNFs with 
market power if there are overriding countervailing benefits. These benefits may 
include among others an improvement in efficiency gains from innovation, 
improving production or distribution which results in lower costs and promoting 
technical or economic progress and allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefits. In this regard the competition policy of the UK and the EU may allow 
firms having 25.0 per cent or more of the market shares, provided these firms do not 
abuse their dominant position and market power. In this context we have seen that 
the four largest UK supermarket firms measured by shares of grocery sales in 
1998/1999 controlled 71.2 per cent, with Tesco having 24.6 per cent. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at some kinds of regulation and government policy 
particularly suited to MNFs associated with vertically integrated activities, with 
potential applications including supermarket firms. The host countries are interested 
in ways in which the activities of the MNFs may affect a variety of policy goals. In 
that context models (7.2)-(7.4) have shown how entry of such firms may be regulated 
in specific ways to achieve various goals, including productivity enhancing goals and 
competition enhancing goals. 
It has been shown how governments may choose to regulate entry and 
multinational activities through contingent taxes and subsidies. The tax policy may 
reflect the attractiveness of the host country as an investment destination and 
particularly may affect the level of entry of MNFs. Other things being equal, a lower 
corporate tax in one host country may attract more entry vis-ä-vis other countries. 
However a lower tax rate also implies a loss of revenue. On the other hand a higher 
tax rate imposed on MNFs may also be a mechanism to enhance the survival of local 
firms but may have the unfortunate side effects of reducing foreign investments and 
the efficiency gains associated with multinational entry. 
Similarly the use of contingent subsidies, a may be used as mechanisms to 
attract and regulate the entry of MNFs and their subsidiaries with efficiency and 
productivity enhancing variables, gl, g2 and associated costs Gl(gl), G2(g2). At the 
same time host governments, especially those in developing countries, may also want 
to enhance the efficiency and the productivity variables, gs of local firms via the 
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transfer of technology. Since it is commonly the case that the efficiency and 
productivity enhancing variables of the MNFs are superior to the efficiency variables 
of firms in developing countries (see Pavitt, 1971), then in the context of model (7.3) 
contingent subsidies may also be an effective mechanism to encourage the transfer of 
technology, g1, g2 to local firms. 
This chapter has also looked at the survival of local producers which may be 
affected by the `make or buy' decisions, yl, y2 of the MNFs regarding the acquisition 
of their intermediate inputs. With the assumption that local producers are high costs 
producers, the governments may bring in competition to reduce costs. In this context 
an MNF with its superior gl may produce its intermediate inputs internally, via its 
subsidiary, s-1 with efficiency g2 or through its multinational contacts worldwide 
may import from outside. Limiting all forms of the `make' decision, yl via 
subsidiary production or from imports, in the present model (7.4), would obviously 
imply a higher price for domestic consumers -a trade off which consumers are 
unlikely to accept. An optimal policy measure could be one which strengthens local 
producers, via W4 rather than a policy that hinders the multinationals' ability to 
supply the local market. Such regulatory measures are also potentially consistent 
with WTO transition ideas and probably with the UK and the EU innovation rules. 
Finally, the presence of MNFs may also be subjected to other kinds of public 
intervention, especially by means of national competition policies. However, most 
developing countries do not have formal competition policies but may have 
legislation on the protection of consumers welfare, as is the case in Malaysia. A 
major step forward in such cases would be to promote the implementation of a well 
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developed competition policy in these countries that protects both consumers as well 
as business entities. In this context Malaysia could draw useful lessons particularly 
from the UK and the EU Competition Acts. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
8.0 A Brief Review 
This dissertation has explored the subject of FDI and entry with reference to 
multinational supermarket firms from three distinct perspectives, namely from the 
aggregated FDI theory, from a micro approach using industrial economics literature 
and also from the context of regulation, both in theory and practice. Following the 
introduction, Chapter Two focused on a wider regulatory framework and its potential 
impact on entry and industry development with a contrast between European practice 
and the practice in Malaysia. Within this broader regulatory context, in Chapter 
Three, attention turned to issues of concentration and the determinants of industry 
structure with emphasis on potential entry of multinational supermarket firms into a 
developing economy. A variety of literature which bears on this topic was reviewed 
in that chapter, including literature on industrial economics and on multinationals. 
This more general framework in turn led to the development of four chapters which 
form the core of this dissertation, namely two chapters on FDI (FDI theory and 
empirical modelling of the services-manufacturing distinction), a chapter on vertical 
integration and coordination and a chapter on regulation of entry by MNFs. 
Supermarket firms were used as a class of examples to illustrate the emphasis in 
these chapters on service industry related developments because of the particular 
importance of such firms to the host economy in terms of their economic 
contributions, as well as providing useful examples from the perspective of FDI and 
economic policy. The subject of supermarkets is also useful and distinctive vis-a-vis 
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other firms in services because they can usefully be seen as vertically coordinated or 
integrated organisations combining aspects of both services and manufacturing 
related activities. 
8.1 Some Key Results 
This dissertation has added to the large number of studies on FDI but with a 
different emphasis and methodology. It has looked at services FDI and at 
supermarket firms, in contrast to the preponderance of studies which have 
concentrated on manufacturing FDI. The analysis has not only included the entry of 
FDI and MNFs but has also focused on market structures, vertical integration and 
regulation, where these themes are interrelated and have implications for theory and 
policy. The policy implications are a concern to the host country, especially with 
regard to FDI and regulation mechanism because there might be trade-offs. 
The determinants of entry of services FDI were empirically tested using 
econometric analysis. In the model it was found that the variables that are significant 
to the inflows of services FDI in the UK are inflation rate, openness, interest rates 
and exchange rates, whereas the growth rate and the market size variable 
(GNI) are 
not statistically significant. A potential explanation for this was explored 
in Chapter 
Five where it was argued that foreign investors may consider other 
determinants 
(such as the openness variable) rather than the growth rate, which may not 
be 
sustainable over the long run. In the case of services FDI inflows in 
Malaysia, the 
variable estimations associated with market size, openness, interest rates and 
financial crisis are statistically significant, whereas the variables on growth rate, 
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exchange rate and inflation are not significant. Chapter Five has suggested an 
explanation for the difference on the interest rate variable; it was postulated that 
foreign firms might be bringing in capital from abroad instead of raising funds from 
within because of the high interest rates in the host country. On the exchange rate 
variable, it was argued that an appreciation of the exchange rate may have a negative 
impact on FDI inflows but some economists tend to reject the links between FDI and 
exchange rates. The impact of inflation on FDI is not clear-cut a priori and it was 
argued that it might have negative and also positive impacts on FDI. 
Chapter Five has shown that the magnitudes of the coefficients of the 
variables relative to their standard errors are quite different between services and 
manufacturing FDI for the UK and also for Malaysia. One main variable that is 
central to the finding is the openness variable. This variable is also a key variable in 
the context of regulation, as discussed in Chapter Seven, and this in itself is a novel 
result. The services-manufacturing distinction will have some policy implications for 
governments seeking to attract FDI, particularly in the context of vertical integration, 
multinational firms and regulation, as will be discussed further in Section 8.3 of this 
Chapter. 
However, in common with authors using such methods, the econometric 
studies of FDI undertaken here were aggregated methodologies and also sector 
specific, related to the services-manufacturing FDI distinction but not to micro and 
firm specific analysis. In part because there is a clear distinction 
between 
manufacturing and services FDI, arguably at least for certain purposes a 
disaggregated approach would be more appropriate and this in turn via issues relating 
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to vertical integration and MNFs suggests an interrelation between the two sectors. 
In this context this dissertation went on to look at vertical integration and regulation 
related issues. 
Chapter Six developed a stylised model based on earlier work by Hasan and 
Ryan (2003) looking at potential determinants of whether or not a firm would 
potentially integrate or otherwise. That chapter looked at internal productivity versus 
external productivity issues, which in turn will affect the transfer price. It also 
looked at ways in which an advantage in productivity will affect prices to consumers 
and the nature and degree of integration or coordination with suppliers. Following 
on this, the interpretation of the basic model was extended to look at multinational 
applications. In the context of the `make or buy' decisions it was argued that 
tradeoffs in innovation and efficiency may lead to reductions in outputs by domestic 
suppliers because MNFs may source from their own subsidiaries (integration) or 
from imports rather than from local suppliers. This argument is related to the fact that 
incoming firms (MNFs) have a higher productivity enhancing resources relative to 
local firms. A partial or complete switch by the MNFs from a `make' to a `buy' 
decision may be associated with a higher productivity of local suppliers as compared 
to the acquisition from within (subsidiary) or from imports. The results stemming 
from the interpretations have implications, including potential applications to 
multinational supermarket firms. 
The analysis in Chapter Six on the distributional implications from vertical 
integration also makes a new contribution. By means of multinational interpretations, 
Chapter Six has shown that the distributional benefits stemming from vertical 
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integration may accrue to different nations involving owners of the super profits, 
suppliers and workers, whereas this distinction is not obvious in FDI models using 
aggregated and econometric methods. In this context it was found that the net 
welfare gain to the host nation as a whole is not really evident because only 
consumers may gain in terms of lower prices. 
The regulation model in Chapter Seven on the other hand has shown how 
regulatory environments may affect not only entry decisions but also interactions 
between corporate structures and efficiency. In this context, one key variable that 
has links to regulation was `openness', in ways potentially associated with the 
openness variable which is also central to aggregate FDI model. The difference is 
that in the regulation model the `openness' arises at a disaggregated level, in contrast 
to the aggregated level of the FDI model. At a disaggregated level the government 
may vary the magnitude of the openness variable in at least three different ways, 
namely, directly at the entry level involving taxes, t, indirectly with reference to 
inducement with reference to the efficiency and productivity enhancing resources 
g1, g2 and associated costs G1(gl), G2(g2) and finally with reference to policy at the 
intermediate inputs level, cZ, c2 and imports. The decisions to regulate in each of these 
ways may be based on the policy directions of the host government in particular with 
reference to a wider application on how tariffs and subsidies will affect the `make or 
buy' decisions and the different behaviour and outcome if taxes are charged on the 
profits of the MNFs. These regulatory mechanisms have policy 
implications 
potentially applicable to supermarket firms. The models in Chapters Six and 
Seven 
show how in every case the structure of affected incoming 
firms will change 
depending at which point taxes, tariffs or subsidies are included. 
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8.2 Some Implications for Theory 
The key chapters of this dissertation have looked at FDI theory, vertical 
integration theory and also at regulatory mechanisms in the context of FDI and 
MNFs. A combination of both the macro and micro methodologies has been used in 
ways which demonstrate how both approaches can be useful and can substantially 
contribute towards the understanding of FDI and MNFs and the ways in which they 
may be regulated. 
A prominent theory of FDI which was reviewed in Chapter Five and referred 
to extensively in subsequent chapters in this dissertation was the `eclectic' paradigm 
espoused by Dunning (1991). It consists of an amalgam of approaches which 
Dunning found lacking in the related works of other authors. But, as noted in that 
chapter, Dunning's paradigm has also been criticised on the grounds that it lacks 
deeper explanation of the behaviour of the MNFs, especially in the context where 
now most MNFs have diversified their activities. The `eclectic' paradigm identifies 
three aspects, ownership, locational and internalisation (OLI) specific advantages as 
being the main motivation for FDI flows. However the OLI paradigm does not 
explain the evolution of FDI flows. In this dissertation it was argued that there are 
other shortcomings of existing FDI theories, including that of Dunning. 
A prominent shortcoming of the FDI literature is the essentially 
manufacturing oriented emphasis. In terms of empirical works, most studies on FDI 
also relate to manufacturing firms (see Chapter Five) and little attention has been 
given to services FDI and the vertically integrated nature of the MNFs. The 
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manufacturing emphasis may have been appropriate in the early years of FDI inflows 
but the current and also the future flows of FDI seem to be in the services sector (see 
UNCTAD 2003). Further, associated econometric works (example Beer and Cory, 
1996, Govindan, 1997, Culem, 1988 and Li and Guisinger, 1992) have been 
aggregative and not firm specific and here it has been argued that in order to analyse 
MNFs a micro methodology may be more appropriate. This point was demonstrated 
and underlined by the theme of supermarkets and associated vertical integration and 
regulation issues, which has been maintained throughout this dissertation. This 
microeconomic approach can substantially improve the aggregated FDI approach and 
its results. 
The major variants of the FDI theories, including Dunning's `eclectic' 
paradigm, do not address specifically the manufacturing-services distinction of FDI 
and MNFs. This leads to the motivation in Chapter Five, which pursued the 
manufacturing-services distinction, and it was shown that there is a difference 
between the coefficients associated with the variables at the aggregate level for the 
UK and Malaysia. One of the key results in the distinction is the openness variable, 
which may have implications for policy and regulation. This suggest more arguments 
and a significance for a disaggregated approach that needs to be looked at 
in the 
context of vertical integration (Chapter Six) and regulation (Chapter Seven). 
Again, 
this was not highlighted by the `eclectic' paradigm, which is macro in methodology. 
A prima facie case for disaggregation and sector specific analysis stems 
from its 
usefulness for policy related purposes, which is sharper to 
draw than the macro 
approach. 
196 
A further extension of the micro approach adopted in this dissertation is on 
regulation, whereas in the standard FDI model and literature on FDI there is no direct 
mention of regulation in the context of entry of FDI and the MNFs. The resulting 
regulatory model has looked at a wider application of the openness variable on the 
impact of regulation on FDI which was not looked at by the FDI model. The 
regulation model has shown how the effect of varying the magnitude of the openness 
variable such as raising or lowering the barriers on taxes and subsidies will have an 
impact on market structures, leading to integration or disintegration. It was also 
shown in Chapter Seven that issues regarding regulation and entry could also be 
usefully linked to the implicit regulatory mechanism of the contestability theory and 
in particular to regulated contestability ideas, especially with regard to two useful 
distinctions between physical and financial contestability and between market and 
industrial contestability. 
A focus on a disaggregated approach was also used to highlight the fact that 
standard FDI theory has not distinguished between financial capital and 
human 
capital. In fact the measurement of FDI as defined by the IMF, 1993 and 
UNCTAD, 
1998 refers to FDI as cross border transfer of funds, which is financial capital. In the 
context of services FDI, human capital may be significant and financial capital may 
be only the complementary factor in this sector. Therefore FDI is also about the 
transfer of non financial capabilities. In this context, the human capital may 
be 
linked with the efficiency and productivity enhancing resources associated with the 
vertical integration model that was looked at in Chapter Six, where it was argued 
that 
MNFs have a higher productivity vis-a-vis local firms. 
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8.3 Some Implications for Policy 
This section will look at the policy implications both in general and also in 
the context of Malaysia. In Chapter Two, this dissertation has traced the regulation 
practices of Malaysia (developing) and also, in contrast, those of the UK (developed). 
In that chapter it was shown that government intervention in the retail trading sector 
in Malaysia is pervasive in contrast to the manufacturing sector. The retail trading 
sector is subjected to legislative acts (such as Price Control Acts, 1946 and Control 
of Supplies Act, 1961) as well as administrative control (minimum capital 
requirement and equity policy). This intervention is postulated on the grounds of 
curbing inflation and income distribution. The main policy implications of these 
interventions are the impact on the industry structure which will affect supply and 
demand as well as prices, and will lead to inefficiency in the industry. In addition 
there will also be costs of monitoring of prices and enforcement of these acts. In 
contrast, the UK relied upon the Competition Act (1998) which has links to 
efficiency and also to regulation. 
The equity policy that was also discussed intensively in Chapter Two is not 
only peculiar to Malaysia but is also found in other developing countries as well. In 
the retailing sector, a foreign firm is required to form a joint venture company with 
local firms, especially with the Bumiputera group. This policy was designed in the 
context of income distribution but the impact of limiting foreign equity in the retail 
trading sector (including supermarket) may have implications, such that it may stifle 
and discourage entry of FDI and MNFs which is needed especially from the 
perspective of innovation and as drivers of development. In addition, the equity 
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policy is not effective in increasing Bumiputera participation in the corporate sector, 
since as Chapter Three has shown, multinational supermarket firms have difficulty in 
finding suitable local partners with financial capital capability. Furthermore, it was 
found that some Bumiputera firms are only used as `window dressing' rather than 
becoming active business partners. 
It was also shown that antitrust legislation or competition policy in Malaysia 
is largely missing (there is only the Consumer Protection Act, 1999), whereas in the 
UK, competition policy and related laws are well developed. In the absence of post 
entry regulation or competition policy, this means that Malaysia has no particular 
view or policy on dominant position and market power and matters arising from 
these, such as abuses of dominant position and anti competitive conduct may not be 
addressed. One policy implication will be that this may affect Malaysia's 
international competitiveness in attracting FDI and MNFs, since in theory 
competition policy is an imposed level playing field with rules applying to all. 
Therefore the antitrust legislation or competition policy is arguably important 
for Malaysia, and useful lessons in this respect could be drawn from the UK and the 
EU. One such lesson is that the approach towards dominant position may be different 
in the context of Malaysia and hence the emphasis in policy will also be different. In 
Malaysia the emphasis may be more on innovation and efficiency rather than 
concern with unfair use of dominant position and market power. This is in contrast to 
the UK and the EU, where innovation is secondary to the issue of unfair use of a 
dominant position. 
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Chapter Three has shown that Malaysia is an attractive location for 
multinational supermarket firms. It now hosts several of them, including some of the 
world largest supermarket firms, Carrefour of France and Tesco of the UK. The 
entry of these MNFs is a new source of FDI associated with innovation that has 
brought radical change to the supermarket sector but at the same time has affected 
sales from local supermarket firms. The innovation and efficiency of these firms are 
clearly evident. Within a short time, these firms have established a dominant position 
and have captured a significant share (see Table 3.8) of the supermarket sales vis-ä- 
vis local firms. As was argued earlier, the development policy in Malaysia is to 
encourage innovation, and issues of dominance and market power are secondary, 
unlike the UK and the EU. 
Chapter Four has looked at the FDI theory, and it was argued that there are 
shortcomings of the theory but nevertheless relevant in explaining FDI and MNFs in 
general. Empirical work on the entry of FDI was carried out in Chapter Five in the 
context of the manufacturing-services distinction, where determinants on market size, 
growth, openness, inflation, interest rates and the exchange rates were tested. One 
result of the econometric work is that the coefficients of the variables (relative to 
their standard errors) between services and manufacturing FDI exhibit a difference. 
In particular a key determinant in the econometric work is the openness variable. 
One policy implication suggests that an open policy is both desirable for 
manufacturing as well as services FDI and will attract more investors vis-ä-vis 
countries with barriers to entry. In the FDI model, the openness variable measures 
tariffs but in general openness may also refer to policies that restrict entry, such as 
the equity policy in Malaysia. In this context, it is therefore essential for a small 
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economy such as Malaysia to review its openness policy if it is to attract more FDI. 
Other things equal, apart from bringing in capital, MNFs have higher productivity 
and or lower costs. They may also bring in innovation which may be transferred to 
local firms. We considered phenomena of this kind in Chapter Six. 
In Chapter Six this dissertation has looked at vertical integration in the 
context of the MNFs with potential applications to multinational supermarket firms. 
It was shown that there may be some policy implications stemming from the `make 
or buy' decisions and the efficiency and productivity enhancing resources. Since 
MNFs are often vertically integrated, the different outcomes on the `make or buy' 
decisions may have an impact on industry structure leading to integration or 
disintegration. Local suppliers may or may not benefit from the decisions, for 
instance if the multinational supermarket firms decided to source internally (vertical 
integration) or via imports for reasons stemming from lower transfer price, better 
quality and higher efficiency. If the policy is to encourage local production at the 
expense of efficiency and productivity of the MNFs, there may be tradeoffs, for 
example, between lower prices in supermarkets that benefit consumers arising from 
efficiency of the MNFs (via vertical integration or imports) and higher prices by 
relatively less efficient local suppliers. A longer term policy objective would be to 
provide incentives in order to encourage the integration of local suppliers with the 
multinational supermarket firms, particularly with a view of transferring technology 
so that local suppliers may become more efficient producers over time. 
As well as technology transfer, there is also technological spill-over from the 
efficiency and productivity enhancing resources of the MNFs. This spill-over may 
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come from competition, labour mobility and also through imitation. The 
technological spill-over may also benefit local firms and of relative importance to the 
development objectives of Malaysia. On the other hand, as well as being potentially 
productivity enhancing, MNFs may also be particularly threatening sources of FDI, 
as was discussed in Chapter Three. However, a pragmatic policy approach is 
therefore to look at the entry of the MNFs with a view to benefit from their presence 
that will synthesize change in the domestic firms, rather than to restrict entry. 
In terms of regulatory mechanisms, this dissertation has looked at a wider 
framework of regulatory policy and ways in which entry of FDI and MNFs may be 
regulated including, potentially, supermarket firms. As well as considering openness 
in an aggregated econometric context in the FDI model, this dissertation has looked 
both in general and specific ways how openness may affect or be affected by 
regulatory policies on FDI entry (magnitude and profits), market structures 
(integration or disintegration) and efficiency (innovation and productivity), bearing 
in mind that the government may vary the entry conditions in line with the national 
objectives of the host country. From the perspective of policy, a competitive 
regulatory policy relative to other countries will ensure that investments are not 
affected while at the same time government priorities are not compromised and local 
supermarket firms as well as local suppliers are not worse off. 
Malaysia is a small economy, seen by its government as dependent on FDI, 
and the MNFs are viewed as the catalyst for growth and development. The work 
here suggests that from the policy point of view it is therefore imperative for 
Malaysia to beef up its openness policy as one way of attracting more FDI in order to 
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stay competitive vis-a-vis other countries and at the same time encourage 
competition to enhance the productivity of local firms. But this is not to say that the 
entry of FDI must not be regulated, because unregulated entry will present a threat to 
local firms. 
8.4 Future Work 
This dissertation has paved the way for the analysis on vertically integrated 
MNFs (including supermarket firms) from a number of different approaches 
including the FDI theory, the vertical integration approach and also regulation issues. 
It has looked at both the aggregated and macro approach, as well as the 
disaggregated and micro methodology, each of which has looked at specific issues 
but in a way interrelated with each other. 
However much remains to be done. Firstly, it is suggested that a case study 
on multinational supermarket firms (such as Tesco or Carrefour) would be valuable 
to the analysis on vertical integration in the context of the quality variable, the 
productivity and efficiency enhancing variables and the `make or buy' decision and 
in this way the stylised model may be tested. In the context of a double monopoly 
model, besides the `make or buy' decisions as discussed in Chapter Six, ways in 
which the price of the intermediate good are actually determined may be investigated 
further. In addition, future work should also quantify the distributional gains of 
vertical integration with regard to super profits, suppliers, and consumers. 
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Secondly, much more work needs to be done on the regulation issues 
regarding the costs and benefits of taxes and subsidies. In this context, using a 
parameterised model would be helpful to calculate transfers, welfare gains and dead 
weight loses arising from the various possibilities of taxes and subsidies. Finally, an 
overall model is also suggested for future work to take into account the firm's 
reaction with regard to taxes and subsidies set by the government. 
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Appendix 2.1 
List of Goods under the Control of Supplies Act, 1961 
1. Controlled at all times 
Food Items 
Sugar 
Milk - includes powdered, condensed milk and liquid milk 
Salt 
Flour 
Cooking Oil 
Rice, all types 
Bread 
Non Food Items 
Rubber wood 
Cement and clinker 
Fertilizer 
Pesticide 
Cast Iron Rod 
Kerosene 
Petrol and Diesel 
2. List of Food Items Controlled during Festive Season 
All types of butter and cheese 
All `halal' bottle drinks 
All type of cooking oil 
Coconut 
Groundnuts 
Mushroom 
Jelly 
Meat and meat products Fruits 
Poultry Onions and garlic 
Prawns Chili 
Eggs Pepper 
Sea Products Rice flour 
Maize flour 
Potatoes 
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Appendix 5.3 
Table 5.2 
Determinants of Manufacturing and Services FDI Inflows in the UK 
Variables Real Services FDI UK Real Manufacturing FDI UK 
Constant 0.89 70.82 11.38 16.28 1.85 4.92 
(0.11) (5.43) (0.59) (1.78) (0.18) (0.76) 
Real GNLI 0.69 -1.90 0.27 0.12 0.79 0.56 
(2.14) (-4.40) (0.33) (0.36) (2.08) (2.28) 
AGDP 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.15 -0.12 -0.13 
(1.60) (0.91) (0.49) (-4.78) (-3.09) (-5.55) 
Inflation 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.01 
(10.4) (8.84) (4.12) (1.67) (5.690 (6.85) 
Exchange rate -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 
(-8.40) (-8.20) (-10.2) (-1.88) (-1.27) (-2.21) 
Lending rates- -0.15 -0.13 -0.14 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 
Libor (-6.37) (-5.31) (-3.53) (-3.16) (-4.23) (-4.79) 
M/GDP 11.21 - - 7.13 - - 
(8.80) (10.68) 
X/GDP - 18.92 - - 9.92 - 
(3.78) (4.62) 
M+X/GDP - - 7.38 - 
4.6 
(3.99) (8.32) 
Adj. R . 72 . 
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Table 5.3 
Determinants of Manufacturing and Services FDI Inflows in Malaysia 
Variables Services FDI 
Malaysia 
Manufacturing FDI 
Malaysia 
Constant -51.69 -78.37 -52.39 -1.65 -1.89 -1.20 
(-1.55) (-3.74) (-2.13) (-3.77) (-7.19) (-3.70) 
Real GNL1 2.77 3.89 2.78 1.02 1.03 0.99 
(2.00) (4.49) (2.73) (47.7) (71.8) (60.70) 
AGDP 0.04 0.01 0.19 -0.005 0.01 -0.004 
(1.13) (0.24) (0.64) (-1.92) (2.16) (-2.55) 
Inflation 0.03 0.02 0.21 0.002 0.01 0.001 
(1.40) (0.78) (1.05) (-1.42) (2.15) (1.06) 
Exchange rate -0.08 2.14 -0.69 -0.38 -0.19 -0.22 
(-0.04) (1.23) (-1.10) (-2.82) (-1.22) (-2.42) 
Lending rates- 0.13 0.15 0.14 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
Libor (2.30) (2.60) (2.89) (-1.76) (1.690 (-2.35) 
D1 (crisis) -0.69 -1.05 -0.78 
(-0.17) 0.11 -0.15 
(-1.24) (-2.31) (-1.78) (-2.63) (1.78) (-3.09) 
M/GDP 3.93 - - 1.30 - - 
(2.14) ((7.39) 
X/GDP - 2.16 - - 
1.23 - 
(2.38) (13.2) 
M+X/GDP - - 1.89 - - 
0.68 
(2.99) (12.30) 
Adi. R 92 . 91 . 93 . 
90 . 91 . 
90 
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Appendix 6.1 
Associating Lagrange multipliers X and _1 with the constraints of 
(6.3), the 
corresponding Lagrangean is: - 
Max 1t3=n3*=P5(xs)xs wLs rKs wLs-i-rKS-i-czs-, -, ks[xs fs(LS, K,, y, )I 
-Xs-i[YS-fs i(LS i'Ks i'zs i)] (6.3)* 
Necessary Conditions for a Maximum 
xs >_0 8&3/8xs = P(Xs) + Xs bp/8xs -k<0 
LS>O S7L3/8LS = -w + 1S öfs/8LS 50 
Ks >_0 8713/SKS = -r + XS bfS/8KS <0 
Ys >_0 87t3/8y = -ks 1+ kS 8fs/8ys <0 
Ls-1 ?0 8713/8LS- ,= -w + ks-18fs-1/8LS-1 <0 
KS-i >0 8713/8KS -i = -r 
+ XS-i Sfs-1/8KS-i <0 
zS-1 ?0 8t3/SZ = -c + Xs-18fs-1/8z <0 
(6.3.1) 
(6.3.2) 
(6.3.3) 
(6.3.4) 
(6.3.5) 
(6.3.6) 
(6.3.7) 
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Appendix 6.2 
Proof 
There are three possibilities 
" ks_, =p(ys_, *). In this case n3*=n1*+it2* and vertical integration/coordination 
would yield the same overall value as independent profit maximization at 
levels s and s-1. 
" ? S_1>p(ys_1*). In this case profits contributed at 
level s-1 are reduced vis a vis 
an optimum to (6.2) since p(ys_1)* is associated with a profit maximizing 
solution to (6.2). Under this condition, too, profit at level s must be reduced vis 
a vis and optimum to (6.1) since unit costs of inputs ys_1 are then increased vis a 
vis an optimum solution to (6.2), it follows that, if XS_>>p(ys_i *), that solution 
cannot be optimal in (6.3). 
" 4s_1<p(ys_1*). In this case profits contributed at level s-1 will again be decreased 
vis a vis an optimum to (6.2) since p(ys_, *) is associated with a profit 
maximizing solution to (6.2). But in this case the profit contribution at level s 
would be increased, since unit costs of inputs ys_, are then decreased vis a vis 
an optimum solution to (6.2). 
It follows that a necessary condition for an increase in overall profit such that it3*> 
lt1 *+lt2* is %S_, <p(ys_, *) and thence, by the concavity of p(ys_1 *), that ys_, >ys_I *. 
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Appendix 6.3 
Associating Lagrange multipliers 0, a, s and _1 with the constraints of 
(6.4), the 
corresponding Lagrangean is: - 
Maximising Conditions 
Max 7t4 =7t4*= ps(xs, q) xs-wL, - rKs-wLs-i-rKs-i-CzZs-i-c2Y2-Gi(gi)-G2(b2)-Q(q) 
-9(ys-Yi-ya)-ks[xs-fs(Ls, K,, y, 'gl)]-XS-i[Yi-fs-i(Ls-i'Ks-i'zs->>gz)] 
(6.4)* 
Necessary conditions for a maximum to (6.4)* are: - 
02t4/bxs = P(Xs) + Xs bp/8xs - kS <0 (6.4.1) 
S7L4/ÖLS = -w + kS 8fS/6LS 50 (6.4.2) 
8714/SKS = -r + kS bfs/8KS <0 (6.4.3) 
8t418ys =-0+ Is 8fs/8ys 50 (6.4.4) 
8714/öLs-1 = -w + Xs-1 bfs-1/8Ls-1 <0 (6.4.5) 
8714/8Ks-1 = -r + Xs-1 öfs-1/SKs-1 <0 (6.4.6) 
8&t4/6z = -c + IS-15fs-1/8z <0 
(6.4.7) 
87U4/Sq = x, öps(xs, q)/8q - SQ(q)/8q <0 (6.4.8) 
8714/8y1 =0- 2's-1 <0 (6.4.9) 
87U4/8y2 =0- C2 <0 (6.4.10) 
8714/891 =- SG1(gl)/bgl + ks 8fs/Sgl<0 (6.4.11) 
874/892 =- 8G2(g2)/892 + kS 8fs/Sg2<0 (6.4.12) 
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